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ABSTRACT 
EXECUTIVE LEADERSHIP AND POLITICAL DECISION-MAKING: 
A CASE STUDY OF THE DEVELOPMENT AND EVOLUTION OF THE 
COMMUNITY COLLEGE SYSTEM IN THE COMMONWEALTH 
OF MASSACHUSETTS 
1957-1962 
SEPTEMBER 1994 
JAMES H. MULLEN, JR., B.S., COLLEGE OF THE HOLY CROSS 
M.S., HARVARD UNIVERSITY 
Ed.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
Directed by: Professor William C. Wolf, Jr. 
Politics plays an inevitable and integral role in the 
development of policy concerning higher education at the 
state level. Governors are fundamental to the political 
process of statewide higher education policymaking. This 
study examines the role which two governors played in the 
early development of community colleges in Massachusetts 
between 1957 and 1962. 
The purpose of this study is essentially two-fold. 
First, it seeks to tell a political story about two 
governors of different personalities, parties, and policy 
priorities. Focusing on the common historical theme of 
community college development, this story presents how the 
contexts of their times influenced the strategies and 
decisions of Foster Furcolo (1957-1960) and John Volpe 
(1961-1962) and how, in turn, these two men shaped the 
period in which they lived. 
The second purpose of this study is to analyze 
specifically how Furcolo and Volpe influenced the critical 
vi 
early years of community college development in 
Massachusetts. Furcolo held a passionate policy commitment 
to community colleges and his passion is largely 
responsible for their gestation and birth. Volpe was less 
personally committed, yet his administration witnessed a 
marked increase in funding and pace of campus planning. 
Analysis of this irony holds a number of significant 
lessons concerning gubernatorial responsibilities for 
policy formulation, legislative leadership, and public 
opinion leadership. 
This dissertation utilizes a case study research modus 
operandi. It includes a literature review which focuses on 
works related to politics and policy-making in higher 
education, as well as the American governorship and the 
range of gubernatorial power. 
The results of this study offer insights into how 
governors use the powers of their office to shape the 
policies of their eras and beyond. It also provides a view 
of how two different governors engaged the specific policy 
issue of community college development within the context 
of other demands and policy concerns of their 
administrations. Finally, it offers tightly defined 
lessons for the relationship between governors and higher 
education in contemporary times. 
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CHAPTER I 
GOALS AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
Statement of the Problem 
Politics and political institutions play an 
inevitable role in shaping the community college mission in 
Massachusetts as well as in other states. Governors, 
legislators, regulatory boards and county and local 
officials provide the enabling legislation for such 
institutions, establish the ground rules under which 
community colleges operate and set the budget 
authorizations that fund college programs. Moreover, the 
community college commitment to comprehensiveness, 
affordability and open access make such institutions a 
logical vehicle for public officials who seek a guick and 
visible response to issues ranging from labor force 
training to developmental education. Finally, by 
definition community colleges are intimately tied to local 
needs. Such intimacy weds community colleges to state, 
county and local political processes. 
While much has been written concerning the history of 
community colleges (Bogue, 1950; Monroe, 1972; Witt, 1988; 
Cohen, 1989; Witt, Wattenbarger, Gollattscheck, & Suppiger, 
1994) and an important body of work is developing related 
to issues of class and economic development at two-year 
colleges (Clark, 1960; Blocker, Plummer, & Richardson, 
1965; Zwerling, 1976; Brint & Karabel, 1989), comparatively 
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little research exists concerning the role of politics and 
political institutions in shaping the community college 
mission. Most such research is reported in chapters of 
general texts (Tillery, et al., 1985; Cohen & Drawer, 1989; 
Brint & Karabel, 1989), in portions of dissertations 
(Asquino, 1976; Bartley, 1985; Whitaker, 1989) and in 
unpublished papers (Lustberg, 1979) or in occasional 
articles (Katsimas, 1993). 
The work of scholars such as Fabian and Lustberg 
emphasizes the legislative perspective, focusing on how the 
Legislature has historically influenced the mission of 
community colleges in Massachusetts. Conversely, the role 
of the governor in defining that mission has received 
minimal scholarly attention. 
A small but growing body of literature examines the 
policy relationship of governors and higher education. 
However, while the writings of such authors as Goodall, 
Lederle, Eulau and Quinley each provide useful insights 
into executive branch policymaking vis-a-vis public higher 
education, their analyses emphasize the actions of specific 
governors toward statewide higher education systems or 
toward large and unwieldy research universities. Almost no 
specific attention is paid to the policymaking goals and 
influence of governors concerning community colleges. 
Moreover, while this growing body of literature offers 
useful analyses of systems in states such as Wisconsin and 
California, it does not relate specifically to the 
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situation in Massachusetts, a case study which is in many 
ways unique. 
The absence of scholarship pertaining to the central 
policymaking role of the executive branch in Massachusetts 
is unfortunate. Bartley has called the governor "the chief 
legislator” (interview, 11/26/90), for it is the executive 
branch which sets the policy agenda for government in 
Massachusetts. The governor's annual budget requests to 
the Legislature establish the basic parameters for policy 
debate, while constitutional powers such as the veto 
provide gubernatorial leverage over legislative action. 
Executive branch appointments to cabinet and sub-cabinet 
posts provide the leadership for key departments and 
program initiatives. Moreover, the governor personally 
commands extensive media attention and can utilize this 
visibility to focus the policy debate on issues of 
importance to him or her. 
Since the 1960s, public higher education in 
Massachusetts has expanded greatly in size and has earned a 
more prominent position in the policy debate on Beacon 
Hill. From fifteen institutions (UMass, ten state 
colleges, the Massachusetts Maritime Academy, three 
technical institutes) in 1957, public higher education had 
grown to twenty-nine institutions by 1990 with a total 
budget of some $700 million. 
The public community college system in the 
Commonwealth had grown since 1960 into fifteen institutions 
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by 1990 with a total annual budget of over $120 million. 
More than 100,000 community college students attended 
classes during the day and evening in the Fall of 1990. 
This growth has occurred within a context that is 
unique in three important ways. First, public higher 
education co-exists with Massachusetts' unmatched array of 
private colleges and universities. This reality has 
historically affected the priority given public higher 
education by political decision-makers in the Commonwealth. 
Moreover, the funding mechanism for community colleges in 
Massachusetts is unlike that in most of the rest of the 
nation. State dollars fund higher education, with no 
contribution from either local or county government. 
Finally, evening educational progrcuns receive no state 
support and must be self-supporting. 
As is the case across the country, the Commonwealth's 
community colleges are committed to comprehensiveness and 
to open access as they struggle to balance diverse mandates 
which include career progreans, transfer curricula, 
developmental coursework and contract training. With 
attrition rates at some institutions exceeding fifty 
percent and vocational programs dominating an increasing 
portion of community college curricula, however, a number 
of scholars such as Zwerling and Karabel have asked whether 
the community college commitment to open access offers 
little more than false promises to the lower socioeconomic 
classes of American society. 
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It is important to build on the current scholarship 
concerning the factors which influence the mission of the 
Commonwealth's public two-year colleges. A full 
excunination of the community college mission in 
Massachusetts should entail consideration of the role 
played by political institutions and personalities, 
including the Commonwealth's chief executive. The present 
study has sought to contribute to this effort by examining 
how two gubernatorial administrations influenced 
development of the Massachusetts community college system 
between 1957 and 1962. 
The period 1957-1962 provides a useful case history of 
gubernatorial influence upon the Commonwealth's community 
colleges. First, it encompasses their birth and early 
development. Second, it provides a window on two 
governors, Foster Furcolo and John Volpe, who belonged to 
different parties, possessed very different personalities, 
held different priorities, faced different political 
dynamics, encountered different crises and left different 
legacies. Both, however, affected the early formation of 
Massachusetts community colleges in a positive manner. 
Finally, in examining the period 1957-1962, this study 
concentrates on a manageable case history. A great danger 
in historical research is to grasp too grand a topic, only 
to lose focus and become mired in volumes of disconnected 
data. This study analyzes a tightly defined period of 
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gubernatorial activity, thus forming a solid foundation for 
future research of subsequent administrations. 
The clearest and most direct impact of the executive 
branch on community colleges came at the time of their 
authorization by the Legislature in 1958. Perhaps more 
than any other individual, Governor Foster Furcolo is 
responsible for the birth of the community college in 
Massachusetts. Proposals for two-year colleges had been 
presented to the Legislature periodically since a 1922 
study by George Zook recommended inclusion of junior 
colleges in a general expansion of the Commonwealth's 
public higher education system. It was Furcolo, however, 
influenced by community college programs in other states 
(particularly Florida) and seeking to provide comprehensive 
institutions that would "allow students to pursue whatever 
type of educational program they needed" (Furcolo, 
interview 1988), who was the first Massachusetts governor 
to make community colleges a cornerstone of his legislative 
progrcim. His personal commitment and stewardship, combined 
with that of key supporters in the Commonwealth's House and 
Senate, was the most critical factor in the 1958 passage of 
legislation (Chapter 605 of the General Laws of 1958) 
authorizing the development of community colleges in 
Massachusetts. 
The nearly two-year period between Furcolo's first 
formal call for a community college system in his 1957 
inaugural address and the passage of Chapter 605 offers a 
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number of important insights into both early evolution of 
the community college mission in Massachusetts and the 
policymaking and legislative processes in the Commonwealth. 
It also provides a clear example of how the steady support 
of a chief executive can combine with the goals and 
ambitions of individual legislators to drive major policy 
development. It is no coincidence that the first two 
community colleges in Massachusetts were established in 
Pittsfield and Hyannis, home respectively to Representative 
Thomas Wojtkowski and Senator George Stone, two key 
supporters of Furcolo's initiative. 
Although scholars such as Lustberg have described 
Furcolo's leadership in developing support for community 
colleges in Massachusetts, the case offers fertile ground 
for analysis as both a study in policy development and as 
the critical first phase of executive branch influence over 
the evolving community college mission in Massachusetts. 
The role of subsequent administrations has received 
even less historical analysis, despite important 
developments related to the mission of public higher 
education in general and community colleges in particular. 
For example. Governor Volpe's role in the historical 
development of community colleges has been essentially 
unexplored. His first administration (1960-62) provides a 
particularly informative contrast to the Furcolo era. 
Whereas his predecessor held community colleges as a 
personal priority, Volpe's fundamental policy focus lay 
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elsewhere, particularly in capital projects and political 
reform. Despite Volpe's relative lack of attention, 
however, the Massachusetts community college system 
continued to expand, thanks largely to support from key 
legislators and a strong governing board and the governor's 
willingness to endorse continuation of his predecessor's 
two-year college program. 
This study sets the two administrations in the 
historical and political context of their times. It 
examines the personalities of Furcolo and Volpe as well as 
the priorities and predispositions each brought to office. 
Finally, and most significantly, it analyzes their relative 
influence over the development of community colleges and 
their mission in Massachusetts during the critical era of 
1957-62. 
While scholars have examined the history of community 
colleges in Massachusetts and explored the roles of 
legislators, statewide education officials, private 
businesses and individual college presidents in shaping 
institutional mission, almost no research has incorporated 
a detailed analysis of the role played by the 
Commonwealth's governors. Although the personal interest 
of individual governors has varied from the very direct 
role played by Furcolo to Volpe's less focused attention, 
every governor has played some part in influencing the 
mission of community colleges in Massachusetts. At the 
very least, they have approved the opening of such 
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institutions, set budget authorizations for them and 
appointed college trustees as well as other key officials 
who have directly influenced the community college mission. 
Purpose of the Study 
The present study addresses the role of the 
Massachusetts governor in shaping the early development and 
mission of community colleges in the Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts. Specifically, it examines how the actions 
and inactions of the governor and key executive agencies 
influenced the evolving mission of the commonwealth's 
community colleges between 1957 and 1962. 
The primary research questions which guided this study 
are: 
1. What role, if any, did the executive branch play 
in shaping the mission of community colleges in 
Massachusetts during the period in question? 
2. How was that role shaped by the individual 
priorities of the governor in question and the 
historical context in which that governor served 
the commonwealth? 
3. Who were the other key political actors who 
influenced development of community colleges and 
their mission in Massachusetts? 
4. What is an appropriate policy role for the 
governor in shaping the mission of community 
colleges in the commonwealth? 
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Meaning of the Terms 
For the purpose of this study, the terms community 
college, primary sources, secondary sources, executive 
branch, fiscal year, legislature, and political institution 
have been defined. 
Community College - While several definitions exist in 
the literature, the two most appropriate for use in the 
study are found in Cohen and Brawer's The American 
Community College and in Deyo's 1967 examination of the 
Massachusetts Community college system. Access to Quality 
Community College Opportunity - The former defines a 
community college as "any institution accredited to award 
the Associate in Arts or the Associate in Science as its 
highest degree (p. 4). Deyo recognizes the comprehensive 
aspect of these institutions when he writes, "the community 
college, by definition, is a growing, changing institution 
responding in its program and services to the changing 
needs of the region and of society" (p. 3). 
Executive Branch - For purposes of this study, the 
executive branch will be considered to include the 
governor, his or her immediate staff as well as all staff 
and agencies which report to the governor or to a member of 
his or her staff. 
Fiscal Year - The fiscal year in the Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts runs from July 1 of a year through June 30 of 
the following year. For example. Fiscal Year 1960 would 
encompass the period July 1, 1959 through June 30, 1960. 
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Legislature - The Massachusetts Legislature is 
bicameral with a House of Representatives and a Senate. 
Political Institution - This study considered any 
institution whose chief executive officer or board is 
elected or appointed by elected officials to be a political 
institution. 
Primary Source - Travers defines a primary source as 
"one which has had some direct physical relationship to the 
events that are being reconstructed" (1969, p. 383). This 
study considered as primary sources those individuals 
directly involved in development of the Massachusetts 
community college mission, documents written by these 
individuals and newspaper articles written by direct 
observers of the evolving community colleges. 
Secondary Sources - Travers (1969, p. 383) defines 
secondary sources as "those that do not bear a direct 
physical relationship to the event that is the subject of 
study." This study considered as secondary sources 
individuals who have examined the Massachusetts political 
scene and/or the evolution of community colleges in the 
Commonwealth but who were not directly related to that 
scene or that evolution, as well as writings by scholars 
who have studied the American community college movement. 
The same consideration was given to other sources not 
directly related to the evolution of Massachusetts 
community colleges or to the political institutions that 
have influenced that evolution since 1956. 
11 
significance of the Study 
Significant research exists pertaining to the 
historical evolution of community colleges at the national 
level, as does literature which analyzes the economic and 
social effects of such institutions. Included aunong these 
studies are important examinations of the role of community 
colleges within the Massachusetts higher education system. 
As noted earlier, however, the role of key state and 
local political institutions in shaping the mission of 
Massachusetts community colleges has received relatively 
limited scholarly attention, while the influence of 
individual governors has been the subject of almost no 
focused research. The theoretical significance of this 
study lies in its emphasis upon the relative role played by 
the executive branch in the early development and mission 
of community colleges in the Commonwealth. 
Furthermore, the present study provides a case study 
of policy development within the Massachusetts state 
political structure. From this study, useful lessons have 
emerged as to how policy priorities evolve (or fail to 
evolve) within Massachusetts state government and how the 
executive branch interacts with other key institutions of 
government such as the Legislature. 
This study is also significant in that its results may 
provide a foundation for recommendations as to what role is 
appropriate for the executive branch in influencing the 
mission of community colleges in Massachusetts. Such 
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recommendations should provide salient data to those who 
will advise the current administration as well as future 
governors concerning the process of educational policy 
development in Massachusetts. 
Delimitations of the Study 
There are five specific limitations to this study. 
First, its scope is restricted to Massachusetts. While 
community colleges in Massachusetts share many 
characteristics (e.g., commitment to open access) with 
similar institutions in other states, there are important 
differences in history, size, governance and financing 
between Massachusetts community colleges and those in other 
parts of the country. In particular, community colleges in 
Massachusetts operate within a state characterized by 
exceptional private institutions, a fact which has 
historically influenced resource allocation to public 
higher education. Moreover, governance and funding at 
community colleges in the commonwealth have been dominated 
by the state and (until 1980), by an appointed statewide 
governing body, the Massachusetts Board of Regional 
Community Colleges. Conversely, in many other states 
county and local governments play a central role in 
governance and funding while local boards of trustees are 
elected. Appropriations to community colleges in 
Massachusetts flow solely from the state (again, no role 
for county and local governments) and state dollars support 
only day programs. 
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The second major limitation of this study is its focus 
on community colleges. While examining the executive 
branch's role in shaping the community college mission will 
provide useful insights into governance at the state level, 
it is important not to assume that all observations are 
fully generalizable to other inter-governmental 
relationships or to other parts of the higher education 
system. 
The third significant limitation of this study is its 
focus on a circumscribed period of six years. While 
failure to so constrain this research effort would lead to 
diffusion and unwieldiness, it is important to remember 
that the late 1950s and the early 1960s were in many ways a 
unique era in the histories of Massachusetts and the United 
States. Thus, any extrapolation or generalization of this 
study's results must be carefully circumscribed. 
The fourth limitation of the study is its reliance on 
primary resources and, most specifically, on interviews 
with key figures in the development of public higher 
education policy in Massachusetts during the past three 
decades. The limitation of source materials creates a 
research constraint best summarized by John Whitaker (1989) 
who faced a similar dilemma in completing his doctoral 
research: 
Ultimately a study can never completely reveal 
the motivation of participants in an event no 
matter how complete the record. It cannot 
completely recreate, for purpose of analysis, the 
total context within which a series of events 
took place some twenty years in the past. It can 
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never fully document the genesis of a new idea or 
change of attitude among a group of decision 
makers. This study was limited by the necessity 
to work largely with the written and printed 
record and limited as well by the all too human 
tendency of participants to forget, to embellish 
or to misconstrue events in which they played a 
significant role. (p. 32) 
The final limitation grows from the personal 
involvement of the author in the Commonwealth's community 
college system. Although an earnest effort at impartiality 
has been made, it is impossible for the author to approach 
this study without a set of predispositions concerning the 
role of the community colleges in Massachusetts higher 
education. 
This study looked to the evolution of community 
colleges in Massachusetts as an historical case which could 
contribute to the literature concerning educational 
policymaking at the executive level of state government. 
Before making broad extrapolations, however, the reader 
should keep in mind that the study focuses on a single 
state that has a rather unique higher education pedigree 
and on a community college system whose development has 
been influenced by that pedigree. 
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CHAPTER I I 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Policy and Politics in Higher Education: 
Overview of the Field 
Since 1958 and the publication of Moos and Rourke's 
comprehensive study. The Campus and the State, a growing 
literature has developed concerning policy and politics in 
higher education. Much of this scholarship has been 
completed since 1970 and, as Hartmark and Hines have 
demonstrated, it has often been descriptive in nature, has 
generally focused on the state level and has consisted 
primarily of case studies (Hines & Hartmark, 1980, p. 5). 
The field of policy and politics in higher education 
at the state level incorporates a range of topics and 
subtopics related to the content (policy) and the process 
(politics) of decision making (Hines & Hartmark, 1980, p. 
7). In their work. Politics of Higher Education (1980), 
Hines and Hartmark write that "state governments influence 
higher education largely through three mechanisms: planning 
and coordination, budgetary appropriations and the 
allocation of resources among institutions and sectors, and 
administrative regulation and control" (p. 21). Given this 
scope of influence, scholars have examined questions 
related to statewide coordination, institutional governance 
and mission, budget and finance and academic freedom. 
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In a separate article, Hines and Hartmark argue that a 
taxonomy of higher education exists in which five levels 
(purposes, values and norms, programs, management, and 
resources) comprise the policy domain and in which 
political interactions occur in three loci (institutional, 
extramural, and governmental) (Hines & Hartmark, 1980, p. 
9). The present study operates primarily at the 
intersection of purposes (policy) and government (politics) 
as it traces the gubernatorial role in shaping the 
community college identity in Massachusetts. 
While research specifically related to the 
gubernatorial role in the development of individual 
community college systems is rare, this study draws from 
and contributes to a diverse literature whose common thread 
is the gubernatorial role in policymaking. 
First, the present study depends on a body of 
literature which describes the relationship between state 
governments and public higher education. The foundation of 
much of this literature is The Campus and the State in 
which Moos and Rourke (1959) present an extensive analysis 
of the relationship between university systems and state 
governments. Subsequent authors, including Hartmark, 
Hines, Goodall, Eulau, Greer and Glenny have made 
significant contributions to the scholarship concerning 
state governments and public higher education. In doing 
so, each has also offered useful, if somewhat generic 
insights into the role governors play in the relationship 
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between the state and its public institutions of higher 
learning. 
The present study also relies on a second related body 
of literature which focuses on the American governorship as 
a political institution. This literature examines the 
governor's office through the lens of political science and 
is primarily concerned with the mechanics of how 
gubernatorial power is exercised in relation to that of the 
other key political actors. Leslie Lipson's 1949 study, 
The American Governor: From Figurehead to Leader, is among 
the first such examinations of the governorship and has 
been followed by the works of Ransone, Sabato, Beyle and 
Osborne, among others. 
The existing literature concerning the evolution of 
community colleges in the United States offers surprisingly 
little substantive discussion of the role played by 
governors in shaping the identity of such institutions in 
individual states. Even Brint and Karabel's The Diverted 
Dream, a case history of community college growth in 
Massachusetts, is relatively silent on the gubernatorial 
impact on the Commonwealth's fifteen-college system, 
emphasizing instead the role of campus presidents and the 
statewide governing board in creating institutional 
missions. While others such as Lederle (in Beyle & 
Williams, 1972) have at least acknowledged the role of 
governors in shaping the two-year college mission in their 
states, it is interesting that in most important recent 
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works concerning the American community college, the 
gubernatorial role is almost ignored. Perhaps the most 
useful history of the community college movement is 
provided by Witt, Wattenbarger et al. in their 1994 work, 
Americans Community Colleges: The First Century. Although 
the text does not focus on the gubernatorial role, it 
offers a most helpful sense for the context in which 
community colleges developed nationwide. 
A limited body of literature exists which relates 
specifically to either the Massachusetts governorship or to 
the overall relationship between the state and public 
higher education in the Commonwealth. In the former group, 
Malian and Blackwood's study of Foster Furcolo's 
legislative battle over issues such as the sales tax (in 
Westin, 1962) and Osborne's analysis of Michael Dukakis' 
two incarnations as governor (1985) are particularly 
helpful. In addition, the governor's role as legislative 
leader includes useful insights into both the Furcolo 
administration and the Massachusetts Legislature of the 
late 1950s. Brint and Karabel contribute to the 
understanding of state government's relationship to 
community colleges as do Bartley (1988) and Asquino (1976) 
in their respective studies of campus strategic planning 
and systemwide budgeting. Examinations by Stafford (1980) 
and Murphy (1974) of higher education reorganization 
efforts in Massachusetts during the 1960s and 1970s provide 
data concerning the more general relationship of state 
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government to public higher education during a watershed 
era for the system. Katsinas (1993) has provided a most 
useful analysis of George Wallace's role in the founding of 
Alabama's two-year college system. 
Thus, the goal of the present study is to bridge 
several bodies of literature. Building from foundations in 
both the political science study of the governorship and in 
higher education and the field of policy and politics, it 
seeks to provide an historical case study that will fill a 
void in the contemporary literature concerning both 
community colleges and the modern office of governor. 
State Government and Public Higher Education 
Gubernatorial influence over public higher education 
is rooted both in the formal and informal powers of the 
office and in the individual governor's hierarchy of 
interests and needs. Executive influence is also a 
function of the primary responsibility which state 
governments (particularly Massachusetts) have assumed 
vis-a-vis public higher education. 
Adler and Lane (Politics. Budgeting and Policy, 1985) 
have argued persuasively that higher education has evolved 
into a unique policy area in most states: 
To begin with, we see education as a policy area 
of increasing state activity. In the American 
federal system, we know that most governmental 
activities are carried out jointly by the various 
levels of government. At the same time, some 
policy fields are dominated by state government. 
Higher education is a good example of an area 
which is primarily a state responsibility and in 
which state government is becoming increasingly 
active. 
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Not only is there a trend toward greater 
state policymaking activity in higher education, 
but we also feel that higher education's 
emergence as a unique policy area is an important 
related phenomenon. Higher education, as 
distinct from all of education or education and 
welfare, or education and labor, is increasingly 
developing its own identifiable policymaking 
system in the American states. (p. 68) 
Kerr (State Government, 1985) makes a similar 
argument, pointing to a "New States Period" in higher 
education: 
. . . we are once again entering a state period 
in higher education. This has been the standard 
situation for higher education since the founding 
of our republic, except for the land-grant period 
from 1860 to 1890 and the recent period from 1955 
to 1985. The states, by and large, have taken 
good care of higher education; otherwise we would 
not have the best system of higher education in 
the world. 
Perhaps I should say that we are entering a 
state-private period of higher education when, 
once again, the major initiatives will come from 
state and private sources. (p. 47) 
As state responsibility for higher education has 
increased, so too have public demands for accountability in 
public college and university systems. Issues of 
accountability manifest themselves most clearly in the 
ongoing debate concerning the appropriate level of 
statewide coordination over public higher education. A 
significant body of literature exists which demonstrates 
the increasing level of control exercised by state 
government over public colleges and universities. While a 
comprehensive analysis of statewide coordination lies 
beyond the scope of this study, coordination and 
accountability are of importance to individual governors at 
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specific moments in their terms. As this study 
demonstrates, establishing the mechanism of statewide 
coordination as well as appointing those who will guide 
that mechanism is a fundamental source of gubernatorial 
influence over the Commonwealth's community colleges. 
Thus, it is important to have some understanding of the 
literature concerning statewide coordination of public 
higher education. 
Hartmark and Hines (1980) provide a useful 
bibliographic overview of major works related to statewide 
coordination, beginning with Glenny's pathbreaking 1959 
study. Autonomy of Public Colleges. In doing so, Hartmark 
and Hines emphasize two recurrent themes in the literature: 
first, that coordinating boards operate in a critical and 
tenuous position between state government and individual 
institutions and that new forms of accountability are 
necessary to address "the increased complexity, 
interdependence, and scale of higher education" (p. 18). 
Concerning the latter point, Hartmark and Hines join 
Balderston in arguing that: 
Numerous demands for more specific and detailed 
information have affected accountability. These 
demands have been a function of a number of 
factors: the increasing size and complexity of 
higher education; increased competition for 
public funds; problems with inflation; 
productivity and enrollment, which have reduced 
institutional flexibility; a perceived decline in 
the value of the college degree; and the 
recurrent problems in supply of trained manpower. 
(p. 19) 
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In his comprehensive work, Statewide Coordination of 
Higher Education (1971), Berdahl makes several important 
points which remain constant in the discussion of 
coordination. Two are particularly salient to the present 
study. First, that true coordination does not exist in an 
ideal form. Instead, government entities such as the 
governor's office, budget office or legislature generally 
intervene to make decisions in something of an ad hoc 
manner. 
Second, Berdahl makes an important distinction between 
procedural autonomy (how institutions pursue their goals) 
and substantive autonomy (what goals the institutions are 
pursuing and how those goals relate to overall systemic 
needs and resources). Berdahl emphasizes the latter, 
arguing that it is in the area of substantive autonomy that 
the state has the most significant and delicate role to 
play. 
In addition to those scholars noted above, a range of 
authors have written extensively on issues related to 
statewide coordination of higher education. Moos and 
Rourke (1959), Millet (1975), Greer (1976), and Newman 
(1973) have each made significant contributions. Beyond 
individual prescriptions and matrices concerning the 
appropriate structures for coordination, one common theme 
throughout the literature is the steadily increased level 
of control by individual states over their public colleges 
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and universities. As the Carnegie Commission on Higher 
Education has written: 
External authorities are exercising more and more 
authority over higher education, and 
institutional independence has been declining. 
The greatest shift of power in recent years has 
taken place not inside the campus but in the 
transfer of authority from the campus to outside 
agencies. (1973, quoted in Hartmark & Hines, 
1980, p. 18) 
While acknowledging the increasing scope of state 
influence over public higher education, it is important to 
also remember that state systems of colleges and 
universities remain important bases of autonomous political 
power in Massachusetts and elsewhere. Zusman (Hines, 1988) 
has argued persuasively that public higher education is not 
wholly subordinate to state government but rather that 
government and higher education exist as 'semihierarchies' 
— each partially dependent on the other. Zusman's primary 
measure of the relative level of interdependence is the 
autonomy of a state's university system in the areas of 
academic decisionmaking and institutional governance. In 
other words, while the interrelationship between state 
government and public higher education is fundamental and 
multifaceted, the "balance of power" in the relationship — 
while generally shifting toward the state on issues such as 
coordination — ultimately depends on the political 
dynamic, on economic realities and on historical trends in 
an individual state at a given moment in time. 
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The American Governorship - Formal and Informal Powers 
It is fair to say that as states have established 
their primary relationship to public higher education, the 
American governorship has expanded its formal and informal 
bases of power. The manner in which Foster Furcolo and 
John Volpe utilized (or failed to utilize) these formal and 
informal powers is fundamental to the purposes of this 
study. 
Larry Sabato (1983) described the evolution of 
America's governors from comparably low visibility and 
limited accomplishment while Beyle and Muchmore (1983) have 
expanded on the same point, arguing that a shift in the 
focus of policymaking has shifted from the federal to the 
state level. 
Neustadt (1960) reminds us that government consists of 
separate institutions sharing power. In the policymaking 
process concerning public higher education, it is now 
increasingly the governor who wields the greatest potential 
power, both in terms of formal constitutional authority and 
in terms of informal powers of political persuasion. 
A number of authors have pointed to the fundamental 
role which American governors can play regarding public 
higher education. Moos and Rourke (1959) describe the 
central importance of the governor in relations between the 
Ccunpus and state government. In its 1971 report. The 
Capitol and the Campus, the Carnegie Commission on Higher 
Education argues that the governor's potential influence 
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over public higher education exceeds all other factors 
affecting a state's colleges and universities. Herzik 
(1985) writes that ’’while the bulk of state funding and 
policy initiatives in education are directed toward the 
primary and secondary levels, gubernatorial influence is 
probably greatest in the area of higher education” (p. 65). 
And Clark Kerr, the eminence grise of public higher 
education, emphasizes that "within most states, the 
governor has now become the most important single person in 
higher education" (1985, p. 47). Kerr goes so far as to 
refer to the governor as chief academic officer (p. 49). 
Adler and Lane (1970) point to three main 
gubernatorial roles in the governance of higher education 
— as chief executive, as chief budget officer and as chief 
opinion leader (p. 70). 
The first two of these roles relate primarily to the 
formal powers of governorship; those powers which come 
directly from the state constitution or from legislative 
statute. For example, as chief executive, the governor 
often appoints members of both statewide coordinating 
boards and local governing authorities. In addition, he or 
she files, supports, opposes or vetoes legislation which 
directly or indirectly affects the state's public higher 
education system. And finally, the governor is often at 
minimum an arbiter and at maximum the determinative force 
in establishing statewide master plans for higher 
education. In some situations, the governor may even 
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become a direct influence over the master plans of 
individual institutions. 
The governor, as chief budget officer in his or her 
state, generally recommends and ultimately approves the 
budgetary package for public higher education as well as 
for all other major statewide appropriations. In 
actuality, moreover, the governor's power within the 
budgetary process extends beyond simple dollars and cents. 
For the accomplished political leader, working in close 
collaboration with a strong budgetary/fiscal adviser, the 
governor's budgetary authority brings with it the power to 
set the tone and agenda for the policy debate. Lederle has 
written (1976), "It is not through the organizational 
hierarchy by itself, but rather through the executive 
budget process, that the governor makes his impact and 
gives significant leadership on major issues of higher 
education policy" (p. 46). 
Sabato (1983) argues that the executive and budgetary 
authority of most American governors has significantly 
expanded since mid-century and that 'the governor now works 
in a political and structural environment less inhibiting 
than ever before" (p. 88). Specifically, Sabato argues: 
In the executive sphere, governors have done 
quite well, not only in successfully 
orchestrating constitutional revisions and 
reorganizations but also in consolidating and 
fortifying their control of administration. 
The executive budget is a formidable and 
almost universal gubernatorial lever. Lesser 
planning and management tools also have been 
strengthened and are at the governor's disposal. 
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The governorship as an office draws a better 
salary and is more adequately staffed now than in 
the past. (p. 88) 
Kerr (1985) shares the belief that governors have 
expanded their formal executive authority since 
mid-century, particularly in their relationship to public 
higher education: 
Governors have mechanisms they did not have in 
1955. They have bigger staffs and they have 
better staffs. There has also been the 
development of state coordinating mechanisms that 
permit governors to become involved, not Ccunpus 
by campus, which would frequently be impossible, 
but through coordination where it is possible to 
have an impact. (p. 48) 
Hines (1988) expands the discussion of formal 
gubernatorial powers, offering a matrix by which to compare 
the strength of America's governors vis-a-vis higher 
education. This matrix assigns values to the relative 
powers held by the nation's governors in five critical 
areas (tenure potential, appointive powers, budgetary 
powers, organizational powers, veto powers). The total 
value across these five areas provides an index as to the 
strength of each governor's formal authority (p. 24). As 
Hines summarizes: 
One measure of gubernatorial influence is the 
extent of formal powers over a number of specific 
areas. Budgetary power is the best known of the 
formal powers, dealing with whether or not the 
governor shares budgetary powers with a civil 
servant or a person appointed by someone other 
than the governor, with the legislature, with 
someone popularly elected, or with others. 
Another area involves how long the governor may 
serve and whether the governor can serve for more 
than a single term. A third area is the power of 
appointment, involving the state bureaucracy and 
agency personnel, including the higher education 
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agency and those who serve on governing boards, 
coordinating boards, and councils. Governors 
have organizational powers regarding creating and 
abolishing offices, conferring organization 
status, and providing access to key personnel. 
Veto power pertains to override by a majority of 
legislators present, by a majority of the entire 
legislative membership, or by a simple majority. 
(p. 23). 
Despite the expanded array of gubernatorial powers, a 
number of scholars have pointed to significant restraints 
which continue to limit most governors' capacities to shape 
policy in their states. For example, Goodall has claimed 
that "in most states, the institutions of higher education 
are prime examples of institutions which spend large 
amounts of state funds but operate fairly independently of 
the governor” (1987, p. 41). 
Lederle (1976) claims that beyond the power of the 
purse strings, governors have surprisingly few direct means 
by which to fundamentally alter policy at colleges or 
universities. For example he points out that governors 
generally have little influence over faculty and staff 
hiring and goes so far as to argue that "it has been the 
rare governor who has used his power to make board 
appointments with the objective of profoundly changing 
educational policy" (p. 45). 
In his study of educational reform in South Carolina, 
Kearney (Journal of State Government. 1987) points out that 
despite the growth in formal gubernatorial power across the 
United States since the 1950s, most governors continue to 
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face significant limitations on their constitutional 
strength: 
In spite of a recent wave of executive branch 
reforms, America's governors suffer serious 
institutional weaknesses compared to the 
president of the United States and to chief 
executives in the private sector. Governors are 
not, as a political observer put it,"masters of 
their own houses." 
Such a constrained institutional environment 
can make it difficult to promote significant 
policy changes. (p. 150) 
Thus even the most constitutionally powerful governor 
must look beyond formal authority to the potentially 
substantial range of informal power at her or his disposal. 
The potency of such power depends on the relative political 
skills of individual chief executives, on the social, 
economic and political environment surrounding a specific 
issue at a particular moment in history and on the 
importance that a governor attaches to a given topic. As 
Moos and Rourke (1959) summarize, "beyond and above the 
law, the high political position of the governor enables 
him to wedge himself deeply into the affairs of higher 
education" (p. 255). Lipson (1939) writes even more 
eloquently, "true leadership which inspires the willing 
confidence of men cannot be crystallized into 
constitutional grants of power. Each governor must earn it 
anew" (p. 268). 
Perhaps the greatest of a governor's informal powers 
is her or his capacity to influence public opinion — the 
governor as chief opinion leader. Adler and Lane (1985) 
emphasize that, particularly during times of fiscal 
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constraint, the informal power to move public opinion is 
vital to the governor: 
Since the governor holds office through election 
by the entire state, the governor is the voice of 
the people of a state. It is he who provides 
public opinion leadership in matters relating to 
higher education. This role of chief opinion 
leader is particularly important in relations 
with higher education boards and with a variety 
of citizen and educational groups and 
organizations. (p. 70) 
A number of scholars have examined the importance of 
public opinion leadership to the success of a gubernatorial 
administration. This research has indicated that in 
setting the tone and agenda of debate, style often matters 
as much as substance, symbols play a critical role in 
communicating to key constituencies, and a significant 
amount of executive attention and staff time is often 
allocated to public opinion leadership. 
Beyle and Muchmore (1983) utilize survey data 
collected from governors and other public officials to 
demonstrate the different approaches that individual 
governors take toward public opinion leadership: 
Governors approach their public role with 
differing perspectives. Some fulfill the role as 
one of many and carry it out to the best of their 
ability. They do not seek to expand on the role 
or encourage contacts but are responsive to 
constituents and to the media. This is often a 
most necessary view of the role due to the sheer 
volume of public activity facing the governor. 
Other governors undertake a more aggressive and 
activist role, seeking out and stimulating public 
contacts. (p. 54). 
Kearney's study of educational reform in South 
Carolina (1987) demonstrates the enormous range of informal 
31 
power available to an astute governor, even in a state 
whose constitution mandates weak executive authority. 
Kearney's research describes how Richard Riley utilized the 
informal powers available to a constitutionally weak 
executive branch in achieving a massive restructuring of 
South Carolina's educational infrastructure. As Kearney 
points out, much of Riley's informal power emanated from 
personal characteristics — his capacity as a politician, 
the depth of his commitment to educational reform as a 
policy issue and the strength of his interpersonal skills: 
Clearly, Riley's remarkable achievement during 
his eight years in office (1978-1986) were not 
the result of the formal powers alone. ... He 
also skillfully used the informal powers of the 
office, which are widely recognized but less 
written about by political scientists. These 
informal powers include such factors as access to 
the mass media, political party influence, 
patronage, pork barrel, prestige of the office 
and the popularity of the governor. Additional 
informal powers encompass personal charac¬ 
teristics such as interpersonal skills, 
bargaining ability, education, experience, 
energy, and ambition. The informal powers are 
just as important as the formal ones and, unlike 
the formal powers, all except patronage and pork 
barrel depend on the person — not the office. 
An outstanding individual can exercise strong 
leadership in a weak governor state as Riley's 
success with the South Carolina's Education 
Improvement Act (EIA) illustrates, (p. 75) 
In the exercise of both formal and informal 
gubernatorial power, a number of authors have correctly 
emphasized the central role played by the legislative 
branch. Arguing that the legislative role is "the role 
around which others revolve," Beyle and Dalton write (1983, 
in Beyle & Muchmore) that 
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a governor who fails to develop a positive 
relationship with the legislature may find his 
executive budget, his programs and policies, and 
his key appointments tied up in legislative 
committees or mired in petty controversies. 
Ultimately, the public most often measures the 
success or the failure of an administration by 
its real or perceived record of legislative 
achievement. (p. xx) 
As Jewell (Beyle & Williams, 1972) has argued: 
A governor is judged today largely on the success 
of his legislative programs. Unless his 
administration has been plagued by unusually 
serious scandals, the administrative success or 
failures of a governor are neither visible nor 
interesting to a voter. The gubernatorial 
candidate's platform is composed largely of 
legislative promises — whether he offers more 
money for education, the enactment of a merit 
system, or the lowering of taxes. To the extent 
that issues determine elections, a governor is 
judged by the legislative promises he has kept or 
broken, and this often means that he is judged by 
his success or failure as a legislative leader. 
(p. 124) 
A governor's formal relationship to the legislature 
depends on the relative constitutional powers assigned to 
the executive and the legislative branches. No less 
significant, however, are the informal aspects of the 
institutional relationship — e-g-f the governor's personal 
history and interactions with legislative leaders, the 
distribution of party membership in each house of the 
legislature and the public's comparative opinion of the two 
branches. 
Sabato's (1983) analysis of the executive-legislative 
relationship indicates that as gubernatorial power has 
increased since the 1950s, so too has the legislature 
increased its scope of informal and formal power. This 
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expansion of legislative influence is due in good measure 
to a series of reapportionment decisions (particularly 
Baker vs. Carr in 1962 which affirmed "one-person one-vote" 
and required that each legislator in a state represent 
approximately the same number of people) as well as 
expanded professional legislative staffs and improved 
compensation packages which often attracted a more 
substantive, policy-oriented brand of legislator (p. 78). 
As legislative sophistication and power has increased, 
the pressure has grown on governors to spend extensive time 
and energy nurturing relationships with key legislators. 
Much of a governor's success in developing these 
relationships depends on both the partisan distribution in 
the legislature and on the personalities and goals of those 
who hold legislative positions of leadership. Jewell 
(Beyle & Williams, 1972) summarizes: 
No factor is more important in determining a 
governor's legislative success than his 
relationship with the legislative leaders of his 
party. When that party is in the majority, those 
leaders — and particularly the House Speakers — 
have broad powers to appoint committees, assign 
bills to committees, and guide deliberations on 
the floor. Moreover, these are the governor's 
spokesmen and representatives in the legislature. 
If they are ineffective or uncooperative, the 
governor is seriously handicapped. (p. 133) 
A number of case studies exist which artfully 
demonstrate how specific governors have utilized various 
forms of influence to achieve specific policy goals. 
Rosenbaum's analysis of university reorganization in 
Wisconsin during the governorship of Patrick Lucey and 
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Wood's study of the University of California during the 
gubernatorial administration of Ronald Reagan are 
particularly informative (Beyle & Williams, 1972). Each 
provides important insights into policy confrontations 
between critical hierarchies — two strong-willed and 
popular governors clashing with two of the nation's most 
influential university systems. Each study demonstrates 
the potential and limits of gubernatorial powers and 
Rosenbaum, in particular, traces the institutional 
importance of the legislative branch in any such 
confrontation. 
The present study contributes to existing literature 
concerning the American governorship by offering insights 
as to how two Massachusetts governors from different 
political parties and with different policy priorities 
utilized the various powers of their office during the 
period 1957-62 and, in doing so, how they influenced 
development of the Commonwealth's community college system. 
For excimple, Foster Furcolo (1957-60) was willing to use 
the full range of his formal and informal powers to create 
a community college system but was ultimately constrained 
by his tendency to be, in Jewell's words, "aloof from the 
party organization, ill at ease with politicians, and 
unskilled and uncertain in bargaining sessions with 
legislators" (Beyle & Williams, 1972, p. 133). John Volpe, 
Republican businessman who succeeded Furcolo, witnessed 
expansion of the community college system, due less to his 
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overarching vision concerning two-year colleges than to his 
instinctive faith in such institutions; to his willingness 
to endorse legislative initiative; to the entrepreneurial 
spirit of the Massachusetts Board of Regional Community 
Colleges; and to the momentum which carried over from 
Furcolo's administration. 
This study analyzes early community college 
development in Massachusetts through the prism of 
gubernatorial use of power and, in doing so, provides a 
contribution to the literature concerning the American 
governorship and to that concerning the mission of 
community colleges in Massachusetts. 
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CHAPTER III 
DESIGN AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF THE STUDY 
Overview 
An historical case study research modus operandi is 
utilized to address the policy role of two Massachusetts 
governors in shaping the community college mission during 
the period 1957-1962. Specifically, the study examines the 
goals and objectives of each governor vis-a-vis the 
developing community college system and how these goals and 
objectives fit into his overall policy priorities and 
practical political needs. It briefly reviews the 
political history of the period in question and fits the 
gubernatorial role in shaping community college development 
into the context of that history. 
The case study identifies the role of each governor 
during the critical early years of community college 
development in Massachusetts. Moreover, it provides 
general insights into how each governor perceived the 
mission of two-year colleges and examines the relative 
policy and political importance that each placed on 
community college development. Further, it summarizes the 
relative impact that each governor had on the evolution of 
the community college mission. Finally, based on its 
findings, the study draws several conclusions concerning 
the appropriate role of a governor in shaping the community 
college identity. In doing so, this study hopes to 
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contribute to the growing body of literature which explores 
the relationship between state government and public higher 
education. 
Theoretical Framework 
This study seeks to weave and analyze together two 
intimately connected stories. 
The first story presents the development of 
Massachusetts community colleges as one element of a larger 
political whole. It focuses on where community colleges 
fit amid gubernatorial and legislative priorities, how 
individual governors of different temperaments and 
political persuasions sought to implement their agendas, 
and how other issues and players influenced the outcome of 
gubernatorial efforts. 
Governors are individuals who bring their own 
priorities, interests, and life experiences to their 
office. In attempting to make history, they, in turn, are 
shaped by it. While their legacy is partly their own 
creation, it also belongs to people and forces beyond 
direct gubernatorial control. 
The second story focuses on the evolving mission of 
community colleges in Massachusetts during the period in 
question. While one cannot discuss mission without 
considering politics, one must equally recognize that other 
factors beyond politics shaped the community college 
identity. To understand adequately the role played by 
governors in shaping two-year colleges in the Commonwealth, 
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it is important to understand the substance of what 
community colleges were expected to do during the period 
between 1957 and 1962, and then to describe the factors 
beyond statewide politics that shaped these expectations. 
Only then can the gubernatorial role be considered in 
something approximating full context. 
The political story is in many ways the most 
interesting and enjoyable to tell, in that it focuses on 
the human side of policy development and implementation. 
It is also a story which compels us to draw on the 
theoretical constructs of both political science and 
sociology. 
One fundamental piece of this political story involves 
issues of executive power. As chief executive of the 
Commonwealth, the governor holds an array of direct and 
indirect powers. It is his or her understanding of these 
powers, willingness to use them and sophistication in doing 
so that combines with no small amount of luck to help 
determine the success or failure of a gubernatorial 
initiative. 
The master political historian Richard E. Neustadt has 
contributed greatly to the study of political power at the 
executive level and his brilliant use of historical case 
studies has profoundly influenced the approach taken in 
this study. Neustadt, particularly in Presidential Power 
and Alliance Politics, eloquently analyzes the potential 
and the limits of executive power at the federal and 
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international levels. As noted earlier, Sabato and Osborne 
have utilized similar case studies at the state level. 
Governors do not act in isolation, however. They are 
but one actor, albeit a central one, on the political 
stage. While the significant policy issues of any given 
time are often a product of gubernatorial emphasis or 
initiative, other forces also influence the evolution of 
public policy. 
Thus, while an historical reconstruction of the 
political saga surrounding community colleges between 1957 
and 1962 is interesting and necessary, it is not sufficient 
to meet the goals of this study. Nor is it enough to 
simply elaborate on the formal and informal powers 
available to the governor of Massachusetts, although this, 
too, is a necessary part of the total story. To 
satisfactorily describe the role that individual governors 
played in shaping community colleges and their mission, we 
must also look through a sociological lens. Only then can 
we analyze satisfactorily how and why governors used (or 
failed to use) their available powers to influence the 
community college identity and how their influence fits in 
with that of other players in the evolution of two-year 
colleges and their mission. 
Brint and Karabel, in their 1989 work. The Diverted 
Dream, utilize an institutional model based on the 
sociological study of organizations to argue that 
Massachusetts community college administrators moved toward 
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a vocational emphasis in the 1960s out of perceived 
organizational self-interest. Their work builds from the 
earlier work of Lustberg, who examined the evolution of the 
Massachusetts community college system utilizing a 
sociological perspective. 
As sociologists, the above authors have sought to 
understand the social and political forces that drove 
community college expansion in Massachusetts. In doing so, 
they have grappled with the reality that policymaking 
involves competing interests battling on a playing field 
whose contours change over time. 
The theoretical framework of this study is heavily 
influenced both by Lustberg and by Brint and Karabel. It 
has sought to view the policymaking field from the 
perspective of the governor's office. It has examined 
gubernatorial influence upon the community college identity 
in Massachusetts by seeking to place the governor's role 
within a broader context that includes other key actors 
(educators, legislators, business and labor, etc.). 
It is also impossible to analyze community college 
development in isolation from other significant policy 
issues of the period in question. As in a chemical 
reaction, the various compounds that comprise the mix 
combine and interact to influence the outcome. So, too, do 
other issues of the day influence the attention or strength 
that a governor can bring to matters such as community 
college growth or mission. Thus, this study must 
41 
continually refer back to the context of the period it 
describes. 
Only by incorporating the broad array of actors and 
issues that compete on the policy stage can one draw 
conclusions as to the actual role played by Governors 
Furcolo and Volpe in shaping the early evolution of 
community colleges and their mission in Massachusetts. 
Study Design 
This study is a case history rooted in theoretical 
constructs of qualitative inquiry. Like much historical 
research, it seeks to reconstruct past events and to draw 
inferences from them. In order to represent faithfully 
the past and avoid careless inferences, this study includes 
a research design which ensures appropriate validation both 
of source materials and of the conclusions drawn from those 
materials. 
Specific study methods which frcime this research 
include review of Massachusetts public records, analysis of 
relevant news media, an examination of appropriate archival 
materials, as well as interviews with elected officials, 
college administrators and appointed leaders within the 
government of the Commonwealth. 
In order to provide an analytical framework around 
which to construct this case study, the researcher utilized 
a modified '’Timeline” summary similar to that employed by 
Whittaker in his 1987 analysis of the process leading to 
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establishment of the Boston campus of the University of 
Massachusetts. 
By building an incrementally more comprehensive 
timeline that includes general political, economic and 
social data from the period, the researcher was able to 
develop a clear perspective as to how the mission of 
community colleges fit into the overall policy situation 
faced by each governor. In Whittaker's words, the 
researcher developed "a more complete picture of exactly 
what occurred during key points in the process" (p. 29). 
As Whittaker emphasizes, (p. 29) this methodological 
approach is inherently "evolutionary in nature" and 
"militates against a precise definition of a course of 
action during the research and information gathering 
phase." As Timeline data expands and is augmented by 
information and insights gleaned from interviews and 
various other primary sources, "materials tend to build on 
themselves often suggesting new directions and sources" 
(Whittaker, p. 30). Thus, as this study progressed, new 
data at times required that the researcher's methodology be 
flexible enough to respond to avenues not previously 
apparent. 
For purposes of analysis, the Timeline for this study 
was divided into six segments, each corresponding to a 
specific year in the life of a gubernatorial 
administration. In order to build a useful historical 
framework, the researcher then added to each segment 
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general political, economic and social data from the 
period, (e.g., economic conditions, fiscal situation, 
legislative composition, size and nature of public higher 
education, demographics of the Commonwealth). For example, 
during the first year of Foster Furcolo's administration 
(1957), critical economic data would relate to the fiscal 
difficulties of the state, while the governor's initial 
battle to enact a sales tax would constitute a critical 
political consideration. 
The researcher then added more specific information 
concerning major events or decisions relevant to public 
higher education and community colleges, including action 
or inaction by individual governors. For example, during 
the administration of Foster Furcolo key events vis-a-vis 
higher education would include the Audit of State Needs, 
passage of the legislation establishing community colleges 
and the decision to open the first such institutions in 
Pittsfield and Hyannis. 
By building an incrementally more comprehensive 
timeline that includes general political, economic and 
social data from that period, the researcher was able to 
develop a clear perspective as to how the evolving mission 
of community colleges fit into the overall policy situation 
faced by each governor. In Whittaker's words, the 
researcher develops "a more complete picture of exactly 
what occurred during key points in the process" (p. 29). 
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with this framework in place, the researcher was able 
to revisit major source documents to create a more 
definitive analysis of the role of individual governors at 
key moments in the development of community colleges in 
Massachusetts. It was only at this point that the 
researcher wrote an initial draft of the proposed case 
history. 
Research Questions 
A number of research questions provided the early 
emphasis and direction for the research. General questions 
concerning the time period included: 
o What was the general economic and fiscal 
condition of the commonwealth at the time of each 
governor's election to office? 
o How did this economic/fiscal situation evolve 
during each governor's term in office? 
o What was the general status of public higher 
education in Massachusetts at the time of each 
governor's election to office? 
o How did the general state of public higher 
education change during each governor's term of 
office? 
o What was the overall political climate of 
Massachusetts at the time of each governor's 
election and during his term in office? 
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o Who were the key political figures who influenced 
the formation of higher education policy during 
the period? 
o How was the political climate reflected in 
composition of the legislature and in key 
gubernatorial appointments? 
o How did the political climate influence the 
debate concerning public higher education in the 
Commonwealth? 
Questions Concerning Gubernatorial Priorities: 
o What is the relevant personal history which 
helped to shape the political philosophy and 
priorities of each governor? 
o What were the major policy priorities which each 
governor brought to executive office? 
o How did the policy priorities of each governor 
shift during his term? If they did shift, Why? 
o Where did public higher education fit as a policy 
priority of each governor? What were his chief 
concerns (governance, mission, finance, 
programs)? 
o Did the governor in question have specific policy 
goals related to community colleges in 
Massachusetts? 
o How did the governor perceive the community 
college mission/identity? 
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o Where did these goals "fit" in the hierarchy of 
the governor's priorities? 
o Did the governor's goals or perceptions 
concerning community colleges change during his 
term? 
o What were the major constraints and which limited 
or aided the governor in achieving his goals 
vis-a-vis the community college system? 
o Who were his chief allies/foes in pursuing these 
goals? 
o How successful was the governor in achieving his 
policy goals concerning the mission/identity of 
Massachusetts community colleges? 
Questions Concerning Applications of the Study: 
o What conclusions does the analysis permit 
concerning the policymaking style of each 
governor? 
o What conclusions can be drawn concerning the 
policymaking role of each governor vis-a-vis the 
development of community college mission/ 
identity? 
o How does that role correspond to the relationship 
in general literature (Eulau, Heinz, etc.) 
between governors and public higher education? 
o What recommendations can be made concerning an 
appropriate role for the governor in shaping the 
community college mission in Massachusetts? 
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Sources of Information 
Sources for this study include formal documents of 
Massachusetts state government, correspondence, memoranda, 
and reports as well as planning documents, legislation and 
other relevant archival material. 
Formal archival documents of the Massachusetts state 
government proved particularly useful to this study. 
Specifically, annual budget messages, requests and 
authorizations informed the research in question as did the 
records of annual legislative sessions and policy planning 
reports of the period. This material is maintained at the 
state legislative library in the statehouse, at the state 
archives at Columbia Point and in the records of the 
Massachusetts Higher Education Coordinating Council 
(formally the Board of Regents of Higher Education). 
The study also relied heavily on a thorough review of 
relevant media coverage of the timeframe in question. 
Particular attention was given to a comprehensive analysis 
of the major Boston newspapers, the Boston Globe and the 
Boston Herald Traveler during the period 1958-1969. These 
two newspapers provided the chronological foundation upon 
which the study's ’’Timeline” analysis was constructed. 
Concomitant with preparation of a first draft of the 
present study, a series of interviews were conducted with 
key individuals who participated in Massachusetts state 
government during the period in question and who, in almost 
every case, played a significant role in shaping the 
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mission of community colleges in the Commonwealth. While 
the schedules or health of some individuals required that 
several interviews occur earlier in the process, wherever 
possible, they were scheduled after the preliminary work on 
the Timeline and drafts were complete. These interviews 
constituted the final layer of this historical analysis and 
provided the personal recollection of those who helped make 
the history which this study interprets. The opportunity 
to speak directly with policymakers or observers who were 
closely linked to the significant historical event or to a 
train of such events provides the chance to develop 
insights not offered by the secondary accounts of more 
distant analysis. 
Documents (e.g., memoranda, policy analysis, 
legislation, reports, budget proposals and authorizations) 
originating in the executive branch, in the legislature, in 
state and local governing boards and, where obtainable, in 
the offices of college officials provided another important 
source of primary data. Such documents proved most useful 
in considering the role played by the executive branch in 
shaping the community college mission during the period in 
question and in developing possible extrapolations 
concerning the policymaking relationships between the 
executive branch and other institutions of Massachusetts 
politics. 
Newspaper and magazine articles of the period were 
also reviewed to gain a sensitivity to key issues at 
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important moments in the history of Massachusetts community 
colleges. These accounts provided a lens through which 
community college development could be seen within the 
context of other events and issues of the times. In 
addition, such accounts allowed data accumulated from 
interviews and primary documents to be considered in light 
of news accounts from the period. 
Other secondary source materials were also utilized in 
this study. Although little secondary material exists 
concerning the executive branch's historical influence over 
the evolving community colleges mission in Massachusetts, a 
significant body of literature has developed concerning the 
growth of community colleges nationwide. A comprehensive 
review of this literature provided data as to how the 
evolution of community colleges in Massachusetts compares 
with that of similar institutions across the United States. 
Literature from the evolving field of politics and 
policy in higher education provided another important 
cornerstone for this study. Of particular utility was a 
body of work focusing on the relationship between state 
government and public higher education. 
Several works which focus on the development of 
educational policy in Massachusetts were reviewed as part 
of this study. These secondary accounts consist primarily 
of articles in various journals, portions of dissertations 
or theses or unpublished works found in the archives of 
graduate and undergraduate programs. 
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Finally, literature which examines the American 
governorship offered an important body of secondary source 
material. Such studies proved relevant to analysis of the 
relationships between the executive branch and other 
political institutions, to an examination of how the 
executive branch interacts with and influences public 
higher education and to a discussion of the most 
appropriate role for the executive branch in shaping the 
future mission of community colleges in Massachusetts. 
Interviews 
This study incorporates interviews with fourteen 
individuals who either directly influenced the development 
of community colleges in Massachusetts or were close 
observers of public higher education and gubernatorial 
policymaking during the period 1957-1962. Appendix A 
provides a complete list of those individuals who were 
interviewed as part of this project. 
Wherever possible interviews were conducted 
face-to-face, avoiding the use of questionnaires. The 
majority of interviews were structured in format, although 
in some limited circumstances, an unstructured format was 
employed. While specific questions varied according to the 
role of the interviewee, each interview was organized 
around the primary research questions that guide this 
study. Finally, interviews were conducted and their 
results utilized with full recognition of the limitations 
of interviewing as a research tool. 
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The opportunity to speak directly with policymakers or 
observers who were closely linked to a significant 
historical event or to a train of such events provides the 
chance to develop insights not offered by the secondary 
accounts of more distant analysts. Moreover, as Travers 
points out (p. 133), personal interviews offer at least 
three advantages over questionnaires: a higher percentage 
of respondents; the capacity to answer questions related to 
the purpose of the interview and to build confidence in the 
researcher on the part of the interviewee; and the 
opportunity to conduct an interview at an appropriate speed 
to garner dependable data. 
There are, however, several important limitations to 
the interview as a research technique. Travers describes 
several such limitations that are extremely important to 
the project at hand (p. 131). The first is connected to 
the inherent complexity of the interviewer/interviewee 
relationship; one in which the behavior of the interviewer 
can profoundly influence the responses of the individual 
being interviewed, as can differences in the environment or 
setting from one interview to the next. In addition, there 
may be differences between those interviewed as to their 
willingness to reveal information. 
A final limitation of the interview was particularly 
relevant to this study. It was best summarized by Rosen 
(as quoted by Whittaker who faced similar hurdles in his 
study of the University of Massachusetts at Boston): 
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The value of the interviews is less for details— 
memories of events that occurred almost twenty 
years have faded—than for interpretation. 
Obviously, people differ in their interpretation 
of events, but it is impossible to cross-check 
interpretation and then reach an independent 
judgment as to the reasonable one. (p. 30) 
Given the warning, the present study relies on 
interviews less for the details surrounding specific 
decisions or policies than for composite sketches of 
overall policy emphasis and insights into the general 
forces and personalities that helped to shape the history 
of a particular moment. 
Limitations and Exclusions 
It is important to emphasize that this study 
functioned within carefully defined parameters. It focused 
on the policy impact of two administrations between 
1957-1962 on the development of community colleges in 
Massachusetts. It did not seek to provide a comprehensive 
history of each governor's term in office nor did it 
analyze in comprehensive detail every policy issue related 
to public higher education in the Commonwealth during the 
years in question. 
This study looked to the evolution of community 
colleges in Massachusetts as an historical case which could 
contribute to the literature concerning educational 
policymaking at the executive level of state government. 
Before making any extrapolations, however, the reader 
should keep very much in mind that the study focuses on a 
single state with a rather unique higher education 
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pedigree, on a community college system whose evolution was 
influenced by that pedigree and on a specific time period 
which cannot in every instance be applied directly to 
contemporary affairs. 
Interpretation of Information 
The present study includes an historical narrative 
which chronicles the influence the two Massachusetts 
governors on the development of community colleges and 
their mission in the Commonwealth between the inauguration 
of Foster Furcolo in January, 1957 and the defeat of John 
Volpe in the election of 1962. This narrative, in concert 
with a final chapter presenting the study's findings and 
conclusions, addresses the research questions outlined 
earlier in this chapter. 
Chapter IV provides a comprehensive presentation of 
the major historical data relevant to this study. The 
chapter opens with a brief summary of pre-1958 efforts 
(e.g., the Zook Report of 1922) to establish 
state-supported junior or community colleges in the 
commonwealth. This summary provides a context for analysis 
of the period 1958-1969. 
Following this overview. Chapter V focuses on 
Furcolo's two terms as governor between 1957 and 1960. 
Chapter VI describes events of the Volpe administration 
between 1960-62. Chapter VII briefly summarizes 
development of the Massachusetts Board of Regional 
Community Colleges during the period 1957-62, with special 
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attention paid to its early decisions concerning campus 
locations and mission focus. 
These chapters do not seek to provide a thorough 
history of each governorship or even to present every 
detail of educational policymaking during the six-year span 
in question. The careful construction of this study's 
timeline analysis permitted the researcher to focus both on 
events which were critical to the evolving identity of 
community colleges and on the governors' role in shaping 
those events. 
It is also important to emphasize that Chapters V 
through VII rely heavily on primary records, newspaper 
accounts and on interviews with those who observed or 
influenced events during the time period in question. 
Thus, in interpreting the data from these chapters, one 
must always remember that no history is perfect, no 
appraisal of past events can claim to be complete and no 
human memory should be considered either a perfect source 
of historical data or beyond the natural tendency to 
remember events as they should have happened rather than as 
they actually occurred. 
Chapter VIII includes the conclusions and implications 
of this historical study. It analyzes the relative 
influence of each governor in shaping the community college 
identity in Massachusetts, analyzes the political context 
and the strategic foundations from which this influence 
emanated and offers recommendations as to an appropriate 
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policymaking role for Massachusetts governors in the years 
to come. 
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CHAPTER I V 
THE EVOLUTION OF THE AMERICAN COMMUNITY COLLEGE 
MOVEMENT: 1900-1957 
Witt, Wattenbarger, et. al (1994, p.l) have described 
the American community college movement as "the most 
important higher education innovation of the twentieth 
century." From its origins at the turn of the century as a 
means of providing access to rapidly increasing numbers of 
high school graduates while preserving university elitism, 
the community college movement in the United States had 
grown by 1990 to include some 1200 institutions which 
enrolled approximately 45% of the nation's college students 
(Witt, Wattenbarger, et al., p. 262). 
This chapter presents a brief overview of two -year 
college growth in the United States during the first half 
of the century. It seeks to provide a background against 
which to examine the early development of community 
colleges in Massachusetts. 
This chapter also describes the condition of 
Massachusetts public higher education on the eve of Foster 
Furcolo's inauguration as Governor of the Commonwealth in 
1957. It offers a foundation upon which to tell the 
political stories of the governorships of Foster Furcolo 
and John Volpe and to analyze the evolution of a community 
college system in Massachusetts. Long blessed with the 
nation's most respected concentration of private colleges 
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and universities, Massachusetts has historically struggled 
to develop a strong system of public institutions. To 
understand the gestation, birth and early development of 
community colleges in the Commonwealth, one must understand 
the context of Massachusetts public higher education in the 
late 1950s. 
Community and Junior Colleges in America. 1900-1957 
Community colleges were an accepted feature of 
educational systems across much of the United States by 
1957. Born as junior colleges at the turn of the century, 
community colleges satisfied the seemingly conflictive 
goals of expanding higher educational oppoAtunities to the 
growing number of graduates from public high schools and 
the desire of elite universities to focus their missions on 
advanced scholarship. As Blocker and his colleagues have 
summarized (1965): 
The two-year college might be considered an 
historical accident growing out of the struggle 
between conservative thought and liberal thought 
. . . [Conservative thinkers envisioned] the 
highly specialized education of an intellectual 
elite . . . 
Liberal thinking insisted that public 
education be expanded to provide equal 
opportunities for all. (p. 32) 
A primary thrust behind the development of America's 
first community colleges was the nation's late eighteenth 
century expansion of public primary and secondary 
education. The 1874 Kalamazoo court decision, which 
authorized local governments to fund secondary education, 
led to a rapid increase in the numbers of students 
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attending public high schools. Between 1874 and 1904, high 
school enrollments nationwide increased by some 600 percent 
(Witt et al., 1994, p. 2). This burgeoning public high 
school expansion led to a concomitant increase in the 
numbers of students seeking admission to higher education. 
And with this increased demand for access to postsecondary 
learning came a dilemma for existing American universities 
who sought to maintain themselves as bastions for study by 
the most gifted and elite students. 
The notion of junior colleges, based on the much 
admired German gymnasiums, provided a unique common ground 
for those committed to university elitism and those who 
were equally dedicated to the populist ideal that access to 
higher education was a right deserved by all. The junior 
college would serve as a semi-permeable membrane through 
which the most talented would pass on to university 
training, while the less gifted would complete two years of 
college work leading to a dignified and productive place in 
the increasingly industrial economy of the United States. 
While private two-year colleges had existed in states 
such as Illinois, Massachusetts and Georgia since the 
mid-nineteenth century, the roots of the national junior 
college movement lie in Illinois, where William Rainey 
Harper implemented the first true junior college program. 
The founding president of the University of Chicago, Harper 
was influenced by the arguments of other university 
presidents such as Michigan's Henry Tappan and Minnesota's 
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William Watts Folwell, who pressed for a mechanism to 
"guard the entrance of universities" (quoted in Witt et 
al., 1994, p. 8) from the mass of high school graduates. 
Harper sought to create Chicago as a laboratory of 
reform in higher education, believing that such reforms 
would "revolutionize university study in our country" 
(Quoted in Witt et al., 1994, p. 13). Specifically, in 
1892, Harper divided the four-year undergraduate curriculum 
into two distinct colleges, the Academic and University 
Colleges. By 1894, he had renamed the Academic segment as 
the Junior College. 
Harper saw his efforts as the first step toward 
establishment of a national network of junior institutions 
which would be linked to university programs. In 1902, 
thanks largely to momentum created by Harper, the first 
such junior college opened in Joliet, Illinois (Witt, p. 
18). By the early 1900s, ironically after the premature 
death of Harper at forty-nine, junior college movements 
were evolving in other parts of the country. 
Most prominent among these early systems was 
California, where the state legislature approved a 
state-supported junior college system in 1921. Under the 
legislature's mandate the system was to "provide courses of 
instruction designed to prepare for higher institutions of 
learning; courses of instruction designed to prepare 
persons for agricultural, industrial, commercial, 
homemaking, and other vocations; and such courses of 
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instruction as may be deemed necessary to provide for the 
civic and liberal education of the citizens of the 
community” (House 1700, 1923, pp. 259). 
By 1929, eighteen states had at least nine public or 
private junior colleges within their individual borders, 
with the heaviest concentration of publicly-supported 
institutions found in California, Illinois, Michigan and 
Missouri (Brint & Karabel, p. 31). Two-thirds of the 
community colleges in the United States on the eve of the 
Depression were secular and the vast majority were liberal 
arts institutions that emphasized transfer curricula (Brint 
& Karabel, p. 31). 
In the 1920s, however, arguments had increased for a 
new vocational focus in junior college education. Respected 
authors such as Koos, Bells, and Campbell argued that 
beyond the transfer function lie the need for expanded 
terminal programs in the "semiprofessions" (Brint & 
Karabel, p. 38). This argument would gain increasing 
support during the Depression and the years following World 
War II. 
Today, while most community colleges offer both the 
transfer and vocational tracks, the appropriate balance 
between the two remains a fundamental issue of debate on 
campuses across the country. This debate will arise 
periodically during this study's analysis of community 
college growth in Massachusetts. 
61 
During the Depression and again in the 1950s, 
community colleges experienced massive enrollment growth. 
Between 1929 and 1939, junior colleges offered affordable 
access for the increasing numbers of high school graduates 
who confronted a devastated job market. Enrollment at 
two-year institutions rose during this period from less 
than 56,000 nationwide to approximately 150,000 (Brint & 
Karabel, p. 53). 
The postwar years of the 1950s witnessed even more 
extraordinary growth, fueled by the G.I. bill and an 
expanding American economy. Between 1950 and 1960, 
two-year college enrollments grew from 562,475 to 660,216 
(American Association of Community Colleges). 
A major factor encouraging the rapid expansion of 
two-year institutions during the years after World War II 
was the work of the so-called Truman Commission which 
sought to articulate a national education strategy for Cold 
War America. The Commission's final report. Higher 
Education for American Democracy, proposed development of 
comprehensive, tuition-free "community colleges" and argued 
that "the democratic community cannot tolerate a society 
based upon education for the well-to-do alone. If college 
opportunities are restricted to those in higher income 
brackets, the way is open to the creation and perpetuation 
of a class society which has no place in the American way 
of life" (Monroe, p. 14). 
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In 1957, on the eve of Sputnik, President Eisenhower's 
Committee on Education Beyond High School would 
rearticulate the basic recommendation of the Truman 
Commission: 
Communities or groups of neighboring communities 
faced with an impending shortage of higher 
education capacity will do well to consider new 
two-year community colleges as part of the 
solution. Experience in a number of areas has 
demonstrated that with carefully planned 
facilities and programs, community colleges can 
be highly effective in affording readily 
available opportunities for education beyond high 
school. (Monroe, p. 15) 
The growth in community college enrollments witnessed 
during the 1950s was but prelude to the explosion which 
would occur during the 1960s. As Eaton has written, this 
growth resulted largely from the historical intersection of 
public policy and demographic reality: 
Several factors combined to produce a national 
public-policy commitment to higher education 
between 1960 and 1970. These included the 
baby-boomers beginning to go to college, a 
growing economy, the liberal-populist political 
tradition of John F. Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson, 
and the civil rights movement. Growth, 
opportunity and the perception of a "right to 
education" dominated the literature and the 
thinking of these years. (Eaton, Colleges of 
Choice, p. 12) 
In absolute numbers, community college growth during 
the 1960s was by any standard remarkable. Seven hundred and 
four such institutions existed in 1963, 1141 in 1973; 
914,494 students attended community colleges in 1963 while 
3,100,951 did so ten years later (Eaton, p. 12). 
Although the 1970s and 1980s would not match the 
unparalleled growth of the 1960s, community college 
63 
expansion continued inexorably toward record heights. By 
1990, community college enrollment totaled 5,851,953, with 
over fifty percent of all college freshmen attending one of 
the some 1,300 community, technical or junior colleges in 
the United States. 
Massachusetts Before 1957 
On the eve of Foster Furcolo's first inauguration as 
governor, Massachusetts public higher education consisted 
of fifteen institutions which suffered in comparison to the 
commonwealth's elite private institutions and which the 
1958 Audit on the Commission of State Needs would describe 
as "neglected” (p. 34). 
The flagship of the public system in 1957 was the 
University of Massachusetts. A land grant institution 
located in Amherst, the University was, in the words of 
Senator Kevin Harrington (D-Salem), a leading voice on 
educational issues in the legislature, a "sleepy 
institution which had yet to earn any real reputation" 
(interview, August 18, 1993). The University, which 
retained a focus on agricultural programming, had seen its 
enrollment grow from 1,002 in 1945 to 4,740 in 1957 (Audit 
Report, p. 34). University governance rested in a board of 
trustees, dependant on the General Court for budgetary 
allocations. 
Ten state teachers colleges were spread across the 
commonwealth, legacies to the normal schools of the 19th 
century. Described by Harrington as a "polyglot," with a 
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generally "confused" purpose, the state colleges had also 
faced rapidly increased enrollments during the post-war 
era. In 1945, the ten institutions enjoyed a total 
enrollment of 2,131; by 1957, that figure had essentially 
tripled to 6,700 (Audit Report, p. 38). The Commonwealth's 
Board of Education, under the leadership of Education 
Commissioner Owen Kiernan, held governance responsibility 
for the state colleges. 
The Lowell Technological Institute, founded as a 
institution in 1895 to prepare technicians for the textile 
and related industries, stood as arguably the most 
respected of Massachusetts' public institutions in 1957. 
Harrington remembers the Institute as "first rate" and as 
"having in its narrow field a reputation probably better 
than the University of Massachusetts" (Interview, August 
18, 1993). Between 1945 and 1957, day enrollment at the 
Institute had grown from 290 to 1,087; while evening 
numbers had increased from 581 to 2,600 during the same 
period (Audit Report, p. 39). The Institute was governed 
by a separate board of trustees. 
Bradford-Durfee Technical Institute (located in Fall 
River) and New Bedford Institute of Technology (in New 
Bedford) were, like Lowell Technological Institute, each 
originally founded as two-year colleges devoted to the 
textile industry. In the years after Furcolo's election 
these institutes would become enmeshed in a protracted 
debates concerning their merger as well as the educational 
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and economic needs of Southeastern Massachusetts. In 1957, 
these debates were percolating, as the institutes stood as 
the most troubled public higher education institutions in 
the Commonwealth; this despite enrollments having grown 
from 120 to 274 students at Bradford-Durfee since 1945 and 
from 62 to 406 at New Bedford. The Board of Education held 
responsibility for governance of the institutes. 
The Massachusetts Maritime Academy at Buzzard's Bay on 
Cape Cod was founded in 1891 as a training academy for 
cadets in the American Merchant Marine. Its specialized 
curriculum, which qualified students to apply for 
commissions to the Naval Reserve, had sustained a 
relatively steady enrollment of nearly 200 students during 
the post-war period (Audit Commission, p. 38). The Academy 
was governed by a separate board of trustees. 
Although not part of the state system, city junior 
colleges had existed in Holyoke and Newton since 1946. 
Supported by state funds (up to $100 per student under the 
provisions of Chapter 756 of the Acts of 1957), the junior 
colleges offered both terminal and transfer programs and 
were governed by the local school committees in each city. 
The Massachusetts Board of Education which retained 
governance responsibility for the state colleges as well as 
Bradford-Durfee and New Bedford Technical Institute, 
focused primarily on elementary and secondary education and 
left its higher education institutions with a good deal of 
autonomy. Governed by a nine-member board, the Department 
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of Education was led by Commissioner Owen Kiernan. A 
veteran of bureaucratic battles who jealously guarded his 
domain and power base, Kiernan would oppose development of 
community colleges outside the Board of Education's control 
and, in doing so, earn the enmity of Furcolo and his staff. 
Massachusetts higher education in 1957, then, 
consisted of fifteen institutions whose missions and 
governance mechanisms were varied and in some cases murky. 
Generally discounted in terms of reputation, they faced 
increasing enrollment projections without facilities, 
funding or firm support egual to the task. Murphy has 
described this situation, which she labels "the 
Massachusetts Lag": 
Before 1950 public higher education in 
Massachusetts had received little or no 
attention. Threats of closing one or more state 
colleges were common occurrences. The reasons 
why were many. Campus buildings had reached a 
state of total disrepair, public education 
institutions were looked upon as a last resort 
for young people seeking higher education, 
enrollments were dropping, and the programs were 
extremely limited, (p. 6) 
In 1950, Massachusetts public higher education served 
less than ten thousand students, approximately ten percent 
of the Commonwealth's total postsecondary enrollments. In 
1959, public enrollment was only 14 percent of the total, 
even though 58 percent of college students nationally 
attended public institutions (Progress Report, p. 19). Not 
until the 1980s would the Commonwealth's public 
institutions achieve enrollment parity with the private 
sector (Brint & Karabel, The Diverted Dream, p. 143). 
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A fundamential reason for the historical struggle of 
Massachusetts public higher education to develop 
credibility lies in the unmatched array of private 
institutions in the Commonwealth. Whereas in California 
educational opportunity is often defined as access to 
Berkeley or in Michigan to the University of Michigan or 
Michigan State, opportunity in Massachusetts has 
historically been seen as access to Harvard, Boston College 
or any of the other prestigious private institutions in the 
Commonwealth. Lustberg and other sociologists have pointed 
out how this perception lessens the public's inclination to 
support public colleges and universities. 
Of profound importance politically is the fact that 
most members of the General Court have historically 
graduated from private colleges. Unlike states with strong 
public higher education traditions, Massachusetts has a 
legislature whose members historically lack a personal 
attachment to the public colleges and universities. For 
the majority of Massachusetts legislators, their 
educational roots and personal ties to postsecondary 
learning lie in the private sector, leaving little urgency 
driving investment in a large public system. 
The Junior College Movement in Massachusetts; 1900-1957 
During the first half of the twentieth century, the 
General Court witnessed at least a half dozen serious 
attempts to inaugurate a two-year college system. In each 
case, the arguments in favor of such an initiative were 
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similar to those heard around the nation: access for 
increasing numbers of secondary school graduates and 
opportunities for vocational training beyond high school. 
Each of these efforts, however, failed and in their 
failures can be seen the roots of Foster Furcolo's battle 
in 1957-1960. 
The most well-known and analytically comprehensive of 
the failed efforts on behalf of two-year colleges occurred 
in 1923-1924. Charged by the legislature in 1922 to review 
technical and higher education in the Commonwealth, "The 
Commission For An Investigation Relative to Opportunities 
and Methods for Technical and Higher Education in the 
Commonwealth" provided a detailed history of the junior 
colleges movement nationally as well as a powerful argument 
for public junior colleges in Massachusetts. 
The author of the Commission report was George Zook, 
then higher education specialist in the U.S. Department of 
Education, and in the years to come. President of the 
University of Akron and President of the American Council 
on Education. Zook strongly supported the junior college 
movement, believing particularly in the vocational role of 
such institutions. Brint and Karabel have summarized his 
views: 
Zook had a clear vision of the proper role of the 
junior college. It was to "draw off" substantial 
numbers of students who might be headed for 
existing colleges, to serve as a sieve for the 
minority that was capable of transferring to a 
four-year institution, and to provide terminal 
vocational training for the remainder, (p. 69) 
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Using extensive survey and comparative data, "the Zook 
Commission” report recommended creation of up to twelve 
community colleges (in cities and towns with assessed 
valuation of $10 million and an average of 500 students in 
four-year courses at local high schools) under the 
management control of local school committees. The report 
endorsed local responsibility for provision and maintenance 
of college buildings, with the Commonwealth reimbursing 
ninety percent of local expenditures for teachers and 
administrators (excluding school superintendents). Junior 
colleges would be tuition-free, with students paying only 
the necessary costs of learning and laboratory materials 
(House 1700, p. 261). 
Like other pre-1957 attempts at creating a junior 
college system, the Zook Commission recommendations fell 
prey to private college influence and conservative 
opposition to increased government spending. Each of these 
obstacles would confront Furcolo and his successors to 
varying degrees and each is evident in the minority report 
offered by Zook Commission member (and Boston College 
president) Reverend Willieun Devlin; 
If sufficient appropriation be made, the State 
university extension, in conjunction with other 
existing institutions could cunply provide in a 
very practical way for all students seeking 
merely further training along particular lines 
after the completion of high school. As regards 
a college or university course in a strict sense, 
the report makes it clear that neither tuition 
rates nor the present number of applicants in 
freshman classes in the large number of colleges 
already established are an obstacle to the 
obtainment of a college education for students 
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properly qualified. It has also been shown in 
the report of the Commission that present 
entrance requirements in Massachusetts colleges 
are not so severe as to debar applicants who have 
been well-fitted for college work. Finally, the 
great increase of tax appropriations required for 
this department of higher education at a time 
when very large appropriations are demanded, not 
only for the betterment of present conditions in 
our secondary schools, but also for their 
necessary expansion in the immediate future, 
seems to render inopportune the recommendation of 
a state system of junior colleges. (p. 926) 
In the more than thirty years between the Zook 
Commission report and the first inauguration of Foster 
Furcolo, at least four major two-year college bills were 
introduced to the Massachusetts House of Representatives. 
For example, in 1943, as the Commonwealth looked toward the 
post-war era, the Special Commission Relative to the 
Establishment and Operation of Junior Colleges (H 1335 of 
1943) called for a system of two-year colleges "offering 
instruction on a level and to a degree of thoroughness 
distinctly above that of the secondary school and on a 
level below that of advanced senior college 
specialization" (p. 6). 
In 1948, the Special Commission Established to 
Investigate and Study Certain Problems of Education in the 
Commonwealth (H2050 of 1948) urged "that the establishment 
and development of community colleges be encouraged" (p. 7) 
and argued that "the impact of new economic and social 
forces, together with the modern attitude toward government 
as a powerful instrument for social betterment, has widened 
the area of state action in public education" (p. 10). 
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This report resulted in successful passage of legislation 
authorizing the Massachusetts Department of Education, upon 
request of local school committees, to maintain junior 
colleges. Interestingly, by 1957 only Holyoke, Newton, and 
Quincy had applied for and received any state assistance 
for institutions in their respective communities (Progress 
Report, p. 21). 
The next major attempt at creating a community college 
system came in 1956-57 with the work of the Special 
Commission Relative to the Operation of Junior Colleges in 
the Commonwealth (H2850 of 1957). Completing its work 
during the final days of the 1956 gubernatorial campaign, 
the Commission was guided by two key community college 
advocates who would subsequently play a major role in the 
successful 1958 effort to finally pass community college 
legislation: Senator Edward Stone (Chair of the Commission 
and powerful Republican from Hyannis) and Representative 
Thomas Wojtowski (Vice Chair of the Commission, Democrat 
from Pittsfield and former teacher). 
Although House 2850, which proposed the study of a 
community college system under the aegis of the University 
of Massachusetts, failed to generate tangible progress, it 
did serve as an opportunity for Stone and Wojtowski to 
develop a comfortable working relationship and to begin 
building a core of legislative support for community 
colleges. The missing ingredient was a governor who had 
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the conviction and the mandate to serve as catalyst, 
governor arrived in 1957. 
That 
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CHAPTER V 
FOSTER FURCOLO: 1957-1960 
Between 1957 and 1962, two governors of different 
parties, backgrounds, personalities and agendas provided 
executive leadership to the nation's most historic 
governing body. The General Court of the Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts. The chronicle of their stewardship embraces 
an extraordinary period in the history of the United States 
and the world. 
It was a period that bequeathed Ike and JFK, the 
Missile Gap and the Cuban Missile Crisis, the New Frontier 
and a growing conflict in a place called Vietnam. 
In Massachusetts, the six years between Foster 
Furcolo's first inaugural address and John Volpe's loss to 
Endicott Peabody provide a time capsule of historic change. 
From the fiscal mess of 1957, to election of its favorite 
son to the Presidency in 1960, to accusations of corruption 
in state government in 1961, Massachusetts witnessed the 
pain and promise of change in a major industrial state. 
This chapter focuses on the period 1957-1960 and the 
governorship of Foster Furcolo. It views Furcolo and his 
time through the prism of the struggle for legislation to 
establish community colleges in Massachusetts. Through 
this prism one sees not only debate concerning an issue of 
fundamental importance to higher education in the 
Commonwealth but also the rich tapestry of personal 
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idiosyncracies and policy interactions that comprise 
politics in Massachusetts, Most of all, one witnesses the 
opportunities and pitfalls awaiting a complex individual 
committed to use the full range of gubernatorial powers to 
alter the higher education landscape in the Bay State. 
The Governor-Elect 
The roots of Furcolo's commitment to educational 
reform extended to well before his election to the 
Massachusetts Governorship in November 1956. Although only 
45-years-old at the time of his election, the Democrat had 
already built a successful political career and a solid 
progressive record on issues such as education. 
Defeated in 1943 for the post of Springfield District 
Attorney and narrowly beaten in a 1946 congressional race 
by a six-term incumbent, Furcolo broke through in 1948 with 
a 10,000 vote victory over that same Republican. As a 
young Congressman, Furcolo guickly earned both a post on 
the powerful Appropriations Committee and a reputation as 
one of the rising stars of the Massachusetts Democratic 
Party (a position which encouraged no small amount of 
tension between Furcolo and another rising star. 
Congressman John F. Kennedy). 
In 1949, Furcolo introduced legislation to create a 
higher education loan program; legislation which reflected 
his deep commitment to college access. In the 1970s, 
during an interview with Lustberg, he gave voice to this 
commitment (1977, p. 113): 
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It has always bothered me that some students 
couldn't go to college just because they couldn't 
afford it. ... I saw friends of mine who were 
even more qualified than me that couldn't go. 
In 1952, Furcolo attained statewide constitutional 
office when outgoing Governor Paul Dever, appointed him to 
the vacant post of state Treasurer. With this appointment, 
Furcolo set his sights on a long-shot Senate race against 
Republican stalwart, Leverett Saltonstall. 
Furcolo entered the 1954 race burdened by his widening 
rift with Kennedy (who had won a Senate seat in 1952) and 
facing a wealthy incumbent blessed with personal wealth and 
a reservoir of good will from the Massachusetts electorate. 
Despite the fact that Kennedy never endorsed him (Globe, 
8/10/58, Gould Lincoln, "Democrats Making Bid for Full 
State Control, p. 23), Furcolo ran an impressive race, 
losing by a surprisingly narrow margin and reinforcing his 
image as an attractive candidate who now possessed a strong 
base for another statewide campaign. 
In his 1956 gubernatorial run against Republican 
Lieutenant Governor Sumner Whittaker, Furcolo took 
advantage of a stabilized relationship with Kennedy and a 
progressive platform to win the race "hands down" (Boston 
Globe. 8/10/58, p. 23). His victory margin of 140,000 
votes was particularly impressive given that it came in the 
face of an Eisenhower landslide both nationally and in the 
Bay State. 
As Furcolo's victory margin grew, other statewide 
races also fell into the Democratic column. The posts of 
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Lieutenant Governor, Auditor, and Treasurer would all 
belong to Democrats by night's end, with only the office of 
Attorney General in the Republican column. 
In the Legislature, the results were less decisive, as 
the House of Representatives remained heavily Democratic 
(132-108) and the traditional Republican majority in the 
Senate held by the slim margin of 22-18. 
Thus, as Furcolo arrived at the statehouse on January 
3, 1957 for his inauguration as Massachusetts' 60th 
governor he stood as a power in Massachusetts politics and 
a budding voice on the national scene. As the first 
American of Italian descent elected to the Commonwealth's 
governorship and the first Western Massachusetts resident 
to achieve that office in twenty-six years, Furcolo could 
reasonably expect success for his progressive agenda. As 
one Boston Herald columnist observed (1/1/57, W. E. 
Mullins, "This is How I See It; Attractive Hopefuls Lurk in 
Democratic Party Wings," p. 92): 
The dawn of the new year is one of exultation for 
the Democrats of Massachusetts. For their 
brethren in the Republican Party it is one of 
despair. The Democrats have been restored to 
power. Not only have the Republicans encountered 
disaster at the polls, but they also have scant 
prospects for salvage purposes. 
On that January day, however, as Furcolo took the oath of 
office in the House chamber, the seeds of future difficulty 
were already in place. 
First, it is important to emphasize that the 
Massachusetts governorship was a far weaker office in 1956 
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that it is at present. Burdened by limited constitutional 
authority and the necessity to face a re-election campaign 
in only two years, Furcolo's capacity for major policy 
reform was significantly constrained. As Furcolo's closest 
advisor and future Commissioner of Administration and 
Finance Charles Mahoney recalls (Interview, July 27, 1993): 
The governorship of Massachusetts was very 
different than today. The executive branch was 
probably at its weakest point in history. . . . 
The Legislature was dominant. And when we came 
to power. Governor Furcolo could only appoint one 
or two senior members of the executive 
branch—for example. Commissioner of 
Administration and Finance. All the major agency 
heads served three to seven years. The 
governor's entire appointed staff consisted of 
only fourteen people. 
Second, in terms of substantive policy, Furcolo's 
progressive agenda confronted an increasing bipartisan 
awareness that the Commonwealth faced severe fiscal 
imbalance. Although estimates varied as to the extent of 
the state's debt, there was general agreement that it was 
significant and that it was growing. Furcolo, himself, had 
referred to the Commonwealth's fiscal difficulties 
throughout the campaign and, on the night of his election 
had said, "It is generally agreed that whoever won a 
tremendous headache" (Feinberg, 1956). 
Mahoney recalls unraveling the full extent of that 
headache during the period immediately after Furcolo's 
election (Interview, July 27, 1993): 
When he got elected that fall, he was very 
popular. Very soon thereafter, I'd gone through 
the books and found that we were about $1 billion 
78 
in debt. There were all these items which by 
legerdemain has not been dealt with. 
To meet the Commonwealth's statutory requirement for a 
balanced budget while simultaneously expanding public 
investment would inevitably require new revenues. Any tax 
proposal would face an uphill climb, particularly in the 
Republican Senate. A Boston Herald column the day after 
Furcolo's inauguration offered a preview of the challenge 
Furcolo confronted: 
Massachusetts does rank high in per capita 
income. But it also is near the top, if not the 
topmost, state in social welfare expenditures. 
In Old Age Assistance, Aid to Dependent Children, 
pensions, subsidized housing units, care for the 
mentally ill, work hours of municipal employees, 
and, though the tax levy is different, in 
employment compensation and workman's 
compensation, Massachusetts is about the most 
liberal in the country. If we have a big debt 
and high taxes, that's a major reason. Yet, so 
far as Mr. Furcolo has indicated a program, he 
has indicated more of the scone — more mental 
health employees, more subsidized higher 
education, more public welfare. A sort of 
hair-of-the-dog-that-bit-us progrcim. (Boston 
Herald Editorial, "Furcolo—Mixed Reaction" 
1/4/57, p. 32) 
The Political Cast 
Compounding Furcolo's challenge was the cast of 
political players with which the governor would share 
center stage during the upcoming term. In its passion and 
historical emphasis on personality and ethnic rivalries, 
Massachusetts politics often resembles sport as much as the 
process of policymaking. 
One of the most influential and potentially 
problematical of the political players in the Legislature 
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was John Powers (D-South Boston), the Senate minority 
leader. A veteran of Boston City Government, the House and 
the Senate, Powers had demonstrated extraordinary tenacity 
in ascending to a leadership role. 
As Furcolo's term began. Powers had every apparent 
reason to wish the new governor success. A successful 
Furcolo would likely earn re-election in 1958 and quite 
possibly carry a Democratic majority to power in the 
Senate. Such a majority would make Powers the prohibitive 
favorite to become Senate President. A positive 
relationship between the Irish politician from South Boston 
and the Yale-educated governor, however, would only survive 
as long as one needed the other and perceived that the 
other remained supportive on major issues in the General 
Court. 
Powers was in many ways among the last of a dying 
breed of politicians in the lineage of legendary Boston 
Mayor James Michael Curley. The minority leader had no 
core ideology and his politics relied on the pure 
manipulation of power. Mahoney recalls him as a man who 
was "devoid of substantive interest" and one who was "very 
parochial" in view (Interview, July 27, 1993). 
For Powers, Furcolo was an aberration—"an outlander 
who wouldn't last" (Mahoney Interview, July 27, 1993). 
Powers had no context within which to understand a Western 
Massachusetts progressive whose view of the world was broad 
and cultured. Where Powers saw the raw power of Beacon 
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Hill and South Boston, Furcolo saw Massachusetts in the 
context of a changing world. As Mahoney has said, theirs 
were "polar personalities” (Interview, July 27, 1993) and 
it was but a matter of time before their relationship would 
be untenable. 
The Speaker of the Massachusetts House of 
Representatives, Michael Skerry (D-Malden), also held a 
crucial voice in the future of Furcolo's progreun. From 
early in the governor's term, however, it would become 
clear that Furcolo and Skerry were "like oil and water" 
(Costello, interview, 6/1/92). The governor and the 
Speaker shared little in common beyond party affinity and 
their relationship would deteriorate quickly. 
More cimenable to the Furcolo agenda was "Iron" John 
Thompson of Ludlow, the Democratic Floor Leader. Committed 
from the early days of 1957 to the Governor, and friend to 
both Furcolo and his key education advisor Kermit Morrissey 
of Brandeis (Lustberg, p. 120), Thompson had earned his 
reputation as an iron-fisted leader in the Democratically 
controlled House. 
The relationship between Skerry and Thompson was at 
best tenuous from the beginning. As columnist W. E. 
Mullins of the Boston Herald would write in late 1957, 
Although Representative Thompson was appointed by 
Speaker Skerry to serve as Democratic floor 
leader, they subsequently came to a parting of 
the ways on important issues. ... At the close 
of the session, they were barely on speaking 
terms. (Boston Herald Traveler, October 3, 1957, 
"This is How I See It: Artesani Support Aids 
Thompson for Speaker", W. E. Mullins, p. 26) 
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Although neither held the formal powers vested in the 
Senate President or the Speaker of the House, two 
legislators of opposing parties and very different 
backgrounds would also play central roles in shaping the 
governor's educational program. Senator Edward Stone 
(R-Hyannis), wealthy Cape Cod businessman and 
personification of the Massachusetts Republican Brahmin, 
and Representative Thomas Wojtkowski (D- Pittsfield), 
former teacher and first in his large family to attend 
college, would form an unlikely alliance in support of 
expanding Massachusetts higher education. 
The Governor as a Politician 
Those who knew Furcolo well knew him to be bright, 
extremely witty, personally honest, and often a visionary 
public servant. The Governor was not, however, a naturally 
gifted administrator. His talents were more suited to the 
United States Senate—his lifelong goal—a center of debate 
on big ideas and big policy initiatives. One sympathetic 
observer recalls him as "a great idea man who could quickly 
see the solution of a problem but not an effective 
day-to-day administrator of government" (Costello, 
interview, 6/1/92). 
Compounding the governor's handicaps was the fact that 
he came to the office without deep relationships in the 
Legislature. He had never served in either the 
Massachusetts House or Senate; had never come through the 
ranks. As such, there was no accrued loyalty to him in an 
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institution which revolves around political ties. This was 
a potentially debilitating situation for a governor who 
sought to implement a progressive agenda in fiscally 
constrained times. As John Malian and George Blackwood 
have written: 
His background separated him from many of the 
Democratic legislators; he was urbane and 
well-educated, with a broad interest in national 
and international issues, while many of them were 
self-made men—small businessmen, lawyers or 
insurance salesmen—whose education had ended 
with high school or perhaps night law school. 
But more essential was the interest Furcolo had 
in broad and sweeping programs, combined with a 
determined if not stubborn willingness to push 
for an idea he believed in against the political 
judgment of his own advisors. (p. 287) 
It is one of the ironies of Furcolo's governorship 
that the Governor's ’’stubborn" commitment to swim against 
the tide was both the sine qua non of success in pursuit of 
his community college program and the great contributing 
influence to his continued defeat on the painful sales tax 
issue. The political giants of our history have all 
possessed the instinct to divine when to pursue issues of 
principal against all cost and when to fold one's hand or 
compromise to face another day. Perhaps to the credit of 
his fundamental integrity, such instinct for strategic 
retreat was not common in Furcolo's administration. 
To strengthen his personal relationships in the 
Legislature would have required a concerted effort by the 
governor during the early days of his administration. 
Unfortunately, such an effort did not come naturally to 
him, particularly as he dove into the policy demands of 
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addressing the Commonwealth's budget difficulties while 
simultaneously preparing his administration's legislative 
package. 
Moreover, in the early days of his administration, he 
lacked any senior staff member who combined personal 
loyalty to the governor with strong and historical ties to 
the legislature. In short, he lacked a buffer during a 
period of difficult political choices. 
The Furcolo Agenda and the Audit of State Needs 
Any expectations that the governor or his staff would 
use the beginning of his administration as a honeymoon 
period to develop alliances in the General Court were 
quickly dismissed by Furcolo's inaugural address: 
I am shocked! The outgoing administration has 
left bills for some one to pay. That some one is 
the public. The inheritance left to the public 
by the outgoing administration is the worst 
financial mess in our history, and we need to 
raise millions and millions in additional revenue 
to clean it up. It is a legacy of inherited taxes 
and still more inherited taxes. (Senate No 1, 
1957) 
Pointing to an accumulated state debt of some $721 
million, Furcolo divided the state budgetary options into 
three general categories. To simply carry on at the same 
level of services provided during the previous year ("No 
Progress Budget") he offered a total dollar figure of $387 
million, an increase of some $24 million dollars over the 
previous year to account for inflation, interest on the 
state debt, expanded compensation to state employees and a 
$10 million reimbursement to cities and towns. A "Slight 
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Progress Budget" entailed $418 million, while Furcolo 
argued that a "Fair Progress Budget" would reguire $450 
million in spending (Boston Globe, 1/4/57, "Must Hike Taxes 
- Furcolo. GOP Angered by His Charge of 'Financial Mess:' 
New Governor Calls Deficit Staggering", William J. Lewis, 
p. 8). The Governor promised to attach details to those 
numbers in a special message to the General Court slated 
for the following week. 
While the new governor's inaugural focused on the 
fiscal inheritance bequeathed by the Herter administration, 
it also provided useful insights into Furcolo's major 
policy interests. In the area of education, the governor 
emphasized that 25% of Massachusetts schools were 
"overcrowded, inadequate or unsafe" (Boston Globe, 1/4/57, 
"Furcolo Says State Purse Flat: Full Text of Inaugural 
Speech by Bay State's New Leader" p. 5). In higher 
education he warned that "the number of young people of 
college age is increasing" and emphasized that "even in 
1955, only one out of ten applicants was accepted to begin 
his freshman year at U/Mass" (Boston Globe, "Furcolo Says 
State Purge Flat: Full text of Inaugural Speech by Bay 
State's New Leader," 1/4/57, p. 5). 
Furcolo's commitment to education was long-held and 
deeply rooted. This commitment grew both from his own 
liberal progressive instincts and from the "brain trust" 
which formed his inner circle of advisors. Mahoney 
describes Furcolo as a veteran who shared the post war 
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belief that "the Western world would be developed and 
rebuilt through education at all levels" (Interview, July 
27, 1993). And as Lustberg (1979) wrote shortly after 
interviewing Furcolo as well as several of his closest 
advisors: 
Furcolo, being a "liberal from Yale", was 
especially comfortable with education issues, 
especially those pertaining to higher education. 
He was more puzzled, Malian told me, by technical 
issues in areas such as health or economics. 
Furcolo surrounded himself with a "brain trust" 
which was largely composed of educators, men like 
Malian (a professor of Political Science at Smith 
College) and Kermit Morrissey who was a Professor 
of Political Science at Amherst College "when he 
was drafted to organize a research team for 
Governor Furcolo." Even those who were not 
professional academicians were, in Furcolo's 
words, "all in favor of the idea of education." 
(p. 113) 
On January 14, Furcolo returned to the House Chcuober to 
offer a more detailed "special message" outlining the 
specific legislative goals of his administration. Serving 
as a bridge between the previous week's inaugural and his 
upcoming budget proposal, the special message clearly 
reaffirmed the governor's progressive instincts, as well as 
his recognition of the Commonwealth's severe budgetary 
constraints. 
In our complex society, we must recognize that the 
functions of the State have been greatly expanded, and that 
there is, therefore, an urgent requirement to establish 
priorities among the prograuns and proposals which compete 
for our attention (Senate No 1, 1957). 
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The centerpiece of Furcolo's special message was his 
call for "the creation of a commission to be appointed by 
the Governor and the General Court to make an overall Audit 
of State Needs" (Senate No. 1, 1957, p. 26). Arguing that 
"we should not simply guess at our needs and neither should 
we use all of our revenues on one or several programs at 
the expense of neglecting others" (Senate No. 1, 1957), 
Furcolo recommended that the Commission consist of ten 
members — two appointed by the Senate President, three by 
the Speaker of the House, the Commissioner of 
Administration and Finance (Chair), and four gubernatorial 
appointees. He further recommended that the Commission 
focus its efforts on seven major areas (Senate No 1, 1957, 
p. 27): 
1. Educational Needs 
2. Health 
3. Problems of the Aging 
4. Mass Transportation 
5. A revision of the tax structure 
6. The organization and operation of state 
government 
7. Programs, laws and proposals related to the 
economic growth of the Commonwealth, with due 
regard to the problems of IcdDor and industry. 
In establishing education as the first priority of the 
proposed Audit of State Needs, Furcolo emphasized his 
commitment to the issue, stating in the special message (p. 
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29), "one of the areas of critical need is that of 
providing adequate educational opportunities not only for 
our children but for our citizens of all ages." 
Concerning public higher education, Furcolo's special 
message highlighted his concern that the Commonwealth 
lacked adequate facilities to cope with increasing 
enrollment pressures: 
There is an urgent need for an increase in our 
higher educational facilities. We must take 
steps toward providing them. Whether we may best 
meet this demand by expanding the University of 
Massachusetts, and/or our state teachers colleges 
and technical institutes, and/or by aiding in the 
establishment of regional colleges in various 
sections of the Commonwealth, or by other means, 
is a problem of first priority for the Audit of 
State Needs on Education. Following its report, I 
shall submit a report on this subject, (p. 30) 
Although a detailed review of Furcolo's entire higher 
education program lies beyond the scope of this study, it 
is important to note that the governor was deeply committed 
to reform across the public university and college system. 
He believed in a strong state university as the anchor of 
that system. And against the opposition of an entrenched 
University Board of Trustees, he would push hard during the 
next four years to enhance what was still essentially an 
agricultural institution in Amherst. Moreover, the 
governor and his staff hoped to bring the Commonwealth's 
state colleges beyond their traditional role as "teachers 
colleges," transforming them into solid liberal arts 
institutions. He further sought to identify a new mission 
for the technical institutes in Lowell and Dartmouth, whose 
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programs had suffered with the decline of Massachusetts' 
textile industry. And, finally, there was the still 
conceptual notion of community colleges to flesh out. His 
vehicle for all of this would be the special commission. 
Furcolo set April 15 as the goal for a preliminary 
report by the Audit Commission, with a final report to 
follow in time for legislative action in 1957 (Boston 
Herald-Traveler, "State Audit Plan Stirs Row: GOP Charges 
Move to Shift Responsibility," Edward Devin, 1/15/57, p. 
12) . 
The governor's proposal for a special commission 
received generally positive, if in some cases bemused 
responses from the political establishment. The Boston 
Herald-Traveler. conservative in its editorial viewpoint, 
labeled the Commission a "Super Hoover Commission" 
(1/15/57, "The Furcolo Audit," p. 12) and called it "one 
recommendation of outstanding importance" (1/15/57, p. 12). 
Norman McDonald, Executive Director of the Massachusetts 
Federation of Taxpayers Association, suggested that Furcolo 
has revealed an entirely new approach to 
executive responsibility by proposing that a 
great many decisions hitherto regarded as purely 
legislative in character be shared by members of 
the legislature, a suggestion that there be 
created a Commission on the Audit of State Needs, 
one half the members of which would come form the 
House and Senate. (Boston Herald-Traveler, 
1/15/57, p. 1) 
Furcolo agreed with the Senate President and Speaker 
on a distinguished group to comprise the Commission. In 
doing, so, he both established education as the 
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Commission's primary issue of concern and ensured that it 
would ultimately issue recommendations which were 
consistent with his progressive agenda. 
Although Francis X. Lang (Commission of Administration 
and Finance) would serve as the commission's official 
chair, Malian would act as ’’Executive Secretary” and 
Mahoney would provide policy guidance to the group. It is 
not a coincidence that Furcolo's final proposal for 
regional community colleges—a proposal developed by the 
Commission—would resemble a recommendation first put 
forward by Malian to candidate Furcolo during his 
unsuccessful Senate campaign against Saltonstall (Lustberg, 
1979, p. 114). 
Another gubernatorial appointment of great 
significance was Seymour E. Harris, Professor of Economics 
at Harvard. Deeply respected by the Governor, Harris would 
in 1958 become one of the most articulate voices arguing 
for the importance of community colleges to Massachusetts' 
economic development. Harris would also later serve as a 
founding member of the Commonwealth's Board of Regional 
Community Colleges. 
Third among the critical appointments to the Special 
Commission was that of Senator Edward C. Stone, Republican 
of Hyannis. Powerful member of the Senate Ways and Means 
Committee, wealthy insurance executive and member of the 
Boston University Board of Trustees, Stone had long hoped 
for a community college in Hyannis to replace a state 
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teachers college lost during the previous decade. In the 
months ahead. Stone's absolute commitment to community 
colleges, his extraordinary power in the Republican Senate 
and his position of influence within the private higher 
education establishment would all contribute immeasurably 
to the establishment of the two-year colleges in 
Massachusetts. "Without Stone," former Representative 
Thomas Wojtkowski of Pittsfield has said, "there would very 
simply have been no final community college bill" 
(Interview, June 1993). 
The fourth particularly significant appointment to the 
Special Commission was that of J. William Belanger, 
President of the Massachusetts AFL-CIO. Although one would 
expect Belanger and his union colleagues to instinctively 
support Furcolo and his progressive agenda, a rift was 
growing between labor and the Democratic Governor over the 
issue of introducing a sales tax to the Commonwealth. By 
appointing Belanger to the Special Commission, Furcolo had 
drawn the powerful union leader toward him on higher 
education issues—a move that would ultimately help to 
ameliorate potential labor opposition to the governor's 
community college proposal. 
The Governor's First Budget Proposal and The Sales Tax 
The need to combine revenue enhancement with any 
progressive budgetary package became increasingly clear as 
Furcolo completed his special message concerning the Audit 
of State needs and refined his budget proposal for 
91 
presentation by the end of January. Furcolo's budget 
message included a bold proposal which he hoped would 
address this reality. It would, in fact, ensnare him in 
controversy for the remainder of his administration. 
The sales tax story is fundamental to any discussion 
of Foster Furcolo's governorship. Three times (1957, 1958, 
1959) he would propose the measure only to see it lose in 
the legislature by overwhelming margins and amid often 
angry defections by members of his own party. Over time, 
the sales tax would become a political stone around the 
Governor's neck as well as a compelling symbol for those 
who opposed the administration or doubted its capacity. 
In 1957, Massachusetts remained one of sixteen states 
which did not rely on a sales tax to support its public 
spending (Globe. "Sales Tax? Globe Finds Out What Other 
States Are Doing About It", William E. Jones, 1/27/57, p. 
1). While some economists and an occasional legislator had 
argued on behalf of such a levy as a counterbalance to the 
property tax, no governor had publicly supported the 
potentially volatile measure. 
The sales tax was anathema to the Democratic Party and 
its core labor constituency, both of which believed it 
intrinsically regressive. Opposition to a sales tax had 
traditionally been a fixture of the party's platform and 
for several members of the Democratic leadership (e.g.. 
Senator Powers) such a position constituted a litmus test 
of party loyalty. As Mahoney recalls, "Democrats were 
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absolutists about the sales tax—they saw it as heresy" 
(Interview, July 27, 1993.) 
While most Republicans in the legislature shared a 
general disdain for taxes, the idea of a judiciously 
applied sales tax as a lever to reduce property taxes 
inspired at least some measure of interest. And in the 
face of fiscal crisis, many felt that a sales tax deserved 
consideration before increased income levies. 
It is unclear at what point Furcolo decided to cast 
his lot behind a sales tax proposal. What is clear is that 
by January he had determined that such a proposal was the 
only hope for any progress toward his progressive agenda. 
Mahoney recalls that as the final reality became clear, 
Furcolo became increasingly firm in his belief that a sales 
tax was the only way to preserve his agenda: 
We spent a lot of time in November and December 
looking at options. He really believed that a 
limited sales tax was in the economy's best 
interests, particularly because it could be used 
to ameliorate the very regressive property tax. 
(Interview, July 27, 1993) 
In his budget proposal to the legislature, Furcolo 
called for a 3% limited sales tax to finance a record state 
budget of over $423 million (Boston Herald-Traveler. "Sales 
Tax Chances Look Good: Furcolo's Proposal Wins Wide 
Support", William J. Lewis, 1/24/57, p. 1). Under terms 
of the tax, exemptions would be provided for food, 
prescription medication, rent, children's clothing, light, 
heat, gas, telephone, utilities and items already affected 
by the excise tax. Of $112.5 million in revenue expected 
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from the tax, Furcolo proposed that two thirds, or $75 
inillion be returned to cities and towns to underwrite 
property tax relief. Other fees and revenue sources would 
provide the remainder of the budget's $60 million in 
additional spending (Boston Globe. 1/24/57, p. 1). 
The governor's sales tax proposal came with almost no 
warning to Democrats in the legislature. As the 
Herald-Traveler would summarize on January 24 (p. 1), 
Furcolo's plan "came as a stunning blow yesterday to 
legislative leaders of his own Democratic Party." One year 
later, the same newspaper would write: 
When Furcolo took office in January 1957 he was 
inclined to play things close to the vest. His 
inaugural address came as a surprise to party 
leaders and his budget message in which he 
proposed a limited 3% sales tax flabbergasted 
Democrats. (1/14/58, "Edward Devin Scene and 
Heard at the State House" Governor Seeks Improved 
Liaison with Legislature," p. 24) 
The Democratic leadership was clearly caught off 
balance by the sales tax measure and their remarks at the 
time indicate no small measure of cautiously expressed 
pique at both the governor's message and the process 
leading to it. Senator Powers set the tone by saying, "The 
Democratic Party has consistently and historically opposed 
this type of tax imposition" (Boston Globe. "Civic Leaders 
Opinions of Sales Tax Proposal", 1/24/57, p. 9). 
Initially, Skerry and others in the party leadership 
remained relatively silent on the subject. The 
Herald-Traveler pointed out that "Skerry refuses to say 
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that he is for or against [the sales tax] — one can read 
much into this” (4/17/57, p. l). 
By January 24, Powers had become less cautious in 
expressing his opposition to the sales tax. Speaking to 
the Massachusetts Federation of Labor Tax Forum (a union 
group opposed to the sales tax), he made his view clear: 
Don't let them sell you a sales tax. Don't let 
them sell you a philosophy that makes the poor 
poorer and the rich richer. We shouldn't try to 
tax people on what they spend. The theory of 
taxation is based on what you earn. (Globe, 
1/25/57, "State Sales Tax Hit and Updated at 
Labor Forum", p. 1) 
Within hours of this speech, the Minority leader 
placed the sales tax directly on Furcolo's lap distancing 
himself and the party leadership from both the Governor and 
the proposal. He emphasized to the press that the 
Democratic leadership had "urged, pleaded, importuned, 
entreated, tried to persuade, argued and respectfully but 
firmly requested" Furcolo to move away from the sales tax. 
"But," the Minority Leader summarized, "Foster Furcolo is 
the Governor and nobody else. He made the decision and 
it's his baby" (Globe. 1/26/57, "Retailers to Support Sales 
Tax, If ... Want Relief Assured to Cities and Towns", p. 
2). 
As Powers continued to raise the level of rhetoric 
against the Governor of his own party, early press reaction 
to Furcolo's sales tax proposal was positive. The Globe in 
an editorial piece of January 24 ("Governor Furcolo's 
Surprise," p. 18) wrote "In the past, no governor of 
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Massachusetts has committed himself as forthrightly on the 
subject as did the chief executive yesterday," The 
Herald-Traveler, no friend to Furcolo, went even further 
stating that: 
For a decade Massachusetts has been building up 
to a financial crisis. For a decade successive 
governors have either sidestepped the issue or 
met it with half-hearted recommendations. Today, 
Governor Furcolo has grasped the nettle and 
boldly advanced the only solution——a sales tax. 
(1/24/57, "Furcolo Meets a Crisis," p. 28) 
The initial reaction to the sales tax was also 
comparatively warm in the Republican ranks. As one 
observer summarized at the time, "oddly enough, some of the 
more favorable comments on [Furcolo's] recommendations came 
from Republicans, including Governor Herter" 
(Herald-Traveler. 1/24/57, "Bitter Sales Tax Fight Due: 
GOP, Civic Units Hail Reality Aid," Edward Devin, p. 1). 
It is important for purposes of this study to consider how 
the sales tax influenced progress of the governor's 
two-year college program. First, the Governor's commitment 
to the sales tax both antagonized key parts of his core 
constituency and influenced how several key actors viewed 
other parts of the Furcolo agenda. As Lustberg (1979) has 
argued: 
Furcolo alienated liberals, party Democrats, 
labor and the press without ever capturing the 
Republican Party to implement a sales tax . . . 
in the fact of its political presence during the 
time of the proposal for regional community 
colleges [the sales tax issue] structured that 
debate and those who lined up on either side of 
the issue. (p. 119) 
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The antagonism aroused during the sales tax fight 
would surface again during the debate over community 
colleges, affecting the positions taken by key players. 
Powers, for example, would remain neutral and not helpful 
on the community college package. Having taken so strong a 
position in opposition to the sales tax, the Senate 
President felt constrained from supporting any major new 
expenditure of funds (Lustberg, 1979, p. 120). But, 
fundamentally, it was Powers' deep-seated animosity toward 
Furcolo that influenced his lack of active support for a 
bill that a Democratic leader would normally have worked 
diligently to pass. Given this vacuum in the Senate, 
Furcolo sought allies wherever he could. Thus did Stone's 
role become paramount. As Mahoney has stated: 
We didn't have a Senate President with us. So we 
had to make due. Where we grew up [Springfield], 
it was important to work in a pluralistic 
universe. We were entirely open to this [dealing 
with Stone and the Republicans]. (Interview, 
July 27, 1993) 
Labor would also remain vehement in its opposition to 
the sales tax. While these is no record of strong, active 
labor support for the community college bill, legislation 
that unions would seem likely to endorse with vigor, 
Belanger's presence on the Special Commission combined with 
a general union weariness of opposing Furcolo to earn "a 
passive endorsement" from the chief executive of the 
AFL-CIO (Lustberg, 1979, p. 120). 
Thus, the sales tax influenced, albeit subtly, the 
attitudes of key actors in the community college debate. 
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While one should not overly generalize, it seems fair to 
observe that Furcolo's path on the community college bill 
was made more uncertain by the alienation of natural allies 
in the sales tax debate. 
It is difficult to measure how the chain of events 
around one issue affects the outcome of another. But 
certainly, the sales tax fight did not help Furcolo in the 
ensuing battle for community colleges. As noted, he had 
antagonized in many his own party without guaranteeing 
widespread support from opposing Ccunps. Moreover, the 
Governor spent much precious political capital in a failed 
effort. Third, the sales tax debate would contribute to a 
growing public perception that the governor's 
administration had difficulty figuring out how to push its 
agenda. And finally, Furcolo was forced to consistently 
argue why he was pushing so hard for new and expensive 
program if the state confronted such fiscal turmoil as to 
require a new tax. 
The Politics of Educational Reform: 1957-58 
As the first signs of spring moved over Boston Common 
and the legislature's focus turned increasingly to the 
budget for the next fiscal year (Fiscal Year 1958, to begin 
on July 1, 1957) as well as to closing the deficit in the 
current year's accounts, debate over the proposed sales tax 
dominated the political landscape. Furcolo looked to the 
newly appointed Audit Commission as the foundation for his 
progressive program. The Special Commission, however, was 
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quickly becoming a convenient avenue by which the 
increasingly disenchanted Powers and Skerry could avoid 
action on issues of major concern to the governor. In a 
Herald-Traveler column, political writer Edward Devin 
summarized: 
Some controversial legislation will be disposed 
of by sending it to a study by the newly created 
Commission on the Audit of State Needs. Bills 
based on requests of the Governor for legislation 
in various fields will be sent to the commission. 
These will include bills for state aid to 
education and the establishment of state-operated 
medical and dental schools and scholarships. 
(Boston Herald-Traveler. "Skerry Turns on 
Heat,House Docket Shrinks," 4/28/57, Section V, 
p. 6) 
Furcolo's relationship with Powers, Skerry and others 
in the Democratic leadership had deteriorated by early May 
of his first term to the point of jeopardizing his 
legislative program if not his prospects for re-election in 
1958. Powers, in particular, consistently challenged the 
governor on the sales tax issue. In May, the Senate 
president went so far as to spend two and one half hours 
before the Joint Committee on Taxation, making clear that 
he was "unalterably opposed to the thing the governor has 
advocated here" (Herald-Traveler. 5/3/57, "Opponents Blast 
Sales Tax Plan", p. 21). 
The administration in late spring of 1957, appeared to 
be adrift. There had been no major legislative victory, 
available political appointments remained vacant, and a 
general restiveness was growing within the governor's 
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party. Increasingly, the press pointed to ominous tidings 
in the governor's future. 
Currently, there is an element in the party which 
looks ahead to 1958 with apprehension. Governor 
Furcolo's administration is hardly sensational. 
Devoid of important accomplishments, it even has 
antagonized vital groups which helped in its 
election. The result is likely to be a big 
demand for the Republican nomination . . . 
(Herald-Traveler, 5/7/57, "This Is How I See It: 
Furcolo Rule So Far Devoid of Anything Hurtful to 
GOP," W. E. Mullins, p. 44) 
Entering Fall of 1957, Furcolo looked to be a wounded 
governor. His sales tax proposal had been soundly defeated 
by summer's end, the 1957 budget had been balanced only 
through a series of one-time savings, and there still was 
no significant initiative from the Commission on the Audit 
of State Needs. Moreover, in addition to the governor's 
program for education, he was committed to four other major 
legislative items—construction of a new state office 
building, establishment of the Massachusetts Port 
Authority, completion of the Massachusetts Turnpike and 
construction of a major parking garage in Boston—all 
projects steeped in cost as well as political 
contentiousness. 
Looking ahead to the election year of 1958 as 
determinative for his governorship, Furcolo moved to set 
his administration on firmer political footing. His first 
step was to take advantage of a vacancy in the Malden 
District Court to move Skerry out of the speakership. 
Furcolo realized that Skerry would remain an impediment to 
progressive legislation as long as he controlled the House. 
100 
The Democratic floor leader, John Thompson, who would 
likely succeed Skerry, was a Furcolo loyalist whom the 
Herald-Traveler had described as "Governor Furcolo's 
right-hand man during the 1957 session" (10/3/57, "This Is 
How I See It: Artesani Support Aids Thompson for Speaker", 
W. E. Mullins, p. 26). 
A strong-willed veteran of the General Court, Thompson 
had proved his loyalty to Furcolo by supporting the 
ill-fated sales tax proposal. As Mullins of the 
Herald-Traveler summarized: 
Although Rep. Thompson was appointed by Speaker 
Skerry to serve as Democratic floor leader, they 
subsequently came to a parting of the ways on 
important issues. During the 1957 session, 
Thompson ardently, supported the administration in 
the House while Skerry was a factor in the defeat 
of several administration projects, particularly 
the sales tax . . . (10/3/57, "This is How I See 
It: Artesani Support Aids Thompson for Speaker", 
p. 26) 
On October 8, Furcolo submitted Skerry's name to the 
Commonwealth's Executive Council (an elected body which 
must approve many gubernatorial appointments) for approval 
as clerk of the Malden District Court. The nomination to 
this choice political slot was part of a larger deal in 
which Skerry had agreed to deliver to Thompson key House 
votes (particularly Boston members who were inclined to 
support Representative John J. Toomey of nearby Cambridge) 
for the Speakership, while Furcolo had committed the jobs 
of state purchasing agent and registrar of motor vehicles 
to two Skerry loyalists (Mullins, "This is How I See It: 
Artesani Support Aids Thompson for Speaker," 10/3/57, p. 26). 
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On October 10, House Democrats met in caucus to 
unanimously endorse Thompson, virtually assuring his 
selection as Speaker when the full House reconvened in 
January. Later the same day, the Executive Council approved 
Furcolo's nomination of Skerry to the Malden clerkship. In 
November, Furcolo moved to shore up his own administrative 
team. Most significantly, he replaced Francis X. Lang as 
Commissioner of Administration (the most powerful cabinet 
post) with the governor's young special assistant and 
Western Massachusetts protege, Charles Mahoney. Seasoned 
beyond his twenty-eight years, Mahoney had held key posts 
in each of Furcolo's campaigns, had practiced law with the 
Governor between 1954 and 1956 and was acknowledged as 
✓ 
brilliant, savvy, and personable. Most of all, he held the 
governor's trust and provided a sure, loyal hand at 
Furcolo's side. 
With Mahoney in place, Furcolo also took steps to 
strengthen his ties with rank and file Democrats in the 
Legislature. In late December and early January, he began 
to schedule more frequent briefings for members of the 
Democratic leadership and on January 13, 1958 announced 
regularly established opportunities for individual 
legislators to visit him on issues of importance to them. 
As the Boston Herald-Traveler. a frequent critic 
editorialized: 
Governor Furcolo yesterday announced a new "open 
door'* policy to improve his liaison with the 
Legislature. Starting tomorrow, legislators are 
invited to his office from 2 to 5 pm to discuss 
102 
any problems or to speak their minds. Legis¬ 
lators will be received every Wednesday afternoon 
right through to the end of the session. This 
will mark an improvement in the governor's 
relationship with the legislature and will help 
eliminate much of the friction that existed 
during the 1957 session. It is only one of a 
number of steps that the governor is taking to 
assure as harmonious a year as possible. 
(Herald-Traveler. "Scene and Heard at the State 
House: Governor Seeks Improved Liaison with 
Legislature," 1/14/58, p. 24) 
Having taken steps to smooth the way for 1958, Furcolo 
also realized that he needed a major breakthrough on the 
legislative front to generate momentum for the election. 
Knowing that he had pinned great expectations on the 
Commission on the Audit of State Needs, Furcolo had to 
shake substantive policy recommendations out of the body. 
After its much ballyhooed introduction in Furcolo's 
1957 annual message, the Commission had faded into the 
background. Not only had it failed to meet its ambitious 
April deadline for a preliminary report, the Audit group 
had drifted away from its original focus on a prescribed 
set of broad policy issues, becoming instead a 
legislatively-driven research vehicle. Mullins of the 
Herald-Traveler assessed the Commission's work in a 
Christmas 1957 appraisal of Furcolo's first year in office: 
His Commission on the Audit of State Needs 
currently is overburdened with a multitude of 
demands for research in many areas. Instead of 
being used by the executive department, it has 
become an agency employed to inform the 
Legislature. There is the suspicion that the 
lawmakers have passed many of its own problems on 
to the Commission. (12/25/57, "This is How I See 
It: Governor Furcolo Survey Cites his Three Key 
Achievements," p. 48) 
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In 1958, Furcolo would turn to Mahoney and Malian to 
push the Commission back to its original policy focus and 
to move the group toward recommendations by springtime in 
order to allow the possibility of substantive legislation 
during the election-year legislative session. Mahoney 
recalls: 
By 1958 it had become clear to me that we were 
living in a hat box in the State House so I 
persuaded the Governor to let me exert control 
over the Executive Branch. That is why I went to 
Administration and brought the Audit of State 
needs physically under my office. I used it as a 
bully pulpit and a research tank. (Interview, 
July 27, 1993) 
Despite his best effort, Furcolo still faced 
significant hurdles in achieving his progrcun. Perhaps most 
prominent eunong these was the Commonwealth's continuing 
fiscal difficulties. With estimates of a potential deficit 
in the current fiscal year (ending June 30, 1958) of $47 
million (Herald-Traveler. "Record State Deficit Forecast," 
12/26/57, p. 1) as well as a projection that state costs 
could increase by $20 million in the next fiscal year 
without any expansion in services (Herald-Traveler, 
11/13/57, Editorial; "Paying for the HCG," p. 44), Furcolo 
faced a profoundly unpleasant decision as to reintroduction 
of his sales tax proposal. 
By the end of November 1957, the State Finance Board 
was calling the Commonwealth's financial situation "serious 
if not critical," pointing to a total state debt which had 
grown from $3.5 million in 1945 to $662 million in 1957 
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(Herald-Traveler, 11/21/57, "Furcolo Demands Economy 
Drive," p. 1). Such data left one pundit musing: 
Up on Beacon Hill, Governor Furcolo is wrestling 
with next year's budget and trying to decide 
whether to ask for a sales tax again. Virtually 
all his advisors say it will be poison to push 
this unpopular tax in an election year. And 
there is little evidence that the measure has 
changed since the Legislature said "no' this 
summer. Yet the need for additional funds 
becomes daily more obvious. (Herald-Traveler. 
Editorial, 11/13/57, p. 44) 
Any effort to reintroduce the sales tax would only 
inflame the second problem which continued to face the 
governor. Although Skerry had been removed as a thorn in 
the House, Powers remained as minority leader in the 
Senate. Looking for a Democratic majority in the upcoming 
election to ensure him the Senate presidency. Powers 
retained little regard for Furcolo, as he made clear in a 
December interview with the Herald-Traveler: 
As for myself, my contacts with the governor have 
not always been happy. Since he took office, I 
have sat down with him only four times. I had a 
feeling that I was not welcome. I took what I 
thought was a sound position in opposition to his 
sales tax and I continue to reserve my right to 
disagree . . . (12/30/57, William E. Mullins, 
"Sales Tax 'Folly' For Gov. Furcolo: Powers Gives 
Views on Session," p. 1) 
In his annual message to the Legislature on January 
1,1958, Furcolo sought to balance a clear acknowledgment of 
the Commonwealth's fiscal reality with a commitment to 
progress on a number of fundamental legislative issues: 
The matter of our fiscal rehabilitation continues 
to be one of our most pressing problems. Despite 
increasing economies in every phase of 
governmental operation, our fiscal condition 
remains critical. I shall in my budget message 
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for FY 1959, define those policies which have 
been adopted in order that the substantial 
additional revenue requirements might be reduced 
to a bare minimum. Economy has been and must 
continue to be our watchword, but at the same 
time we must not permit the elimination of valued 
and necessary humanitarian programs which we have 
long labored to establish and maintain. Despite 
the enforcement of the most rigid economy 
possible, despite the stringent curtailment of 
all departmental requests for FY 1959, and 
despite the acceptance of certain measures, 
substantial sums of additional revenue will be 
required for fiscal 1959 without the enactment of 
any additional programs or the provision of 
further services. This is our inheritance. 
While I do not deem it possible for us to 
undertake many desirable and needed additional 
activities and programs during the coming year, 
we shall not turn our backs upon tomorrow. We 
must face the future with confidence and with the 
recognition that the people of this Commonwealth 
expect of their government realistic and forward 
looking policies. (Senate 1, 1/1/58) 
In the area of higher education, Furcolo continued to 
press for a progressive agenda while looking to the Audit 
Commission to give his program both substance and 
credibility. In his annual message, he urged the 
Commission to focus its efforts on issues of access for 
future high school graduates. 
The first quarterly report of the Commission 
demonstrated the demand for post high school 
educational opportunities which we must soon face 
in this Commonwealth. Within the next ten years 
between thirty and fifty thousand qualified young 
men and women will be denied the opportunity of 
self-improvement through training beyond the high 
school unless new and additional public 
facilities are provided for them. The Commission 
on the Audit of State Needs has continued its 
investigation into the difficult questions 
involved in providing adequately for our existing 
institutions, and at the same time, it is seeking 
answers to the questions surrounding the 
establishment of additional facilities. Our 
objective must be to provide quality education, 
adapted to the needs of a complex and growing 
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society, provided for in the most economical 
manner and on a sound fiscal basis. (Senate No. 
1, 1/1/58) 
As Furcolo completed his annual address, Speaker-elect 
Thompson was moving to consolidate his power and, in doing 
so, set the foundation for the governor's legislative 
program. The Herald-Traveler's Edward Devin summarized 
Thompson's moves: 
It will not be a happy New Year, however, for a 
number of House Democrats because shortly after 
Representative John Thompson (D-Ludlow) takes 
over as Speaker there will be shifts made in key 
positions, changes that are bound to cause 
repercussions. In the major change. 
Representative John T. Tynan, an outspoken 
Democratic legislator from South Boston will be 
dropped as assistant floor leader, or "whip” and 
he will also be dropped as a member of the 
powerful House Rules Committee. Tynan will be 
replaced as party whip by Representative 
Cornelious J. Kiernan of Lowell it was reported. 
This will be an important step for it means that 
Kiernan will be in line shortly for the position 
of Democratic floor leader. Representative 
Charles Artesani of Allston is scheduled to be 
appointed floor leader by Thompson as soon as the 
House is organized today. Artesani is also 
reported to be in line for appointment by 
Governor Furcolo as presiding justice of the 
Brighton District Court to replace the late Judge 
Thomas H. Connelly. 
As soon as Artesani is appointed to the 
bench — it won't be for awhile yet — Kiernan 
will move up to the position of Democratic floor 
leader. In another move, former Representative 
Joseph D. Ward of Fitchburg will be dropped as 
Counsel to the House Committees. He will be 
replaced by former Senator Albert S. Previte Jr. 
of Lawrence. (Herald-Traveler. 1/1/58, p. 1) 
This purge, which included the removal of two 
Republicans who had opposed Furcolo's financial program 
from the Ways and Means Committee, permitted Thompson to at 
once demonstrate his intention to rule with an iron fist. 
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remove key members who had separated themselves from 
Furcolo and establish a team loyal to the Ludlow Democrat 
rather than to Skerry. Mullins summarized the moves by 
writing, "Speaker Thompson apparently has moved to 
eliminate as far as may be all opposition to the Furcolo 
administration" (Herald-Traveler. 1/3/58, "This is How I 
See It: Boston Democrats Facing Liquidation as House 
Chiefs," W. E. Mullins, p. 12). 
With the new year underway, therefore, major reform in 
Massachusetts public higher education was undeniably linked 
to the success of Thompson's speakership, to an improvement 
in Furcolo's legislative relations, to the outcome of other 
major legislative initiatives (including the governor's 
decision concerning another try at a sales tax), to the 
unfolding election campaign, and to the status of the 
commonwealth's economy. Furcolo's staff had strongly 
advised the governor against resubmission of the sales tax 
proposal (Herald-Traveler. 11/13/57, Editorial p. 44). 
Even with Thompson in the Speakership, the prospect of 
another bitter tax battle threatened to deflect attention 
away from other key initiatives. And, ultimately, another 
overwhelming defeat could cost Furcolo a second term. 
In his budget proposal to the legislature for Fiscal 
Year 1959, presented as House I on January 21, 1958, 
Furcolo held back from reintroduction of the limited sales 
tax proposal. The governor, however, did call for "a long 
range solution providing for fiscal rehabilitation of the 
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Commonwealth" (House No. 1, 1958). Moreover, he argued 
once again that "the overall tax structure of this 
Commonwealth is antiquated and outmoded for our present and 
future purposes" (House No. 1, 1958). 
Examining the details of Furcolo's budget plan for 
FY59 brings his dilemma into clear focus. An unabashed 
progressive, he sought major expansions in state spending 
for programs in areas such as mental health and education. 
Once again, however, the governor was constrained by a 
worsening fiscal situation as well as a recalcitrant 
legislature unwilling to vote for new taxes. 
The Governor's budget proposal called for $418,025,577 
in total state spending, an increase of some $65 million 
over the total appropriation of the previous year (House 1, 
1958). 
Furcolo's recommended spending for the Department of 
Education totalled $37,126,720, an increase of over $3.4 
million. Of the total amount recommended for Education, 
over $16 million was dedicated to the University of 
Massachusetts, Lowell Technical Institute, the 
Massachusetts Maritime Academy and the ten state teachers' 
colleges (House No. 1, 1958). 
House I was mute on the subject of community colleges, 
awaiting recommendations from the Commission on the Audit 
of State Needs. What seems clear, however, from rhetoric 
of both the governor's annual address and his budget 
message, is that Furcolo believed that ultimately the 
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CommonwGalth could not sustain his progrsssive agenda 
without the foundation provided by additional revenues. 
While only referring to the limited sales tax measure 
as his solution of the previous year "to meet the dual 
problem of providing adequately for essential State 
revenue, and of providing relief for the homeowners and 
rent payers of the cities and towns of the Commonwealth" 
(House No. 1, 1958). Furcolo did reintroduce a withholding 
tax measure. The withholding tax appealed to Furcolo as 
both a means of "assuring collection of taxes when they are 
due" (House No. 1, 1958) and as a means to secure a revenue 
windfall he would later estimate at up to $17 million 
(Herald-Traveler. "Forgive Clause may Save Tax," 8/4/58, p. 
1). 
The 1958 Legislative Program 
Furcolo's team pulled together the pieces of its 1958 
legislative program as it also prepared for an intense 
spring debate over his budget, for the report of the Audit 
of State Needs concerning education and for the heat of the 
year's election battle. 
Again, the sales tax would sit at the core of 
Furcolo's agenda. Despite the best arguments of his staff 
and his own admission that "I have been advised by 
Legislative members of both parties that there is no 
possibility of the membership adopting such a program" 
(House No. 1, 1958), Furcolo would decide to reintroduce a 
bill calling for the highly contentious tax, believing to 
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it to be the best option by which a progressive 
Massachusetts government could meet its obligations. 
During the spring, as debate over the sales tax began 
anew on Beacon Hill, Furcolo's administration finalized a 
major legislative program for the heat of the election 
year. The governor achieved two moderately significant 
victories in the spring with imposition of an additional 
penny per package tax on cigarettes and an increase in the 
number of Supreme Court justices from 32 to 38. By 
mid-summer, however, the Globe"s S. J. Micicche could still 
rightly claim that much remained to be done: 
With the election just three months away, 
administration forces will launch a "crash 
effort" to improve Governor Furcolo's legislative 
record in these intervening weeks. To a governor 
seeking re-election the tally of his legislative 
successes and failures carries the equivalent 
importance of a baseball player's batting average 
when it comes time to renew contracts. While 
Furcolo has managed to better his mark of last 
year, several major recommendations still await 
action. His legislative record for November 
rests largely on the fate of these pending 
matters. (8/4/58, Evening Edition, S. J. 
Micciche, "The Political Circuit: Furcolo Starts 
Sprint for Legislative Record," p. 17) 
In addition to the sales tax, seven other major bills 
formed the core of Furcolo's legislative program. First, 
the withholding tax, which would be twice approved by the 
House in April and July of 1958 only to die in the 
Republican Senate. 
The third major legislative initiative for 1958 was a 
long-awaited measure to activate the Massachusetts Port 
Authority. Created in 1956, the Port Authority had 
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rGmainGci dormant pGnding final iGgislativG and 
gubGrnatorial approval of a provision in its Gnabling 
legislation which SGt a 4% CGiling on thG ratG at which it 
could markGt its bonds. Furcolo's special messagG 
permitted the authority to raise its rate ceiling 
contingent upon a set of state controls, including the 
right of the state auditor to examine Authority records, 
appointment of a financial advisor, and legislative 
approval of the final rate (Herald-Traveler. 8/1/58, Edward 
Devin, "Furcolo Insights On Port Rein: Leaves Issue of the 
Board's Role to Legislature," pp. 1 & 9). 
The fourth major legislative proposal for 1958 was 
construction of a state office building in downtown Boston. 
Key to the Furcolo proposal for a $30 million building was 
creation of a private non-profit corporation to manage the 
development. The governor's proposed corporation consisted 
of State Public Works Commissioner Anthony DiNatale, 
Chairman of the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority William F. 
Callahan, and State Public Safety Commissioner Otis M. 
Whitney. 
The fifth measure of major importance called for 
construction by the Turnpike Authority of a second tunnel 
across Boston Harbor to enhance transportation between the 
downtown and Logan International Airport. 
Sixth on the Governor's legislative slate was 
construction of a public parking garage under Boston 
Common. Viewed by the administration as critical to 
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downtown vitality, estimates indicated that the garage 
would cost approximately $30 million. 
Seventh on the list of gubernatorial priorities was a 
$43 million bond issue to support unemployment relief. 
Reduced from an original proposal of $50 million prepared 
during the 1957 session, the bill was "the nub of the 
governor's unemployment program," which also included 
extension of unemployment relief benefits, a new vocational 
retraining program, and accelerated construction of 
Division of Employment Security offices (Globe. 8/4/58, p. 
17). The bond issue, which would support new state jobs, 
was by August 1958 locked in the Senate Ways and Means 
Committee amid debate over thirteen proposed amendments 
(Globe, 8/4/58, p. 17) and questions over the implications 
of the measure for the high state debt amid signs that 
Massachusetts was emerging from the national recession. 
Eighth, and perhaps closest to Furcolo's heart, was 
the long-awaited Audit Commission proposal for a $111 
million higher education expansion, including $24 million 
for creation of a community college system in the 
Commonwealth. 
The Audit of State Needs and the Governor's Community 
College Program 
In late March, the Commission on the Audit of 
State Needs had finally issued a preliminary report on 
higher education. Malian had heavily influenced the report 
which included proposed legislation for major expansion of 
public higher education in the commonwealth. Building on 
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Furcolo's rhetoric of the past two years, the Commission 
Report described a "crisis in higher education" hitting 
squarely on the issue of access: 
There is growing agreement among educators and 
authorities about the growing shortage of higher 
educational facilities. National and regional 
studies, those made in other states and the work 
of the Special Commission on the Audit of State 
Needs all show that public and private 
institutions together do not at present have the 
facilities, faculty or finances to meet the 
rapidly rising tide of college enrollments. 
(House 3035 of 1958) 
The Commission pointed to a set of imposing 
demographic projections as it called for both an expansion 
of the existing fifteen public institutions of higher 
learning and the creation of a network of regional 
community colleges: 
The simplest way to express the growing shortage 
in MA higher education is to say that by 1967 the 
number of qualified Massachusetts residents 
seeking admission to colleges within the State 
may range from 107,000 to 118,000 to a possible 
higher figure of 133,000. 
But even if all public and private colleges 
expand to the maximum they now plan, they will 
have room for only about 68,000 full-time 
undergraduates from this State. This would mean 
a shortage of college places running from 39,000 
to 50,000 to a possible 65,000. (House 3035) 
In addition to recommending "a unified over-all plan 
for public higher education in Massachusetts" (p. 10) which 
would address "the over-all expansion and coordination of 
our educational system including curricula and programs of 
study at all institutions" (p. 10), the Commission report 
offered a comprehensive case for "the immediate development 
of a statewide system of regional community colleges, under 
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the direction of a new Board of Regional Community 
Colleges” (p. 14). 
The Commission pointed to wide-ranging benefits which 
could accrue from development of such a community college 
system. The benefits of this system would be great to the 
student and his parents, who would save from an average of 
$2,000 in the cost of the first two years of college; to 
the secondary school which could find that many more 
students would be motivated to continue their education, to 
business and industry, which would find available a new set 
of trained and skilled employees; to the tax payer who 
would be saved the much greater costs of further expanding 
four-year residential colleges; and to the entire 
Commonwealth and the nation which would gain in the 
knowledge and skills of its young men and women (p. 14). 
While drawing heavily on national data to support its 
recommendations for a system of regional community 
colleges, the Commission also looked closely at the 
individual character of Massachusetts to define the 
financing and governance models for the system. 
In terms of financing, the Commission recommended 
that, unlike other states, which relied on county and/or 
local support of community colleges, Massachusetts would 
have to rely on state coffers. The large geographic size 
and diminutive political power of Massachusetts counties 
combined with the diversity of local government models in 
the Commonwealth to lead the Commission to full financing 
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by the State, with local contributions coining in the form 
of dedicated space (p. 58). In addition, the Commission 
was influenced by the fact that Massachusetts property 
taxes were already second highest per capita in the nation 
and that any added burden could jeopardize college 
development (Lustberg, p. 116). 
Governance was also to be centralized at the state 
level and separated from the Board of Education and its 
recalcitrant Commissioner, Owen Kiernan. The Commission 
viewed the proposed Board of Regional Community Colleges as 
a dispassionate authority able to rise above the political 
fray on issues such as community college locations and 
budgets. Moreover, as Coles (1977, p. 4) has written 
The Audit Commission urged the development of a 
state-wide system of regional community colleges 
under the direction of its own board because 
members of the Commission did not want the 
colleges to be merely adjuncts to secondary 
education or other institutions of higher 
education. (p. 4) 
The Board would serve as an advocate for the institutions 
in a Commonwealth whose "long emphasis on private education 
and other factors have combined to create a situation where 
many citizens are unaware either of general needs in higher 
education or the possibilities of such institutions as 
community colleges" (p. 59). Morrissey would write in 
later years that statewide coordination was the only option 
seriously considered (Quoted in Lustberg): 
Here [Massachusetts] the organization of two-year 
public colleges has been undertaken by a single 
state board without local control or direct local 
responsibility for operations. In the 
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Massachusetts setting, there is reason to believe 
not only that it was the best solution but that 
it may have been the only solution. (p. 117) 
The Commission recommended that the Board's membership 
include the state's Commissioner of Education, the 
President of the University of Massachusetts, the President 
of Lowell Technical Institute, and a president of a state 
teachers college elected annually. The total membership of 
the Board would be nine with the other five members 
appointed to overlapping five-year terms (p. 65). A 
board-appointed Executive Director would hold 
responsibility for "preparation of an over-all plan to meet 
the need for community college education in the entire 
State" (p. 66). 
While leaving the exact locations of individual 
colleges and precise definition of regions to the Board, 
the Commission pointed (p. 15) to nine general regions 
deserving attention: 
1. Metropolitan Boston 
2. Lowell-Lawrence-Haverhill-Essex County 
3. New Bedford-Fall River-Taunton-Attleboro-Bristol 
County 
4. Greater Worcester 
5. Greater Fitchburg 
6. Franklin-Hampshire Counties 
7. Springfield-Hampden County 
8. Pittsfield-North Adams-Berkshire County 
9. Cape Cod-Plymouth 
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The Commission envisioned that the immediate physical 
needs of the nascent community colleges would be met 
"through the use of high schools or other temporary 
facilities (p. 66). Over the longer term, the Commission 
looked to the Board to develop a state-wide plan to "make 
possible large savings to the taxpayer through uniform 
architectural planning and the large-scale purchase of 
supplies, equipment and library books" (p. 66). Finally, 
the Commission called for passage of a bond issue by the 
Commonwealth to pay for capital charges associated with 
construction and major equipment purchases (p. 66). 
The Commission report was comprehensive and, given the 
strong influence of Mahoney and Malian, presented a 
community college program that was wholly consistent with 
Furcolo's goals. Still, however, debate existed within the 
administration as to the wisdom of presenting a strong 
regional college bill to the Legislature in 1958. 
The report had generated no groundswell of support 
either in communities across the Commonwealth or in the 
General Court. Moreover, there remained the issue of 
Massachusetts' fiscal problems. Any new and expansive 
program would be a hard sell particularly at a time when 
Furcolo was mulling another attempt to secure passage of a 
sales tax. 
So daunting were the hurdles that Furcolo recalls 
meeting with some twenty-five of his advisors from inside 
and outside the government. Twenty-four argued against 
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P^^suing a conununity colleg© bill at that timG; onG arguGd 
"I had onG votG," Furcolo rGiiiGnibGrs, "so wg WGnt 
ahGad" (IntGrviGW, 1988). 
ThG pGriod of March through NovGmbGr of 1958 is 
arguably thG high watGr mark of thG Furcolo administration. 
During this tima, as ha pursuad tha community collaga bill 
as wall as ssvsral othsr ksy piscss of Isgislation, ons 
SGGS tha govarnor at his bast. 
Particularly in tha community collaga bill, Furcolo 
damonstratad a focus and a political affactivanass that 
this author baliavas ha navar aguallad. Mahonay racalls 
that during this pariod, tha govarnor workad thraa to four 
hours a day on aducational issuas (Intarviaw, July 27, 
1993). In doing so, Furcolo draw on tha formal and 
informal powars of his offica. Lustbarg has writtan (1979, 
p. 118): 
Daspita tha work of Malian and all tha aducators, 
lagislators and othar mambars of tha Spacial 
Commission on tha Audit of Stata Naads, this work 
would hava baan 117 pagas of wall-documantad but 
usalass matarial had it not baan for Govarnor 
Furcolo. (p. 118) 
With Furcolo claarly angagad and in control, tha 
administration pursuad an aggrassiva thraa-part stratagy. 
First, tha govarnor and his aidas mat ragularly with 
lagislators individually and in small groups. Furcolo 
ramambars thasa maatings as attampts to "aducata" thosa who 
quGStionad tha naad for ragional community collagas and to 
"convince the legislators who already felt there was a need 
but who didn't want to spend the money because they didn't 
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believe the state could afford to spend the money” 
(Videotape: "The Massachusetts community College Story: The 
Early Years"). 
Second/ the administration sought to create grass 
roots support among key constituencies in those areas 
tentatively slated for establishment of community colleges. 
Such support would not only help the cause of regional 
colleges locally but also/ it was hoped, would have an 
impact in the General Court. As Furcolo recalls 
(videotape): 
We had to try to go in the back door. By that I 
mean, we had to set up committees in the 
districts of the various legislators to try to 
educate the people in those districts in the hope 
that they then would put some pressure on members 
of the Legislature. 
We had what was perhaps the most ambitious 
citizen participation program in the nation, 
where we had citizens participate in every phase 
of government. 
And so we set up what we called advisory 
groups of prominent citizens and influential 
people in every region of the state and we 
proceeded to educate them and see if we could get 
some support. 
Third, and perhaps most important, Furcolo took one of 
the most decisive actions of his governorship. Culling the 
Audit Commission report to its essential themes, the 
governor and his staff developed a special message for 
presentation to a joint session of the legislature on July 
1, 1958. 
In his special message, (The State's Responsibility 
for Higher Education, Seriate 760 of 1958), Furcolo 
energetically engaged legislative and public opinion 
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leadership. Drawing on his capacity to create an audience 
by calling a special session, he set forth the case in 
support of his higher education program. The speech 
deserves attention for at least three reasons. 
First, it stands as eloquent testimony to the passion 
with which Furcolo viewed educational issues. Calling the 
challenges which faced public higher education in the 
Commonwealth a "problem of almost overriding importance in 
our public life" (Senate 760), the governor left no doubt 
as to the priority which he personally placed upon the 
issue. 
Second, Furcolo framed the debate in terms 
understandable to average families. He addressed in stark 
terms the impact of inadequate facilities upon access for 
high school graduates across Massachusetts. 
The recent report of the Special Commission on 
the Audit of State Needs has demonstrated 
conclusively the magnitude of the problem which 
faces us in post high school education. The 
Audit Commission study shows that the minimum 
number of qualified Massachusetts residents 
seeking admission to college will rise from 
approximately 78,000 in 1957 to 88,000 in 1960 to 
99,000 in 1962 and to 123,000 in 1967. If every 
public, private and parochial college in 
Massachusetts increases its capacity to the 
limits which it now anticipates, there will be a 
minimum shortage within the next 10 years of at 
least 39,000 places for qualified young men and 
women seeking post high school education. I wish 
to emphasize that the actual shortage may rise 
above 29,000 to 50,000 or more. This is roughly 
three times the present enrollment at all 15 
state colleges in Massachusetts. It is roughly 
six times the present total enrollment at all the 
state teachers colleges. (Senate 760, p. 16) 
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Furcolo built from his fundamental argument of access 
to make the case for a statewide system of regional 
community colleges. His arguments echo those of the 
Special Commission and give additional insight into the 
governor's broad vision for two year institutions. He 
summarized that a community college system "has many 
advantages for students, for parents and for taxpayers". 
(Senate 760, p. 17) He outlined six such benefits; 
1. For Families of Limited Income — "Colleges within 
commuting distance, enabling students to live at 
home, can mean a savings to the student and the 
family of from $1,400 to $4,400 for the first two 
years. Such savings will, in many cases, mean 
the difference between going to college or not 
going to college." 
2. For Personal and Family Convenience - ". . . the 
presence of a regional community college within 
an area makes it both possible and desirable for 
students to attend college who otherwise have 
neither the hope nor the possibility of 
furthering their education." 
3. For an Adequate Supply of Technical Personnel - 
"Modern business and industry require not only 
newly trained employees but the constant 
upgrading and retraining of those already at 
work. A system of regional community colleges 
will permit those industrial and vocational needs 
to be met in every region of Massachusetts." 
4. For High-Quality Standards and Accreditation - 
"With high quality standards in a state system of 
regional community colleges, qualified students 
will be permitted to transfer in the junior year 
to the state university, the teachers colleges, 
the technical institutes and to other public and 
private colleges . . . Fully equipped and 
properly staffed regional community colleges will 
be a source of regional pride and will benefit 
from maximum regional participation." 
5. For Adult Education and Community Purposes - " A 
community college system will provide evening and 
adult programs for people 'from 18 to 80' who 
wish either vocational or non-vocational 
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schooling. In addition, a regional community 
college can serve as a cultural center and a 
source of expert consultants and advisors to many 
kinds of businesses, professional and 
governmental activities.” 
6. For the Benefit of Taxpayers - "I wish to 
emphasize that substantial savings can be 
achieved by the development of a state-wide plan 
for regional community colleges, utilizing a 
single, basic architectural plan benefitting from 
large scale purchase of supplies." (pp. 17-19) 
To his special message, Furcolo attached a proposed 
capital outlay bill that incorporated all of public higher 
education. Included in the total capital outlay of more 
than $111 million was $24 million for "plans, site 
acquisition [and] construction of nine regional community 
colleges" (Senate 760. p. 39). 
Furcolo formally requested a capital outlay bond issue 
of some $43 million for fiscal year 1959 to initiate the 
$111 million educational development program proposed by 
the Commission on the Audit of State Needs. Twenty-four 
million dollars of that amount remained earmarked for 
establishment of the community colleges. This 
recommendation quickly became locked in the House Ways and 
Means Committee amid concerns for the state's level of 
bonded indebtedness, anxiety about the growing operating 
deficit in 1959 and Republican demands for more coherent 
plans concerning community college development (Globe, 
10/7/58, p. 11). 
To break the logjaun, Furcolo and Thompson agreed to 
push for immediate passage of only the community college 
piece of the legislation. In addition, the Governor and 
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Speaker agreed to press only for the authorization to 
appoint the Regional Board and to establish its powers 
consistent with the recommendations of the Commission on 
the Audit of State Needs. Funding would be left to a 
separate capital outlay bill to follow (Herald-Traveler. 
8/12/58, Edward Devin, "House Passes Four Furcolo Bills: 
Witholding Port Authority Plans Passed," p. 4). With the 
election closing in and Furcolo facing the prospect of a 
tough fight with Republican gubernatorial nominee (and 
incumbent state Attorney General), George Fingold, August 
was set as the month of decision for major pieces of the 
Governor's legislative agenda. In strategy sessions with 
key aides and his allies in the Legislature, Furcolo agreed 
to a plan which would send four essential parts of his 
program (withholding tax, state office building, community 
college authorization, and Port Authority activation) to 
the House in a manner which tied the success of each one to 
that of the others. 
Thompson intended to present the bills in a tightly 
defined sequence which would begin with the withholding 
tax, follow with the $30 million state office building 
proposal, the education plan and finally with the 
activation of the Port Authority. Only after passage of 
the first three measures would Thompson allow a vote on the 
Port Authority bill (Globe. 8/11/58, Evening Edition, 
"House Passes Withholding Tax Again," p. 1) which was very 
much supported by key members of the House. 
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At 1:00 PM on August 11, Thompson gaveled the House 
into what would be a marathon session that would run until 
after 3:00 AM the following morning. As expected, the 
withholding tax measure was approved by voice vote after a 
motion for its rejection was defeated by a roll call vote 
of 140-86 (Herald-Traveler. 8/12/58, p. 4). The $30 
niillion office building proposal was approved next, 
allowing Thompson to move to the community college 
proposal. 
During two hours of debate on the education bill, 
Wojtkowski and others argued on behalf of the measure 
against Republicans who called the plan "a political move" 
in an election year (Herald-Traveler, 8/12/58, p. 4). 
Frank Giles (R-Methuen), the Republican floor leader, 
railed against the community college bill, arguing that it 
was "thrown to the people in an election year as a 
political morsel to try and make voters think the 
Democratic Party is deeply interested in the education of 
our youth" (Globe, 8/12/58, William J. Lewis, "4 Furcolo 
Bills Passed: Withholding Tax Voted; 9 Colleges Approved. 
$30 million State Office Building Ok'd," p. 13). Pointing 
to the Commonwealth's continued financial challenges, Irene 
K. Thresher (R-Newton) claimed, "We shouldn't kid the 
people into thinking they can have things we cannot afford 
to give them" (Globe, 8/12/58, "4 Furcolo Bills Passed: 
Withholding Tax Voted; 9 Colleges Approved. $30 million 
State Office Building Ok'd," p. 13). 
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The depth of conservative Republican opposition to the 
community college program and the level of passion of both 
sides of the issue was evident in an incident involving a 
member of the Grand Old Party which the Globe summarized:: 
One of the first to speak against the governor's 
multi-million community college and education 
program. Rep. Theodore J. Vaistses (R-Melrose) 
stated that he had been threatened in the House 
lobby for his refusal to go along with the 
governor's program. Just a few hours ago out 
there," asserted Vaistses, as he pointed toward 
the lobby, "I was threatened by one of his [the 
governor's] cohorts who told me something would 
happen to me for not being cooperative." 
Vaistses then added, "There's no reason for 
somebody like William Callahan to send fear down 
on us." (Globe. 8/12/58, "4 Furcolo Bills 
Passed: Withholding Tax Voted; 9 Colleges 
Approved. $30 million State Office Building 
Ok'd," p. 1) 
In the end, however, Thompson and his allies such as 
Representative Wojtkowski held the cards on the bill. 
Only two amendments were added to the measure, both by 
Wojtkowski and both with the purpose of strengthening the 
proposed Board's independent power. The first amendment 
authorized the Board to exercise the power of eminent 
domain in securing sites for the nine proposed community 
colleges while the second (which did not survive in the 
Senate) gave the Board power to set teachers salaries 
without prior approval by the Legislature or the State 
Department of Personnel and Standardization {Globe, 
8/12/58, p. 13). The bill passed by voice vote with these 
amendments in place. 
With passage of the first three bills in hand, 
Thompson brought the Port Authority bill to the floor. 
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After a significant debate in which several Furcolo demands 
(e.g., his call for a state audit of PA finances) were 
deleted, a bill approving an interest rate ceiling of 5% 
for Authority bonds was approved (Globe. 8/12/58. p. 13). 
The four measures moved on to the Senate where one 
experienced observer (Globe. 8/12/58, p. 1) correctly 
predicted a rockier path: 
But the real battlefield for all four of these 
measures is expected to be in the Senate where 
the GOP holds a slim but stubborn two-seat 
margin. The Senate has been the graveyard for 
most of the Furcolo administration program this 
year and last. (p. 13) 
The community college bill faced a number of powerful 
adversaries in the Senate chamber. Most notably, Ralph C. 
Mahar (R-Orange), a staunch fiscal conservative and chair 
of the Ways and Means Committee, increasingly questioned 
both the notion of delegating expansive powers to an 
untested Board and the financial implications of increasing 
state debt to fund the proposed institutions. 
Republican fears concerning the debt had intensified 
during the summer months of 1958 as Furcolo proposed a 
series of measures requiring debt financing. In addition 
to the $43,350,000 which would be required for educational 
expansion and $43,375,000 for unemployment relief, the 
Governor had by late August also proposed a $12,884,000 
overhaul of the Commonwealth's prison facilities 
(Herald-Traveler. 8/19/58, Killiam, p. 1). This nearly 
$100 million of new bonded indebtedness was layered on top 
of a projected deficit in the current fiscal year of some 
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$50 million (Boston Herald-Traveler. Editorial, "All on the 
Cuff," 8/19/58, p. 22). The growing debt situation had 
recently resulted in a Wall Street reduction of the 
Commonwealth's rating from AAA to AA (Globe, 10/11/58, p. 
1). In the face of such indebtedness, Mahar recommended 
that the community college bill be shelved for study 
(Herald-Traveler, 8/13/58, p. 1), a position supported by 
the Herald-Traveler in an August 16 editorial: 
Governor Furcolo is reportedly incensed because 
the Senate is taking time to deliberate a little 
on his regional college bill. The fact that the 
upper chamber has not rubber-stamped the measure 
as quickly as the House did makes him suspect a 
plot to defeat the project. 
This urgency is unseemly and unnecessary. 
There is even less reason why the legislature 
should "vote first and talk afterwards" on this 
measure than on the emergency job bill which the 
Governor tried to rush through in the same manner 
earlier in the session. Providing educational 
opportunities for our young people, though 
important, is necessarily a long-range 
undertaking. There must be months of detailed 
planning before any buildings can rise or any 
students be enrolled. 
The governor has a good idea but the 
legislation in which he has embodied it shows his 
own too hasty follow-through. It is hasty and 
incomplete. He wants the General Court to 
provide $24 million for the construction of nine 
regional community colleges and entrust all the 
details of development and administration to a 
still-to-be named board. But he offers no proof 
that his precise number of colleges is needed. 
He merely suggests the probable locations of the 
institutions. He says nothing about the 
recruitment of faculty. And he makes no mention 
of maintenance and other continuing costs 
(estimated by the MA Federation of Taxpayers as 
upward of $20 million annually). Most important 
of all, he fails to show how Massachusetts, which 
cannot meet its regular departmental expendi¬ 
tures, is going to finance this enormous addition 
to its overhead. (Herald-Traveler, Editorial, 
"Time To Deliberate," 8/16/58, p. 4) 
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Recognizing that to permit the General Court to study 
his community college proposal and assume overt control 
over decisions such as campus locations would tie the 
measure up indefinitely while also politicizing the 
future, Furcolo and his aides developed a strategy 
to force the Senate into action. 
First, the Governor turned to Seymour Harris, 
distinguished Harvard economist, member of the Audit 
Commission and proponent of public higher education, to 
make the economic case for the community college plan. In 
the remaining years of his governorship, Furcolo would find 
no more loyal and respected public spokesman on behalf of 
two year colleges. In a letter to the editor of the 
Boston Herald-Traveler. Harris challenged the August 16 
editorial in the same newspaper and developed the arguments 
which he would utilize in the months ahead: 
The $20 million annual estimated cost quoted by 
you of the Massachusetts Tax Federation is 
absurdly high. General educational costs for 
junior colleges are $50-600. Hence, the correct 
figure is about $5 million per year. 
Massachusetts is just about last in public 
provision of higher education. The legislature 
has a heavy obligation in this field. Can it 
afford to delay? (8/28/58, "Junior College Plan 
within State Means," p. 18) 
The governor played as well a critical trximp card 
within the Republican Senate majority. Edward C. Stone, 
the aging Brahmin from Hyannis who had long sought a junior 
college for his district, became the point person in the 
Senate for the community college bill. As a conservative 
and wealthy businessman. Stone's Republican credentials 
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were impeccable. And as a senior member of the Ways and 
Means Committee, he had the institutional strength to force 
a deal on the issue by Mahar and the Republican leadership. 
Of Stone's role, his good friend Wojtkowski has said 
(Interview, June 1993): 
Stone made that bill fly in the Senate. He was a 
man who was committed to education, to a regional 
college for the Cape in the vacant Maritime 
buildings, and to public works programs. Most of 
all, he was a respected Republican power. 
Without him, there would have been no community 
colleges. 
Furcolo played the Stone card by allowing the Senator 
to lead on and gain credit for Senate adoption of the Port 
Authority bill. This legislation was of tremendous 
importance to Stone and his fellow Republicans. As such, 
by turning to the veteran member of Ways and Means as his 
point person on the Port Authority measure, Furcolo also 
solidified his relationship with a critical supporter of 
the community college initiative. As Mahoney recalls, "We 
horsetraded, giving them the Port Authority in exchange for 
the community colleges" (Interview July 27, 1993). 
Furcolo accepted, in turning to Stone, a further blow 
to his already poor relationship with Powers. The Senate 
minority leader had remained largely silent during the 
summer concerning Furcolo's legislative progrcun. The 
governor's willingness to turn to Stone on the Port 
Authority bill, however, combined with past tension over 
the sales tax, left Powers once again angry at the governor 
and unwilling to actively promote the community college 
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legislation. As Mullins of the Boston Herald summarized 
(8/27/58, "This is How I See It: Senator Powers Confused by 
Furcolo Port Bill tactics," W. E. Mullins, p. 14): 
The attitude of Powers toward pending legislation 
desired by the administration will be observed in 
efforts to assess the political consequences of 
this apparent breach between him and his party's 
standard bearer . . . 
It was indicated that if the administration 
had taken him into its confidence 10 days ago the 
entire dispute might have been compromised before 
it burst onto the Senate floor. The episode 
revealed that the administration does not rely on 
him as an official spokesman and it was 
particularly disappointing to him because the 
spokesman was Stone, an undeviating Republican. 
One of the administration's pet measures awaiting 
disposition calls for a vast expansion in public 
education facilities. Stone has ardently 
supported a crucial part of this program. Powers 
has not given any public indication of his 
position on this legislation. 
The third key part of Furcolo's strategy was an 
intensive public effort to counteract arguments against his 
program. Furcolo's battle plan as the election approached 
increasingly focused on a campaign against the Republican- 
controlled Senate, which the governor blamed for his lack 
of legislative success during the past months (Globe. 
8/13/58, William J. Lewis, "Pressure G.O.P. Furcolo Urges 
Voters on T.V.," p. 1). 
Furcolo opened this public campaign during two 
televised appearances paid for by his campaign committee on 
August 12 and 13. Arguing vigorously for his education 
proposal, Furcolo painted to his Republican opponent. 
Attorney General George Fingold and state GOP chairman 
Daniel ("Chuck") McClean as "trying to kill my education 
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program by attempting to put pressure on members of the 
Republican-dominated Senate." He further implored voters 
to "tell your Republican senators you want this bipartisan 
education program" (Globe. Lewis, 8/13/58, p. 1). 
The fourth part of the governor's game plan was to 
continue to separate authorization of the regional board 
from the capital outlay proposal for campus planning and 
construction. 
By fall, the Furcolo strategy had crystallized and his 
political position solidified. His opponent, Fingold, had 
died suddenly on August 31, leaving the Republicans in 
disarray. The late attorney general's replacement as a 
candidate faced the prospect of igniting a campaign from 
ground zero and held little prospect of defeating the 
incumbent governor. 
Thus, with his position strengthened, Furcolo moved to 
capitalize. General agreements had been reached with both 
the House and Senate leadership that in exchange for final 
administration acceptance of the Port Authority bill. 
Republicans would acquiesce to passage of three key 
gubernatorial initiatives—a second Boston Harbor crossing 
to be constructed by Callahan's Massachusetts Turnpike 
Authority, the Boston Common garage and the independent 
Callahan-led corporation to build the $30 million state 
office building. 
With Stone's leadership decisive, Furcolo had also 
secured sufficient votes to pass the legislation 
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authorizing establishment of the regional community college 
board. Stone's leadership in navigating the bill through 
the choppy Senate waters during the throws of an election 
campaign was masterful. 
The final Senate vote in support of the regional board 
stands as testimony largely to Stone's power and his 
determination. It stands also as Furcolo's reward for 
turning to the Republican brahmin to secure a critical 
victory. Finally, it is testimony to the governor's wisdom 
in packaging the legislature with other bills that were 
important to Stone and other key political actors. On 
October 3, Furcolo signed Chapter 605 of the Acts of 1958, 
authorizing establishment of a regional community college 
board to plan and develop a system of two-year colleges in 
the Commonwealth. Still uncertain, however, were the 
futures of Furcolo's two major bond proposals for 
unemployment relief and education expansion. As bond 
issues, each required a 2/3 majority in both the House and 
Senate, a difficult prospect at best. 
The unemployment relief measure faced a particularly 
difficult course. When the measure was first introduced in 
March, 1958, Massachusetts and the rest of the nation had 
been mired in a recession. By October, the economy looked 
to be improving, with the governor himself pointing to 
30,000 new jobs in private industry and $600,000 having 
been spent on new industrial construction during his term 
(Herald-Traveler. 10/3/58, Edward Devin, "Senate Revives 
133 
Jobless Aid Bill: Parties Clash on Need of Fund,” p. 5). 
Despite several resuscitations in both the House and Senate 
during early October, the unemployment bond issue would 
ultimately die on the House floor on October 7 after what 
the Herald-Traveler labelled "Acid” (Herald-Traveler. 
10/8/58, Edward Devin, "House Kills $43,475,000 Job 
Projects; Furcolo Bill Lacks Two-Thirds Vote After Acid 
Debate,” p. 1). 
The capital outlay was thus left as the last major 
Furcolo legislative initiative of 1958. 
As the employment relief bill was moving toward its 
political grave, the House Ways and Means Committee was 
moving to pare down the capital outlay bill. As the full 
House began debate on the outlay at 3:00 pm on October 7, 
the original amount of the bond issue for regional colleges 
had been cut by the Committee from $24 million to $8 
million (Globe. 10/7/58, Evening Edition, "Capital Outlay 
Bill Sent to House," p. 29). 
Early in the House debate. Republican Floor Leader 
Giles moved to eliminate the community college piece of the 
outlay entirely, a motion which was defeated on a roll call 
of 104-93 (Globe, 10/8/58, William J. Lewis, "House Kills 
Jobs Bond Issue: 118-89 Vote Less Than Two-Thirds," p. 23). 
Giles received the support of Representative Tynan for his 
effort. Tynan, a victim of Thompson's purge, said, "It is 
utterly ridiculous to vote this outlay when the Ways and 
Means Committee cannot even now tell us where these 
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colleges are to be located or even how many students they 
are to accommodate" (Globe, Lewis, 10/8/58, p. 23). 
Following Giles' initial thrust, a number of motions 
were filed which reduced the community college outlay to 
sums ranging from $320,000 to $1 million (Globe, Lewis, 
10/8/58, p. 23). Each was defeated on roll call votes. 
The most significant challenge, however, came in a 
parliamentary maneuver by Giles. Not long after debate 
begun, he filed a motion to postpone action on the outlay 
until the next day to allow further study. Despite 
Thompson's opposition, the measure passed on a roll call of 
122-82. Recognizing that such delay could mean the death 
of the bill, Thompson quickly recessed the House until 7:00 
pm that evening. 
Although little is known of exactly how Thompson used 
the hours available, it is known that when the House 
reconvened it voted 106-94 to reconsider the postponement 
measure and that by 1:30 a.m. of the next morning, the 
House had approved a capital outlay for college development 
which included $8 million to plan and develop community 
colleges. 
Debate in the Senate over the capital outlay was even 
more contentious than in the House, and given the 
Republican majority, its outcome was far more questionable. 
Senate ways and Means Chair Mahar was pointing toward 
major cuts beyond those in the House—citing as his 
rationale the Commonwealth's growing debt and precarious 
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bond rating (Globe, 10/11/58, William J. Lewis, "Senate 
Cuts Outlay Bill $20 Million: Education Items Slashed by 
Half in State Budget," p. 1). 
The bill which emerged from the Senate was indeed a 
significantly reduced version of that passed by the House. 
In cutting the total capital outlay proposal bill by $20 
niillion, the Senate slashed the portion devoted to 
education projects by one-half. The $28 million bill 
passed with almost no debate in the upper chcimber and cut 
the community college outlay from $8 million down to $1 
million, a figure recommended by the Senate Ways and Means, 
despite an attempt by Sen. William Fleming (D-Worcester) to 
restore the $8 million figure on the Senate floor. 
Fleming's effort failed on a roll call vote of 15-15 (A 
two-thirds majority necessary to approve bond issues) 
(Globe, Lewis, 10/11/58, p. 1). 
Mahar's arguments were seconded by other members of 
the Republican majority, such as Harrison Chadwick who 
argued: 
The capital outlay program [passed by the House] 
contains a blank check for $8 million to be spent 
by the governor's proposed community college 
commission which has not yet been appointed. It 
contains no emergency items—nothing that cannot 
wait until the next session. (Herald, 10/12/58, 
Edward Devin, "Scene and Heard: Words of Wisdom 
by Johnson Chadwick Ignored as House Votes $48 
Million for Capital Outlay," p. 18) 
Ironically, as the Senate was slashing the community 
college outlay, Furcolo moved to appoint the Board of 
Regional Community Colleges (Globe, 10/11/58, "Furcolo 
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Names 12 Members to College Board," p. 3) (A full list of 
original Board is provided in Appendix C). The Board was 
largely comprised of leading educators and supporters of 
the Governor's community college initiative. Chapter VII 
provides a detailed discussion of the MBRCC and its 
activity during the period 1958-62. 
Furcolo and his allies were faced with a moment of 
stark political reality. As a House-Senate Conference 
Committee began its efforts to mesh the two versions of the 
capital outlay bill, the Governor and community college 
advocates in the House faced three options. 
First, they could attempt to force Senate conferees 
into accepting a higher dollar value for the outlay and for 
community colleges. 
Second, they could focus solely on the community 
college section of the bill, seeking to increase its 
appropriation, irrespective of the cimounts set aside for 
other parts of the bill. 
Third, they could accept a small but partial victory 
by accepting the Senate cuts, choosing to press on and 
fight another day. 
Recognizing that the first two options each risked 
losing everything in a renewed fight as the Legislature 
concluded its session, Furcolo and his allies opted for the 
third route. As House Ways and Means member Anthony 
Schibelli explained at the time, "Let us accept what the 
Senate will give us rather than nothing at all" (Herald, 
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10/16/58, Edward Devin, 'Prorogation Due Today: House 
Passes Capital Outlay Bill 151-158," p. 22). 
Having adopted this strategy, the House and Senate 
moved quickly toward agreement, sending a final capital 
outlay bill of $28 million to the Governor's desk before 
perogation October 16. On the same day, the Governor 
signed the legislation which included $1 million to begin 
development of community colleges in Massachusetts (Herald. 
10/17/58, Edward Devin, "$408,180,000 Session Ends, State 
Debt Reaches Billion Mark: Furcolo Blasts Senators," p. 
17) . 
With passage of the reduced capital outlay bill, 
Furcolo's attention turned first to re-election, then to 
the Commonwealth's continued fiscal dilemma and to 
implementation of key parts of his agenda including the 
community college program. 
Furcolo's strategy revolved around emphasis on his 
efforts both to provide fiscal stability and to lead an 
activist government in pursuit of progressive goals. 
Moreover, he continued to focus strong attacks on the 
Republican-controlled Senate, labeling it "one of shame, 
fraud, deceit and political fakery" (Boston Herald. 
10/17/58, Devin, p. 17). In doing so, he hoped to achieve 
not only his re-election but the long-awaited Democratic 
control of the legislature. 
The Governor accomplished his goals with a solid 
across-the-board victory in November. Winning nearly 
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1,100,000 votes to approximately 815,000 for his new 
opponent. Gibbons, Furcolo carried Democratic majorities 
with him in both the House (147-93) and the Senate (24-16). 
Furcolo and soon-to-be Senate President Powers would have 
the chance to reconcile their tempestuous political 
relationship. 
As the Governor prepared for his second inaugural, 
however, all was not bright on his horizon. Most 
significantly, the governor continued to see little 
alternative to the sales tax as the foundation for his 
progressive agenda, despite signs that the economy was 
beginning to lift itself out of recession. Ironically, the 
economy's improvement in some ways made Furcolo's 
challenges more complex; for, as the recovery settled in, 
both the Legislature and the general public felt less 
urgency to attack the deficit through the Governor's tax 
program. Thus, as prospects for the sales tax and 
withholding proposal continued to diminish, Furcolo's 
maneuverability also declined as he sought to implement his 
ambitious program in the face of a still limited capacity 
for new spending. 
Clearly, Furcolo needed to identify some mechanism to 
pay for his prograan or else lose much of it during the 
upcoming budget debate of spring 1959. Although he stopped 
short of formally reintroducing either the sales tax or the 
withholding program, the rhetoric of both the Governor's 
inaugural and his subsequent budget proposal indicate his 
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continued belief that they offered the only responsible 
means by which government could continue to meet its 
obligations. 
Arguing in his inaugural address that Massachusetts 
would need $25 million in new revenue "just to carry on the 
regular services to the public for the next six months and 
for the twelve months starting July 1, the State will have 
to raise $65 million to continue present services (Globe. 
1/5/59, Evening Edition, "Must Raise $90 Million, Says 
Furcolo," p. 12). Furcolo labeled the Commonwealth's 
fiscal dilemma "the greatest challenge ever to face state 
government" (Globe, 1/5/59, "Must Raise $90 Million, Says 
Furcolo," p. 1). 
Still, however, the Governor remained passionately 
committed to the core elements of his progressive agenda. 
In describing this agenda, he moved quickly to the area 
nearest to his heart (Globe, 1/9/59, "Abolishment of Milk 
Control Commission Urged. Also Asks New Approach to Tax 
Policies Structure," p. 13). 
Last year, in a special message to the General 
Court, I recommended a blueprint for action 
designed to enable the Commonwealth to assume its 
full share of responsibility in meeting the state 
and national crisis in higher education. That 
program included the planned expansion of 
facilities at the University of Massachusetts, 
the state teachers colleges, the Massachusetts 
School of Art and the Lowell Technical Institute. 
The Massachusetts Board of Regional 
Community Colleges was established last year in 
order to provide a statewide system of high 
quality, low-cost education in every section of 
the Commonwealth. We must now implement the 
authorized program of the Board of Regional 
Community Colleges and I shall later make 
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necessary recommendations for this purpose. 
(House No. 1, 1959) 
In his budget submission (House I) for FY60, delivered 
in January 1959, Furcolo made no separate request for 
additional funds to support the community college program 
or the regional college board. Instead, he left any such 
proposal to later in the spring and concentrated additional 
budget dollars for education on the personnel needs of 
Massachusetts' existing institutions. In requesting 217 
new positions for the Department of Education, he stated: 
In my Special Message to the Legislature of last 
year on "The Responsibility of the Commonwealth 
in Higher Education," I pointed out that 
accompanying the recommendations for the physical 
expansion of badly needed educational facilities 
must be adequate support to recruit and retain 
competent teaching and administrative personnel. 
I, therefore, requested that the Informal 
Coordinating Committee of the Presidents of the 
public institutions of higher learning make a 
comprehensive study of the minimum salary and 
staffing administrative personnel. I believe 
that they have successfully and responsibly 
demonstrated the need for additional support. 
Although the Board carried primary statutory 
responsibility for implementing a community college 
program, Furcolo continued to serve as advocate, both 
behind the scenes with legislators and in public 
appearances around the state. As detailed in Chapter VII, 
he lobbied hard on behalf of Wojtkowski's bid for a 
Pittsfield college as well as for seed money to support the 
first campus and operations of the Board of Regional 
Community Colleges. 
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By summer 1959, however, the Governor's attention was 
again diverted by the sales tax issue. Having finally 
achieved victory in January on the withholding program, 
Furcolo had resubmitted the 3% limited sales tax to the 
General Court. Despite his passionate entreaties and 
promises of property tax relief, the Democratic House 
defeated the measure by an overwhelming 197-24 margin on 
August 6, 1959, ending any chance of passage that year. 
In documenting the Furcolo administration, the failure 
of the sales tax stands as a chronic political bete-noire 
for the Governor. Like Prometheus struggling vainly to 
push his heavy stone up an unforgiving mountain, Furcolo 
three times returned to the ill-fated tax as a means to 
provide stable revenue for his ambitious program. 
Honorable in his intent and only a matter of years ahead of 
history on the issue, the Governor paid a high price for 
his guest. Alienated from members of his own party, 
perceived as pushing for more taxes in the face of an 
improving economy and buffeted by the ripples of three 
major political losses on the issue, it is impossible to 
quantitatively measure the impact of the sales tax on other 
parts of his program. But it is undeniable that it had an 
impact and that the impact on the Furcolo governorship was 
significant. 
Fall 1959 also found the Governor consumed by other 
difficult legislative issues beyond the sales tax and 
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community college development. Two stand as particularly 
informative. 
First, during the summer, the Governor had supported 
legislation raising the salaries of faculty at the 
University of Massachusetts and the ten state teachers 
colleges. Arguing that the state's fiscal situation 
precluded more, Furcolo failed to push for concomitant 
increases for the other 35,000 state workers, including 
non-faculty at the Commonwealth's institutions of higher 
education. This position was endorsed by outgoing 
University President Mather as well as other college 
presidents, but earned the ire of pro-labor Democrats such 
as then Boston mayoral candidate Powers as well as state 
employees and union leaders. The Legislature would 
ultimately pass a general pay increase. 
At the same time, debate was proceeding on a capital 
outlay bill totaling some $22 million which the Governor 
had submitted late in the legislative session. Inspired by 
an improving economy and probably in no small measure by 
the upcoming advent of an election year. House members had 
added some $80 million to the bill before sending it on to 
the Senate. Ironically, none of the proposed spending was 
dedicated to community college planning or development. The 
Upper House, in a similar spirit of largess increased the 
outlay to $34.6 million before passage. 
In mid-September, with both general pay increases and 
the nearly $35 million outlay on his desk awaiting 
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signature, the Governor shocked his legislative colleagues 
by vetoing nine major pieces of the latter bill (Globe, 
9/16/59, William J. Lewis, "Legislature Fails in Windup 
Drive," p. 1). An angry and tired Legislature was forced 
to remain in session to respond. It did so, resoundingly 
defeating the vetoes on roll call votes on September 16 and 
17(Globe, 9/16/59, William J. Lewis, "Lawmakers Quit After 
8 Months/" p. 1). 
Thus, the Governor ended the 161st session of the 
General Court facing a still testy relationship with the 
Democratic majority in both houses. 
Completion of this somewhat rocky legislative session 
allowed Furcolo to focus on the next chapter of his 
political life, speculation about which had mounted as to 
whether he would make another run against Senator 
Saltonstall in 1960. 
The Governor's annual special message to the General 
Court (Senate No. 1, 1960) could be seen as setting the 
stage for the Ccunpaign to come. Reaching beyond education 
which had been the bell-weather issue of his 
administration, Furcolo identified seven issues as his 
"positive state prograon" to spur economic development in 
the year ahead. 
1. Natural resources and the promotion of related 
technologies 
2. Programs of economic assistance and industrial 
promotion 
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3. Improved transportation facilities 
4. Protection of consumer interests 
5. Progress in labor management 
6. Greater odiousness and economy in operation of 
state government 
7. Constitutional revision and reform 
In his budget submission for FY61 (House No. 1, 1960), 
the Governor proposed a total of $34,382,057 in state 
spending, including $900,000 of new expenditures for 
essential state services and a total increase of some $3 
million in General Fund requirements. Of the $900,00 in 
new expenditures recommended $85,000 was slated for the 
MBRCC to help in the opening of Berkshire. This community 
college proposal was markedly less that the $200,000 
requested by the Board, a fact which is at least as 
reflective of the still tenuous state of legislative 
support as it is of the Governor's continued sense of 
fiscal fragility. 
The Governor's budget also called for more than 
$58,000,000 in capital construction projects for the 
upcoming fiscal year, including over $30,000,000 to 
complete the three-year educational plan submitted in 1958. 
Although there was little chance of this aggressive outlay 
passing, it offered more than election-year posturing. It 
again demonstrated the Governor's deep-seated belief in 
educational access. As he noted in his budget address 
(House No. 1, 1960): 
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In this budget more than 1200 new students have 
been provided for in September of this year at 
our institutions of public higher education, and 
this increase in student capacity reflects 
construction approved over the past three years. 
The need for additional higher education 
facilities is increasing, however, and the years 
immediately ahead promise to produce an 
unprecedented demand for added classrooms, 
laboratories, etc. for the qualified young 
people of Massachusetts. The progrcun that I am 
recommending will assist thousands of 
Massachusetts students to take full advantage of 
higher educational opportunities, and will enable 
Massachusetts more effectively to meet the 
educational challenge of the present and the 
future. 
The Governor's announcement of a Senate run had 
combined with the Presidential bid of favorite son, John F. 
Kennedy, to energize the Massachusetts political scene. 
While some six Democrats battled for the nomination to 
succeed the governor, the first-term Mayor of Springfield, 
Thomas O'Connor, opened a long-shot bid to defeat Furcolo 
in the Democratic contest to select Saltonstall's opponent. 
A full review of the 1960 election in Massachusetts 
lies beyond the scope of this study. It is ironic, 
however, that as John Kennedy's political star achieved its 
zenith, that of his rival Foster Furcolo fell suddenly from 
the sky. 
Having won the party's nod at its June convention, 
Furcolo moved to the September 12 primary as the odds-on 
favorite for formal nomination. O'Connor, however, refused 
to quit the race, arguing both that the Governor had 
coerced support from convention delegates and that Furcolo 
ultimately would do no better against Saltonstall than he 
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had in 1954. While Furcolo campaigned on his achievements 
in areas such a higher education, O'Connor relentlessly 
portrayed himself as an outsider who had cut taxes each 
year of his term as Springfield's Mayor (Globe, 9/12/60, 
Advertisement, p. 3). 
O'Connor's vigorous campaign caught hold in the late 
summer weeks. A series of alleged scandals in the 
purchasing and public works areas of state government hurt 
the Governor as investigations loomed. Moreover, Furcolo 
was probably damaged by the nearly inevitable outcomes of 
two terms in executive office—an intangible public desire 
for change to a new younger generation of political 
leadership (not unlike the mood that helped carry Kennedy 
to the presidency) as well as the cumulative scars of 
legislative battles. As political columnist John Harris 
summarized on the eve of the primary (Globe, 9/12/60, 
"Rebel Democrats Enliven Election," p. 26), "The dissenting 
vote has often proved significant in past primaries when 
Governors seek re-election or other office when their terms 
draw to a close." 
O'Connor's victory in the Democratic primary was 
shocking, as he claimed over 268,000 votes against the 
Governor's more than 218,000 (with some 70,000 votes to 
Middlesex County Registrar of Deeds, Edmond C. Buckley). 
O'Connor had accomplished a smashing victory in what would 
prove to be Furcolo's last campaign. It is poignant and 
ironic that one of the final stops of that last campaign. 
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opening ceremonies at the new Berkshire Community College 
on September 10, had to be postponed due to the threat of 
Hurricane Donna. An emotional Furcolo, unable to complete 
his remarks, would attend that ceremony as outgoing 
governor in December, 1960. 
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CHAPTER VI 
VOLPE: THE COMMUNITY COLLEGE PROGRAM BEGINS TO GROW 
Every governor or elected official assumes office with 
a distinct set of priorities that are driven partially by 
the temperament and background of the individual and 
partially by the moment in which he or she governs. Just 
as Woodrow Wilson came to power with a priority commitment 
to economic reform only to be cast as world leader during 
the Great War, so too did Foster Furcolo come to his 
governorship with a progressive agenda centered on his 
personal commitment to education only to have fiscal 
reality and legislative difficulties draw him into new 
battles over tax policy. 
John Volpe assumed the Massachusetts governorship with 
his own set of priorities and his own value structure. A 
successful self-made Republican contractor, he believed in 
government's responsibility to support major social 
programs in areas such as education and mental health. He 
was, moreover, committed to cleanse state government of 
corruption and cronyism, while promoting constitutional 
reforms that would make the infrastructure of government 
more modern and efficient. Most of all, Volpe was at heart 
a builder who sought to expand the Commonwealth's 
construction activity while maintaining fiscal restraint 
and providing property tax relief. 
149 
Unlike Furcolo, Volpe did not hold education, much 
less community colleges, as his primary area of interest; 
although he endorsed expansion of the two-year community 
college system. It is important to emphasize, however, 
that while his support of education was sincerely felt and 
helped to spur the expansion of community colleges, it was 
not fundamental to Volpe's governorships. 
It is this dichotomy—the willingness of Volpe to back 
community colleges as good things which offered attendant 
political benefits, combined with his apparent lack of 
focus as to either the frcimework of the community college 
system or its mission that opened a vacuum of policy 
opportunity for others to fill. The story of Volpe's 
governorship as it relates to community colleges and to 
educational issues in general is largely a story of how 
momentum created by his predecessor combined with events as 
well as with the efforts of leaders in both the Legislature 
and the community college movement to draw a willing 
governor toward a significant expansion in campus 
development. 
The 1960 Election 
The election of 1960 electrified Massachusetts as its 
junior Senator became the youngest man and first person of 
Irish Catholic descent to achieve the presidency of the 
United States. But as John F. Kennedy swept the 
Commonwealth by a margin of 500,000 votes (Globe, 11/9/60, 
John Harris, "Bay State Splits for Jack, Salty, Volpe, 
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McCormack," p. 1) over Vice President Richard M. Nixon, two 
other major Democrats were facing surprisingly one-sided 
defeats in races for statewide offices. 
Having defeated Furcolo in the Democratic primary. 
Mayor O'Connor carried on his aggressive campaign against 
the stalwart Senator Saltonstall. Despite his attempts to 
set himself as a vigorous alternative to "Salty", 
Massachusetts voters opted for the established Republican 
Brahmin by some 299,000 votes (Globe, 11/9/60, Late 
Edition, C. R. Owens, "Volpe Wins by 132,000, Saltonstall 
Margin 299,000," p. 1). 
In the race for Governor, Secretary of State Joseph 
Ward survived a primary challenge from six other Democrats 
to earn the right to face Republican businessman John A. 
Volpe. Despite Kennedy's big win. Ward carried the burden 
of a bitter and divisive primary contest as well as the 
continuing investigation of alleged corruption within the 
MDC and DPW. These disadvantages combined with a smaller 
than expected pro-Ward vote in Boston to ensure a 
Republican win. Volpe, who had never before sought 
elective office, captured the governorship with a plurality 
of 132,000 votes (Globe, 11/9/60, Late Edition, Owens, p. 
1). 
Amidst the euphoria of his victory. Governor-elect 
Volpe faced the reality of increased Democratic control in 
the Legislature. Twenty-four Democrats would sit in the 
upcoming 162nd session of the Senate, as opposed to 14 
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Republicans (the margin in the previous session had been 
21-17). The Democrats had also increased their margin in 
the House, to 143-92 (Globe. 11/10/60, William J. Lewis, 
"Slim Pickin's for Bay State GOP,” p. 12). 
Volpe was surrounded as well by a full slate of 
Democratic state constitutional officers. Edward 
McGlaughlin of Boston was elected to serve as Lt. Governor. 
Attorney General Edward McCormick was re-elected to the 
post of Attorney General. Representative John Driscoll of 
Boston won the contest for Treasurer, with Kevin White 
elected to succeed Ward as Secretary of State. Finally, 
Thomas Buckley, a Democrat who was carrying out the 
investigations into the M.D.C. and D.P.W., earned 
re-election as Auditor. 
Thus, despite Saltonstall's victory, Volpe's election 
was an aberration in the campaign of 1960. As Globe 
political reporter John Harris wrote in a retrospective two 
days after the election (Globe. 11/10/60, John Harris, 
"Volpe, Salty Didn't Squeak in . . ., They Raced," p. 1): 
. . . There is no question that he won widespread 
acceptance as a successful businessman deeply 
interested in civic affairs. 
But his election won a heavy assist from 
what the Democrats did to themselves in the 
primary and an even greater assist from voters 
who wanted to show their disapproval of the 
scandalous situation that was revealed in the 
M.D.C.'s operations. 
The Governor-Elect 
Volpe, himself, was something of a new breed of 
Massachusetts Republican. In a state whose GOP leadership 
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had been comprised largely of Brahmin stock, the 
52-year-old Governor-elect was a self-made man who had 
built a major construction business from ground zero. 
A former journeyman union plasterer, Volpe had taken 
evening classes at Boston's Wentworth Institute before 
quitting his job to become a full-time day student. To 
support his day studies, he took a job selling shirts in 
the evening. 
Upon completion of his studies, the future governor 
opened Volpe Construction with $500 borrowed from a friend. 
In World War II, he gave up operation of his business to 
become a civil engineer in the Navy. Following the war, 
Volpe returned to his construction business and led it to 
prominence throughout New England. 
In 1953, Republican governor Christian Herter 
appointed Volpe (who had become Deputy Chairman of the 
Republican State Party in 1950) to the post of Commissioner 
of Public Works. Appointed by President Eisenhower as 
Federal Highway Administrator shortly thereafter, Volpe 
helped the administration develop the massive national 
highway program of the 1950s. Upon his return to 
Massachusetts, Volpe again moved to a position of 
prominence in the business community, becoming President of 
the Boston Chamber of Commerce. 
The Volpe Agenda: 1961 
Three key factors shaped the first year of the Volpe 
administration. First, was the new governor's attempt to 
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capitalize on public dissatisfaction with the alleged 
corruption and mismanagement in the MDC and DPW by making 
political and constitutional reform synonymous with his 
administration. Second, was Volpe's personal history as a 
builder and his innate interest in issues related to 
construction: to creating roads, bridges and buildings as 
fundamental cornerstones of his legacy. Third, Volpe faced 
the dilemma of achieving his program in the face of 
Democratic majorities in the Legislature who were already 
looking to a return to executive power in 1962. 
Volpe's inaugural address, which the Boston Globe 
described as "moderate” (Globe. 1/5/61, Late Edition, C. R. 
Owens, "Volpe Calls a Halt: Plans Changes in DPW, MDC, MTA. 
Bars New Spending with $1 Billion Debt," p. 1) sought to 
establish the new governor as an agent of reform who would 
maintain progress on key fronts while ensuring fiscal 
prudence. He offered few specific proposals and made no 
direct references to higher education or community 
colleges. 
Reform was the major topic as the Governor's address 
called for reorganization of both the MDC and the 
DPW—recommending that each agency be run by an executive 
director instead of the existing multi-commissioner format. 
He also called for a standard code of ethical conduct for 
all Massachusetts public officials, saying that it was time 
to "rebuild public respect for our government" (Senate I, 
January, 1961). Finally, Volpe set the stage for future 
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proposals on constitutional reform by arguing that "there 
is an overwhelming need for action" (Senate I, 1961) to 
modernize the infrastructure of state government. 
The Governor's ensuing budget message (House No. 1, 
1961) for Fiscal Year 1962 is interesting on several 
fronts. First, its rhetoric concerning fiscal affairs is 
remarkably similar to that of Furcolo in 1956 and not 
unlike that which one would expect of any governor assuming 
power from a member of the opposing party: 
I found when I started work, on this budget that 
there was $25 million less to work with than I 
had looked forward to a month earlier to pay for 
state purposes and local aid. (House No. 1, 
1961) 
Arguing that there were 5,000 more state employees 
than five years earlier (707 in education), Volpe pointed 
to his overall $57 million reduction of departmental 
requests for the upcoming fiscal year. This said, he 
called for an $11,000,000 increase in total general fund 
appropriations, labeling it "the minimum required to meet 
obligations for which we are committed" (House No. 1, 
1961). 
Of 245 recommended new positions in state government, 
Volpe slated 62 for the new regional colleges, the second 
highest figure (after the Belchertown Nursery) awarded any 
department or agency. The Governor also recommended an 
additional 59 new positions for the University of 
Massachusetts and 13 for the Commonwealth's state colleges. 
155 
Overall funding for the community colleges was also 
markedly increased. As summarized in Table 1, the proposed 
total budget for community colleges was nearly $551,000, an 
increase of almost $400,000 over the FY61 appropriation. 
Some $37,000 of this amount was earmarked for the Board's 
operating costs, while the remainder was divided among the 
four nascent colleges (Berkshire, Cape Cod, Metropolitan 
Boston and Northern Essex). 
In describing the rationale for these proposed 
increases, Volpe's words again echoed these of Furcolo in 
their professed commitment to access (House No. 1, 1961): 
The 13 positions for the state colleges will 
allow them to enroll 450 more students as 
planned. The expansion program of the University 
is based on taking 600 more students in 1962 and 
provides 50 clerical, technical and maintenance 
positions for new buildings and for administra¬ 
tion. 
For the Regional Community Colleges, 53 
positions are for a planned first year enrollment 
of about 800 at Boston, Haverhill, and Hyannis, 
and nine more positions for the second year at 
Pittsfield for 150 students. 
This the total of 134 college positions will 
make it possible to enroll 2,131 additional 
students making a grand total of 19,385 as 
compared with 17,254 now in state operated 
colleges. 
Clearly, Volpe was presenting a vision for community 
college development which was consistent with Furcolo's 
agenda. By May, when the Legislature concluded the 
shortest session in its history, almost all of Volpe's 
recommendations for community college expansion would be 
enacted. 
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It appears logical, then, to assume that education 
remained a high priority and high visibility issue for the 
new governor. Interestingly, however, a review of major 
press during the first year of the Volpe administration 
generates nary a major speech or gubernatorial message 
focused on community colleges. Nor do those who observed 
the governor at the time remember him as a passionate 
advocate for community colleges. Wojtkowski recalls, "It's 
fair to say Volpe wasn't a big education person in terms of 
his basic priorities. He was a builder" (Interview, July 
21, 1993). 
By March, Volpe had initiated a significant effort to 
push lawmakers into supporting his recommended 
reorganization of the MDC and DPW as well as his proposed 
code of ethics and a reform of the Massachusetts 
constitution. Specifically, the governor sought to 
modernize the 180-year-old document by moving to four-year 
gubernatorial terms and by establishing coterminous service 
by key executive branch officials (e.g., commissioner of 
administration, purchasing agent, comptroller, budget 
director, personnel director) and the governor. In the 
general concern for good and efficient government, Volpe 
had found an issue than could separate him from the 
Democratic establishment in the Legislature and possibly 
earn him popular legislative victories that could in turn 
provide momentum for the rest of his program. 
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The push for reform dominated much of the Boston media 
discussion during the spring 1961 session of the 
Legislature. As prominent legal scholars and public 
officials joined the media to support a constitutional 
convention to modernize the Constitution, legislators began 
to board the bandwagon. Speaker Thompson went so far as to 
float the idea of a joint session to debate both four-year 
gubernatorial terms and the idea of a graduated income tax 
which Democrats had traditionally found appealing as a 
basis for substantive tax reform. 
Beyond political and constitutional reform, Volpe's 
attention focused on a delicate issue concerning the New 
Haven Railroad. On the verge of bankruptcy, the carrier 
had turned to the governors of New York, Connecticut, Rhode 
Island and Massachusetts for relief. Statutorily, if Volpe 
moved to aid the New Haven Railroad, he was also required 
to assist the Boston and Maine. In committing himself to 
tax relief for the railroads as well as to state assumption 
of various maintenance functions such as bridge repair and 
to the state purchase of a railroad right-of-way between 
Boston and the southeastern city of Braintree to be used 
for rapid transit development, the governor presented what 
one observer called ”the biggest legislative package which 
must be resolved this year” (Globe. 3/7/61, S. J. Micciche, 
”$1.2 Million 'Safe Haven” Bill Given Legislature by Volpe 
Today,” p. 1, and 4/21/61, S. J. Micciche, “Thompson Hits 
Volpe Rule As 'Era of Good Feeling,'” p. 8). 
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The railroad measure would generate partisan 
controversy throughout the spring as Thompson and other 
Democrats criticized such extensive tax relief for the two 
carriers (Globe. 4/21/61, S. J. Micciche, "Thompson Hits 
Volpe Rule As 'Era of Good Feeling,'" p. 8). 
On the construction front, Volpe's early attention 
focused on agreements for a $170 million extension of the 
Massachusetts Turnpike into Boston and on a new $127 
million "inner belt" roadway through the state capital. 
The Turnpike extension was the more contentious. It 
had stalled over the issue of whether it should be a toll 
road or a freeway. Turnpike Authority Director (and 
Democratic powerhouse) William Callahan strongly supported 
a toll road under his agency's direction while the new 
governor endorsed a free route. Agreement on the issue 
would elude the two throughout Volpe's term, as would a 
final go-ahead on the inner beltway. 
Other major public construction projects were about to 
start in Metropolitan Boston. With 90 per cent federal 
funding. Route 95 North and South of Boston as well as 
Route 93 through the city were underway. Final design 
competition was in progress for a new government center and 
city hall complex in downtown Boston, preparatory work 
continued on the Boston Common garage. The new state 
office building and the second harbor tunnel—all passed 
during Furcolo's 1958 legislative push. On the private 
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side, the long-awaited Prudential Tower finally seemed 
ready for a go-ahead. 
Still, by the end of April, Volpe could point to few 
major legislative accomplishments. Democrats in the 
legislature were already talking of bringing the session to 
a close. Boston Globe political analyst, William Lewis, 
viewed the governor's prospects as bleak (4/21/61, "Little 
Done . . . but Done Fast," p. 17): 
The 1961 legislative session to date has been 
mostly sound and fury. Much legislation has been 
killed outright or sidetracked. Little 
legislation of major import has cleared the 
branches. It has been a stalemate in the 
Legislature clearly dominated by the Democrats. 
Virtually all of Republican Governor Volpe's 
legislative program is in limbo and apparently 
destined for defeat. 
As is often the case, the waning moments of the 
session saw a last minute flurry in the Legislature with 
Volpe achieving at least a portion of his legislative 
priorities. Most significantly, the governor secured 
passage of both three-year 60% tax relief for the railroads 
and the power to purchase the Boston-Braintree 
right-of-way. In addition, the Legislature approved a 
modified reorganization of the MDC which maintained the 
four-person governing commission but gave the agency's 
director expanded powers (Globe. 6/1/61, James H. Hammond, 
"MDC Reorganized; Murphy Now Czar," p. 4). The Legislature 
failed to act, however, on the Governor's proposals 
concerning constitutional reform, an ethics code, the inner 
belt roadway, or reorganization of the MTA and DPW. 
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Of particular interest for this study, however, is the 
rather odd fact that as the Legislature was putting the 
brakes on many of Volpe's major initiatives, it joined him 
to support significant increases in day-to-day operating 
appropriations for a variety of state agencies. 
By the time the Legislature ended the shortest session 
in its history on May 25, 1961, it had passed and the 
governor had signed a budget of over $483 million for the 
upcoming (1963) fiscal year as well as a supplemental 
appropriation of some $4.5 million to close the books on 
Fiscal Year 1961 (which would end June 30). This increased 
spending reflects a growing sense in the General Court that 
the Commonwealth's worst fiscal woes were over and that the 
economy was in a period of growth. For the Legislature the 
net result was an explosion of pent-up demand for spending 
on a range of projects. As Wojtkowski remembers "there was 
money to spend." 
In accepting the largest budget in the Commonwealth's 
history, the Legislature and Volpe also tacitly accepted an 
inevitable budget deficit for Fiscal Year 1962. Estimates 
by state fiscal officers indicated that the $483 million 
budget would result in a deficit of between $5-10 million 
and that an additional $18 million would be necessary to 
match the normal increases in state costs during the 
1962-63 fiscal period (Globe. 5/24/61, C. R. Owens, 
"Deficit Bound Volpe Serene," p. 17). This last minute 
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largesse allowed both Volpe and the Legislature to claim 
victory on several important fronts. 
The budget provided the governor at least some sense 
of achievement and movement in areas across state 
government. Moreover, as shall be discussed subsequently, 
in areas such as higher education, the budget allowed Volpe 
to give key legislators victories in their home districts. 
Finally, as C. R. Owens of the Globe noted in a 
retrospective on the 1961 session, the inevitable deficit 
of FY92 offered Volpe the opportunity to again engage the 
sales tax issue. Writing that "there hasn't been a 
governor in recent memory who has faced the prospect of 
deficit spending with more equanimity than does John A. 
Volpe, " Owens went on to speculate (Globe. 5/24/61, Owens, 
p. 17): 
It is more likely that the governor will wait 
until next year before asking the Legislature to 
enact the tax measure to provide the needed 
money. The 1962 Legislative session will have 
five or more months before the Commonwealth 
actually runs out of funds. With an empty 
treasury facing them, the Legislators may be more 
amenable to approving a tax increase—such as a 
sales tax levy which Governor Volpe supported 
during the administration of Governor Furcolo. 
For Democrats in the Legislature, the budget also 
fulfilled a set of needs. First, it maintained fundamental 
elements of the progressive agenda established during the 
past four years, while blocking approval of several Volpe 
initiatives. Moreover, if a tax increase became necessary 
during the next year. Democrats could put the governor in 
the unenviable position of pushing for new revenues during 
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an election year. Finally, as noted above, the budget 
provided many Democrats with benefits to bring back to 
their home constituencies. 
This interesting balance of needs between Volpe and 
the Democratic Legislature is important to the core issue 
of this study. As Table 1 demonstrates, the Legislature 
adopted and the governor approved, major increases in 
appropriations for the community college program. The 
final Fiscal Year 1962 operating budget of $538,085 
(including $20,484 in a supplemental budget to the general 
appropriations bill), though some $12,000 less than that 
requested in Volpe's House 1, represents approximately a 
$400,000 increase over« the appropriation for Fiscal Year 
1961. All this despite minimal public discussion of either 
community colleges or public higher education by either the 
governor or the legislative leadership. 
”The Mess in Massachusetts Education" — The Media Focuses 
the Agenda 
The world of politics and policymaking is often as 
much reactive as proactive. Events in far-off lands (e.g.. 
Sputnik) or in the nation's capitol (e.g.. Civil Rights 
legislation, funding for new initiatives) can shape popular 
opinion and thus directly or indirectly affect policymaking 
at the state level. The press, particularly in the pages 
of the state capitol's major dailies or on the airwaves of 
network affiliates, holds the power to shape the politics 
of the moment and to focus the policy debate through the 
power and reach of their influence. 
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Table 1 
Massachusetts State Budget Chronology — Coininunity Colleges 
Fiscal Years 1959-1962 
The Furcolo Administration 
October 3, 1958 
October 16, 1958 
January 12, 1959 
April 6, 1959 
July 31, 1959 
September 17, 1959 
January 25, 1960 
Governor Furcolo signs Chapter 605 
of the Acts of 1958 which 
established a Massachusetts Board 
of Regional Community Colleges and 
provides for the establishment of 
regional community colleges. 
Governor Furcolo signs Chapter 650 
of the Acts of 1958, a Capital 
Outlay which includes $1 million 
for community college planning and 
development. 
Governor Furcolo presents his 
proposed budget for FY 1960 (House 
I) which includes no request for 
additional community college 
funding. 
Passage of Chapter 171 of the Acts 
of 1959, a supplemental budget 
which includes $25,000 for 
administration of the community 
college program. 
Passage of Chapter 433 of the Acts 
of 1959 (Budget for FY 1960) which 
includes no additional funding for 
community colleges. 
Passage of Chapter 604 of the Acts 
of 1959 (Special Capital Outlay) 
which includes no additional 
funding for community college 
development. 
Governor Furcolo presents his 
proposed budget for Fiscal Year 
1960 (House I) which recommends 
$85,521 for community college 
operations. This recommendation 
is less than the figure of 
Continued, next page. 
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Table 1—Continued: 
April 13, 1960 
June 30, 1960 
November 23, 1960 
November 23, 1963 
$200,699 requested by the MBRCC, 
but represents an increase of 
$396,335 over the Fiscal Year 1961 
appropriation. 
Passage of Chapter 318 of the Acts 
of 1960, a Supplemental Budget and 
for Fiscal Year 1960 which 
includes $82,950 for the regional 
community college at Pittsfield. 
Passage of Chapter 507 of the Acts 
of 1960 (Budget for Fiscal Year 
1960). Includes: 
Administration of community 
college program $22,126 
Regional community college 
in metropolitan Boston $16,400 
Regional community college 
in Northeast MA $16,400 
Regional community college 
in Southeast MA $16,400 
$71,326 
Passage of Chapter 774 of the Acts 
of 1960. A Special Capital Outlay 
which includes funds ($300,000 to 
be added to funds in Chapter 650 
of the Acts of 1958) to develop a 
system of regional community 
colleges in Massachusetts 
(including plans, agreements with 
local communities, supplies, 
furnishings and equipment). 
Passage of Chapter 784 of the Acts 
of 1960, a Supplemental Budget for 
Fiscal Year 1961 which includes 
funding for: 
Administration of the community 
college program $21,000 
Regional community college 
in metropolitan Boston $ 7,596 
Regional community college 
in Northeastern MA $ 7,271 
Continued, next page. 
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Regional community college 
in Southeastern MA $ 7,394 
Regional community college 
in Central MA $20,000 
Regional community college 
in CT. valley $20,000 
$83,586 
The Volpe Administration 
January 25, 1961 
May 5, 1961 
Governor Volpe presents his budget 
proposal for FY62 (House I). It 
includes $550,942 in proposed 
spending on community colleges, a 
reduction of $102,834 in the 
amount requested by the MBRCC. 
Specifically, Volpe's budget 
recommends: 
Administration 
Community College, 
metropolitan Boston 
Community College, 
Northeast MA 
Community College, 
Southeastern MA 
Community College, 
Pittsfield 
Community College, 
Central MA 
Community College, 
CT Valley 
$ 37,242 
$191,650 
$ 88,550 
$ 89,050 
$144,450 
$550,942 
Passage of Chapter 430 of the Acts 
of 1961 (Supplemental Budget for 
Fiscal Year 1961), which includes 
language limiting the college in 
Metropolitan Boston to "not more 
than 26 permanent positions;" the 
regional community college in 
northeastern MA to "not more than 
8 positions"; the regional 
community college in southeastern 
Continued, next page. 
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May 23, 1961 
May 27, 1961 
May 27, 1961 
MA to "not more than 8 permanent 
positions"; and the community 
college in Pittsfield to "not more 
than 16 permanent positions." 
Passage of Chapter 495 of the Acts 
of 1961, Budget for Fiscal Year 
1962 which includes: 
Administration 
Metropolitan Boston 
(not to exceed 31 
permanent positions) 
Northern Essex 
(not to exceed 11 
permanent positions) 
Cape Cod (not to 
exceed 11 permanent 
positions) 
Berkshire (not to 
exceed 20 permanent 
positions) 
$ 41,794 
$179,965 
$ 74,194 
$ 74,888 
$146,760 
$517,601 
Passage of Chapter 543 of the Acts 
of 1961, a Supplemental Budget to 
the General Appropriations Act, 
which includes: 
Metropolitan Boston 
(not to exceed 31 
permanent positions) $12,500 
Northern Essex (not 
to exceed 11 
permanent positions) $ 3,000 
Cape Cod (not to 
exceed 11 permanent 
positions) $ 3,992 
$19,512 
Passage of Chapter 544 of the Acts 
of 1961, A Special Outlay Program 
for the Commonwealth which 
includes $750,000 to supplement 
that in Chapter 650 of the Acts of 
1958 including colleges in the 
Worcester and Springfield areas. 
Continued, next page. 
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January 23, 1962 
April 26, 1962 
Governor Volpe presents his 
proposed budget for Fiscal Year 
1963, which includes $928,708 in 
new proposed spending on community 
colleges as compares to $1,231,531 
requested by the MBRCC. 
Specifically, the budget proposal 
recommends: 
Administration 
Massachusetts Bay 
(Maintenance) 
Northern Essex 
Cape Cod 
Berkshire 
Regional College of 
Central MA $ 
Regional College, 
CT Valley $ 
Community College, 
Upper CT Valley $ 75,780 
$ 44,891 
$345,396 
$144,202 
$149,809 
$168,630 
$928,708 
Passage of Chapter 373 of the Acts 
of 1962, a Supplemental Budget for 
Fiscal Year 1962. 
Specific community college 
portions of the bill include 
increasing the position caps 
mandated in Chapter 543 of the 
Acts of 1961 to 51 for Mass. Bay, 
21 for Berkshire and 20 for both 
Northern Essex and Cape Cod. The 
bill also expands the language of 
Chapter 544 of the Acts of 1962 to 
include community colleges in 
Boston and Greenfield areas as 
well as Springfield and Worcester 
areas. The Supplemental also 
includes: 
Northern Essex $ 3,600 
Cape Cod $ 5,380 
Berkshire $ 3,880 
Continued, next page. 
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June 17, 1962 
July 11, 1962 
July 21, 1962 
Chapter 591 of the Acts of 1962 
(the Budget for Fiscal Year 1963) 
which includes $952,857 in total 
community college 
Specifically: 
Administration 
Mass Bay 
Northern Essex 
Cape Cod 
Berkshire 
Upper Ct. Valley 
spending. 
$ 43,641 
$346,834 
$148,180 
$156,180 
$176,330 
$ 80,692 
$952,857 
Passage of Chapter 649 of the Acts 
of 1962, a Special Capital Outlay. 
Specific community college items 
approved are $255,000 to support 
planning and development of 
community colleges in Boston, 
Greenfield, Springfield and 
Worcester areas (amount added to 
appropriations in Chapter 544 of 
1961) and $15,000 for furnishings 
and equipment at Cape Cod 
Community College. 
Passage of Chapter 705 of the Acts 
of 1962, a Capital Outlay Program, 
which includes $150,000 in 
additional monies to support the 
planning and development effort 
detailed in Chapter 649 of 1962. 
The Boston Globe has traditionally held a special 
policymaking influence in Massachusetts. As New England's 
largest newspaper and the paper of record in the 
Commonwealth's major city and capitol, the Globe has 
historically spoken with a potent and liberal voice. 
An interesting example of the Globe's influence 
occurred in September 1961, with publication of a 
seven-part series entitled "The Mess in Massachusetts 
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Education." This series, written by the paper's general 
education reporter, Ian Forman, and its scientific 
education reporter, Ian Menzies, returned education to the 
front rank of policy issues and set the stage for a major 
review of all levels of education in the Commonwealth. 
The series presented a scathing indictment of 
Massachusetts public education from kindergarten through 
graduate school. Describing the situation in near 
scandalous terms, Forman and Menzies labelled public 
education in the Commonwealth "an archaic mess" in which 
"the sons and daughters of Massachusetts citizens are being 
cheated" (Globe. 9/17/62, Ian Menzies & Ian Forman, "Who 
Cares About Schools in Massachusetts?", p. 6-A). Pointing 
to "a lack of direction and drive for progressively higher 
standards," the series assailed the Legislature as "slow 
with funds"; educators and education boards as 
"lackluster"; and the efforts of the Massachusetts 
Department of Education as "inadequate" (Globe. 9/17/62, 
Menzies & Forman, p. 6-A). Moreover, it described the 
funding mechanism for local school systems, which relied on 
property taxes for sustenance, as leading to "two kinds of 
public education available to children in Massachusetts 
today—first class and second class" (Globe, 9/17/62, 
Menzies & Forman, p. 6-A). 
Forman and Menzies reserved special criticism for the 
Commonwealth's higher education institutions, writing that 
"public education in the state is at its worst at the 
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college level" and that few people in Massachusetts could 
even name 75 percent of our 19 institutions of higher 
education. That's the kind of impact they've had" (Globe. 
9/17/62, Menzies & Forman, p. 6-A). 
In criticizing public higher education, the authors 
pointed to a "war" within the system which had its roots in 
"a historical background of political, private school and 
religious strife" and emphasized that "Catholic Boston 
considered the University of Massachusetts a stronghold of 
Western Massachusetts Protestantism, alleging 
discrimination against Catholic faculty and students "and 
that legislators, only three or four of whom at any one 
time were graduates of the University, opposed money for 
the University on these often unstated grounds" (Globe. 
9/17/62, Menzies & Forman, p. 6-A). 
Arguing that the "10 state teachers colleges were 
looked on more favorably by the predominately Boston area 
legislators who felt these schools could provide a low-cost 
education for the sons and daughters of their 
constituents," Forman and Menzies labelled as 
"unsatisfactory" these institutions' progress in becoming 
"full-fledged four-year degree granting colleges" (Globe, 
9/17/62, Menzies & Forman, p. 6-A). 
For the new community colleges, Forman and Menzies 
offered relatively positive words: 
The two year community college idea was pushed 
through in the Furcolo administration by 
educators somewhat disenchanted with our state 
colleges. They kept it out of the hands of state 
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educators by assigning them an independent 
governing board. These quite dynamic and needed 
schools, which have attracted good teachers, have 
however, further clouded the higher education 
picture from the overall administrative, 
integrated angle. (Globe. 9/17/62, Menzies & 
Forman, p. 6-A) 
In response to this "clouded picture" and in an effort 
to correct the "mess in Massachusetts education", Forman 
and Menzies argued strongly for a thorough review of public 
education in the Commonwealth: 
One thing must be done. It has been done in 
California, New York, Indiana and other states. 
A master plan for higher education must be 
produced. At the same time, there must be a 
similar plan drawn up for elementary and 
secondary education. The present confusion, lack 
of money, lack of direction and internal strife 
must end. (Globe. 9/17/62, Menzies & Forman, p. 
6-A) 
The Globe series had a profound effect on both the 
governor and the Legislature. Its tone fit with the 
general reform sentiment in the Massachusetts political 
air. Moreover, its temper and timing dovetailed with the 
continuing high number of high school graduates who were 
demanding entry to higher education as well as with the 
increasing perception that the nature of the economy was 
shifting toward a more scientific and technical base. And, 
finally, in its criticism of local elementary and secondary 
systems, the series confirmed the sentiments of homeowners 
whose property taxes supported schools that often seemed 
unaccountable and out of step with educational advances. 
For all of these reasons, the Forman-Menzies series 
reestablished education as a core political issue on the 
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eve of the 1962 election year. As one long-time observer 
of Massachusetts education pointed out, "Forman and Menzies 
drove the issue of educational reform, as did the Globe" 
(Kevin Harrington, interview, 8/16/93). 
The series generated an irresistible momentxim for 
political action. As prominent educational and business 
voices endorsed the validity of the series, Forman and the 
Globe gave their words a wide hearing. For example, in 
October when the University of Massachusetts President 
spoke on behalf of "a major survey and re-evaluation of 
Massachusetts educational resources," Forman gave the 
speech extensive coverage, writing that President Lederle 
". . . added his voice to the growing number of state 
officials, legislators, educators and laymen calling for a 
review of Baystate education" (Globe, 10/17/61, Ian Forman, 
"UMass President Asks review of Education Resources in Bay 
State," p. 8). 
In early October, only one week after the conclusion 
of the Globe series. Senate Majority Leader Maurice Donahue 
(D-Holyoke) filed legislation to authorize a master 
planning effort akin to that recommended by Forman and 
Menzies. That, as then Senator Kevin Harrington (D-Salem) 
recalls, set the wheels turning in the executive branch. 
"Volpe's people said to him, this is a red-hot thing that 
Donohue has filed," Harrington explained in an interview 
years later. "You'd better do the same." 
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In an October 17 Convocation speech at Northeastern 
University, the Governor attempted to catch the tide of 
educational reform created by the Globe series saying that 
he was preparing a program for the "first-class 
re-evaluation of the state's entire public education 
system." Volpe announced, "I shall ask the incoming 
Legislature for adequate funds with which to finance this 
vitally needed study" iGlobe. 10/18/61, Ian Forman, "Volpe 
Maps School Survey," p. 1). 
During the Northeastern speech, which the Governor 
entitled "Building for Education in the Commonwealth", 
Volpe reviewed the Massachusetts educational scene and 
echoed the arguments of Forman and Menzies, "the picture as 
it stands today is not encouraging" (Globe. 10/18/61, 
Forman, pp. 1, 2). Describing higher education, the 
Governor pointed to the Commonwealth's private universities 
as a tremendous asset" but emphasized that "it is not 
possible for them to meet the educational needs of all our 
people" (Globe, 10/18/61, Forman, p. 2). 
The Governor concluded by recommending enhanced 
support for higher education, arguing that "there is some 
danger that Massachusetts will be left behind if it does 
not expand its public support for higher education and 
begin to match the pace that has been set by our private 
institutions" (Globe. 10/18/61, Forman, p. 2). 
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Volpe in 1962: A Legislative Marathon and An Election 
Surprise 
January 1962 on Beacon found both Democrats and 
Republicans looking ahead to the November election with a 
heightened sense of partisanship. Tension was particularly 
high as stories continued related to ongoing investigations 
of the DPW, MDC and alleged improprieties in 1959-60 
planning of the Boston Common garage. Worse yet, recent 
allegations from within the Senate that some members were 
under the influence of bookies sent Legislators into a 
frenzy. Looking to the year ahead and to the opening of 
the second session of the 162nd Great and General Court, 
veteran political observer S. J. Micciche wrote: 
Governor Volpe unveils his 1962 program at noon 
today to a Massachusetts Legislature fretting 
over its public image in an election year, 
lawmakers will convene an hour early to 
officially begin work on a record number of bills 
peppered freely with a large portion of 
controversial matters. House and Senate members 
predicted last night a long and hard year with 
politics tingeing every major proposal. They 
ruled out any repeat of the modern day record for 
speedy deliberations set last year. (Globe. 
1/3/62, S. J. Micciche, "Legislature Fretting 
About Public Image," p. 1) 
In his annual address, the first volley of election 
year rhetoric, Volpe once again focused on corruption which 
he said "cast a shadow over the general repute of thousands 
of civil servants and public officials" and challenged the 
Legislature to pass his controversial proposal for a 
Commission on Crime and Public Morality (to investigate 
organized crime and serve as watchdog over the conduct of 
public officials). He also demanded reorganization of 
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state agencies under a strengthened chief executive and 
presented proposals on a range of issues from a $2.3 
million study of mass transit in the Commonwealth to 
expansion of mental health facilities. 
Concerning education, the Governor grasped the issues 
raised in the Forman-Menzies series and spoke in language 
that built on both their sense of alarm and his October 
speech at Northeastern University: 
Here in Massachusetts, where the first public 
school in America was established and where 
exists an awesome and world envied assembly of 
great schools and universities, we cannot afford 
to remain smug about our achievements or ignore 
our potentials . . . 
There have been efforts over the years to 
examine the critical problems of our schools and 
colleges but for the most part, these studies 
were not comprehensive. I am submitting a 
request for creation of a twelve-person unpaid 
commission to examine our total picture on public 
education, including financing, which now rests 
solely on real estate and to provide a guide for 
a program in our Commonwealth. This commission 
would be appointed by the governor and the 
Legislature and provided with the sum of $100,000 
for necessary expenses. I feel this is needed in 
view of the serious problems facing education 
nationally and in our state. (Senate No. 1, 
1962) 
Among those listening to the Governor's address were 
four men who would play leading roles in establishing the 
study commission during the 1962 session and who would also 
help to drive it to a substantive and important report by 
1965. 
The first was Forman. The highly opinionated, yet 
thoughtful, education writer for the Globe was passionately 
committed to the idea of a master plan for Massachusetts 
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education. In his regular Sunday column, as well as in his 
coverage of Legislative action on education, Forman would 
become a cheerleader for the commission and its members. 
Respected and widely read, Forman was unabashed with both 
praise and criticism. Forman was thus a player to be 
reckoned with on Beacon Hill. 
Also listening to the Governor's proposal was Senator 
Kevin Harrington (D-Salem). Chair of the Senate Education 
Committee and a forceful advocate for the state colleges 
(particularly Salem State College in his native city), 
Harrington was a rising star in the upper house of the 
Legislature. Imposing at over six-foot-five inches tall, 
the Senator possessed the accrued instincts of an 
established political fcimily on the North Shore and 
combined the look and easy intelligence of a Brahmin with 
the charm and tenacity of a first rank Irish politician. A 
favorite of Forman, Harrington shared the reporter's 
commitment to educational reform and saw in the Governor's 
proposal an opportunity for substantive achievement on both 
the policy and political fronts. 
Maurice Donahue of Holyoke, the Senate Majority Leader 
who would in two years succeed Powers as Senate President 
listened to the Governor's words on education reform with 
special interest. Harrington describes Donahue as "a great 
pusher for the University principally because of its 
geographic location near Holyoke” and as one "who 
understood and truly believed that public education was the 
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state's only salvation” (Interview, 8/16/93). The Majority 
Leader also possessed the requisite political savvy to 
understand that while Volpe's support of the educational 
master plan was important. Democrats had to remain out 
front on the issue or risk losing it to the Republican 
Governor. 
Fourth among those who listened attentively to the 
Governor's annual address was the remarkably resilient 
Speaker of the House John Thompson. Unerringly loyal to 
Furcolo during the governor's two terms, Thompson had 
fought Volpe publicly on a series of issues in 1961. Most 
notable among these issues was the latter's crime 
commission proposal which the Speaker believed would stand 
as an inappropriate legislative watchdog. 
Thompson had also earned the enmity of many within his 
own party. Ever the "Iron Duke," Thompson would spend the 
remaining two years of his Speakership beating back 
increasingly bitter challenges to his leadership and 
fighting allegations of impropriety that would eventually 
lead to his indictment. In 1962, he would also face a 
surprisingly difficult re-election ceimpaign. As one who 
had shown his commitment to education and who was fighting 
for his political life against an unruly House and a public 
perception that linked him to Beacon Hill cronyism, 
leadership on educational reform offered an attractive 
opportunity. And as long as he was speaker, any serious 
reform would require his active support. 
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Generally, the response to the governor's annual 
message was what one might expect at the outset of an 
election year. Republicans praised Volpe's effort while 
the Democratic leadership said the governor had "displayed 
intellectual bankruptcy in his 1962 program" (Globe. 
1/4/62, S. J. Micciche, "Democrats Hoist Storm Flag as 
Volpe Launches Program," p. 1). Overall, the press 
response was positive, with the Globe praising the Governor 
for presenting "a moderate program whose very 
reasonableness gives it strength" (Globe. 1/4/62, 
Editorial, "What the Governor Seeks," p. 20). 
In his budget message on January 24, the Governor 
again addressed the need for an overhaul of public 
education and reaffirmed his call for "a commission to be 
provided with the sum of $100,000 to examine the present 
structure of public education and to make recommendations 
for improvement" (House No. 1, 1962). 
For higher education, Volpe proposed a significant 
boost in funding noting that "one of the largest 
departmental increases in this budget is caused by 
increases in enrollment in state colleges" (House No. 1, 
1962) . 
Specifically, the Governor recommended an increase of 
$2,660,000 for the Department of Education in Fiscal Year 
1963, of which $2,097,833 was slated for operation of the 
University and public colleges. Once again, as Furcolo had 
done before him and Volpe had done in his budget message of 
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the previous year, the governor justified his call for 
additional dollars by emphasizing the issue of access. 
Arguing that his budget would "provide additional teachers 
and related expense for 2,273 additional students, Volpe 
went on to emphasize (House No. 1, 1962); 
I know that we want to provide facilities that 
will enable every student in Massachusetts 
capable of achieving a higher education to enjoy 
that opportunity. In view of the rapid rise in 
numbers of students preparing for college and of 
the announced limitations in enrollments made by 
private colleges, there is no other course open 
than for the state to go ahead with plans for 
expansion of publicly supported institutions of 
higher education, not only for 1963, but for the 
years ahead. 
As Table 1 indicates, some $928,708 of the proposed 
increase in educational funding was slated for the regional 
community colleges, so as to allow an additional enrollment 
of 990 at the four existing institutions. Although less 
than those requested by the MBRCC—and rarely does a 
department receive its full request—the proposed increases 
are noteworthy and represent growth of nearly $400,000 over 
the sum appropriated by the General Court in 1960, 
Furcolo's last year as governor. 
Volpe concluded his discussion of higher education by 
announcing that he had "asked each of the governing boards 
of our institutions of higher learning to set down in 
public reports their ten-year anticipations of enrollment 
and to relate them to plans for necessary new 
construction." The Governor's intended wish was that these 
reports provide the Legislature with a "better under- 
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standing" and allow it to express "approval or disapproval" 
(House No. 1, 1962). Chapter VIII will discuss the report 
prepared by the MBRCC in some detail for it provides an 
interesting snapshot of community college mission evolution 
during the early 1960s. 
With the introduction of Volpe's budget, the political 
season was in full sway. In this context, three issues 
would dominate the educational debate. 
First and foremost, was the proposed Master Plan for 
Massachusetts education. Forman continued to press the 
issue in columns throughout the spring, calling the Master 
Plan Commission "the number 1 'must' bill on education 
before the Massachusetts Legislature right now" (Globe. 
4/8/62, Ian Forman, "State Education Board Under Sharp 
Scrutiny," p. A-56). 
Behind the scenes Donahue and other members of the 
leadership pushed for legislative action on the Commission. 
By mid-spring, Donahue's bill, (Senate 615) creating a 
commission has been approved. It still remained, however, 
for the Senator and his allies to secure funding for the 
planning effort. With Forman's support in the Globe, 
Donahue aimed to raise Volpe's recommended funding level 
from $100,000 to $250,000. As the final June battle over 
the budget loomed, Donahue's proposal was locked in the 
Ways and Means Committees of both houses. 
The second major educational issue facing the General 
Court was the long-discussed proposal to develop a 
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four-year state medical school as part of the University of 
Massachusetts. First presented in 1948 by then Governor 
Paul Dever, the medical school proposal enjoyed the support 
of Western Massachusetts legislators Wojtkowski, Thompson 
and Donahue as well as the endorsement of other key players 
such as Harrington. Despite this support and the best 
efforts of Dever and Furcolo, the medical school had never 
been able to overcome opposition and private universities 
(who perceived a threat to their enrollments) and their 
Republican allies. 
Volpe appears to have been at best indifferent to the 
medical school recommendation. Unwilling to take the lead 
on the issue in the face of opposition within his own 
party, the Governor remained on the sidelines as the issue 
percolated. By fall,however, as prospects for medical 
school legislation improved, he would be prepared to step 
in and attempt to score a quick political victory in the 
midst of the election campaign. 
The third major educational issue of 1962 concerned 
another long-debated matter: fiscal autonomy for the 
University of Massachusetts. Another favorite of Western 
Massachusetts legislators, the proposed legislation 
provided the University with the freedom to manage its 
appropriation free of legislative control. Opposed by 
legislators of both parties who were unwilling to give up 
such leverage over the flagship of public higher education. 
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Donahue and Thompson faced a tough but winnable fight, 
again without active gubernatorial engagement. 
Despite the significance of these matters, the primary 
issue of debate in 1962 remained corruption in state 
government. A review of the period's media provides a near 
soap opera level of daily articles concerning indictments 
in the Boston Common garage scandal, continuing 
investigation at the DPW and MDC, firings of longtime staff 
in major departments and a continued swirl of allegations 
of corruption in the Boston Police Department. 
The corruption issue provided Volpe a card that he 
played adroitly. Holding an impeccable personal record, he 
moved to oust individuals (often Democratic appointees) who 
has been accused of wrongdoing; and he did so with great 
fanfare. Most notable were his efforts to fire both the 
State Waterways Director who had been accused of misconduct 
in office and the Boston Police Chief following allegations 
of racketeering in the department. 
In the corruption issue, Volpe had found a weapon that 
concerned the Democratic leadership, particularly when a 
Massachusetts taxpayers Foundation Poll indicated that 80% 
of Bay State residents considered corruption to be one of 
the Commonwealth's major problems (Globe. July 15, 1962, p. 
A-4). Globe columnist C. R. Owens wrote of "a deep-seated 
fear that Republicans have scored with the issue of crime 
and corruption and that the political tides are running 
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against the Democrats ...» (Globe. April 15, 1962, 
p. A-4). 
It is interesting to reflect on how the education 
Master Plan fit into the overall issue of reform in 
Massachusetts politics. In the contentiousness of an 
election year, it provided one area of relative common 
ground which met the needs of both Democrats and 
Republicans. First, education reform was an issue that 
resonated with parents who paid significant property taxes 
to support the school systems that Forman and Menzies had 
pilloried and who sought admission for their sons and 
daughters to increasingly inaccessible and crowded state 
institutions of higher learning. Second, in the notion of 
a commission the political leadership on both sides of the 
aisle could find short-term safety in the benefits of a 
high-profile study knowing that no hard and potentially 
controversial recommendations would follow until after the 
1962 election. Third, for Volpe, whose reform agenda 
remained bottled up in the Legislature, the commission 
offered the promise of tangible achievement on an issue 
that the Democrats held as one of their own. Fourth, for 
Democrats such as Donahue and Harrington, the Commission 
promised both eventual substantive and progressive 
achievement in an area they held dear and the opportunity 
to reclaim for their party the mantle of reform. With 
passage of authorizing legislation in March, the only issue 
that remained was its level of funding—$100,000 as 
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proposed by Volpe or more as Donahue and other legislators 
hoped. 
It became increasingly clear by late spring, that on 
the vast array of issues floating across Beacon Hill, there 
would be little common ground and much jockeying for 
political advantage. June saw both parties preparing for 
their nominating conventional; the air was thick with 
politics Massachusetts-style and the General Court was far 
from completing its work. A host of major legislative 
initiatives awaited action including Volpe's proposed crime 
commission and code of public ethics, the general 
appropriations bill ($512 million), a highway borrowing 
bill ($190 million), a capital outlay ($31 million) and a 
supplemental budget of $6-10 million to close books on 
Fiscal Year 1963 (Globe, 6/17/62, C. R. Owens, "Would Keep 
Financial Records from Auditor," p. 4-A). The major 
education initiatives (Master planning commission. 
University of Massachusetts Medical School, and fiscal 
autonomy for the University) all also remained to be 
completed. 
At their respective June conventions in Springfield 
and Worcester, the Democrats and Republicans nominated 
their slates for the November elections. 
The Democratic affair was filled with a special 
electricity as the President's youngest brother Edward 
squared off against State Attorney General (and nephew of 
the venerable Speaker of the House John McCormick) Edward 
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McCormick in the fight to fill John F. Kennedy's vacant 
Senate seat. While Kennedy prevailed in the nomination 
fight, this battle between Massachusetts dynasties stands 
as one of the fiercest in the Commonwealth's recent 
history. 
While the Kennedy-McCormick race dominated the 
Convention, delegates selected Endicott "Chub” Peabody as 
its nominee for Governor. Peabody was the son of a 
prominent Episcopalian bishop and held seemingly impeccable 
credentials for political office. He was described by the 
Boston Globe (6/17/62, Photo Caption, p. 19) as having ". . 
. the political reputation of a Yankee with a liberal 
streak and a Democrat who gets Republican votes." An 
All-American guard on Harvard's 1941 football tecun, Peabody 
had earned the Silver Star in World War II, graduated from 
Harvard Law School and served on the Commonwealth's 
Executive Council. Despite these credentials, he had yet 
to win statewide office having lost the nomination for 
attorney general in 1956 and 1958 and the nomination for 
governor in 1960. 
Both Kennedy and Peabody left the convention on a 
high. But Massachusetts law leaves final party nominations 
to a September primary. Both McCormick and Peabody's 
rival, Joseph Ward, chose to take their cases to the 
primary ballot, leaving the possibility of upset to stir 
the summer air. 
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Volpe, on the other hand, received his anticipated 
unopposed coronation at the Republican convention. Despite 
the first faint rumblings among some delegates that the 
governor's political operation had isolated itself from the 
party and although Republicans faced the prospects of 
somewhat contentious primary battles for other statewide 
offices, the GOP left Worcester confident that under 
Volpe's leadership, the party would hold its own in 
November. 
The post-convention problems of Speaker Thompson 
further inspired Republican confidence. On July 3, 
dissatisfaction among Democrats over "the Iron Duke's" 
style and his increasingly evident battle with alcohol 
exploded as thirty-five members of the party called for his 
ouster and expressed a "feeling of disgust" with both 
Thompson and the House Democratic leadership (Globe. 
7/4/62, "35 Democrats Seek Ouster of Thompson," p. 1). 
As this unrest festered in the House, Volpe struck 
with two well-timed political jousts on key education 
issues. 
First, the Governor suddenly doubled his proposed 
funding level for the education commission to $200,000. 
Offered as part of the year-end supplemental budget, 
Volpe's new proposal earned plaudits from across the state. 
As Harrington recalls (interview, August 13, 1993), the 
Governor had "upped the ante" on the education master plan 
and in doing so had at least momentarily grasped the 
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limelight on the issue. The Globe would write of Volpe's 
proposed increase in funding for the commission (7/8/62, 
"Volpe Urges $200,000 for Education Survey," p. 10): 
Perhaps the Governor responded to the pressures 
of many top educators and groups throughout the 
state; perhaps he saw it as a shrewd political 
move; perhaps he did it from truly altruistic 
motives. Whatever his reasons for boosting the 
amount, he made many persons happy. 
By the time of Volpe's new proposal, the education 
commission had taken on a dynamic of its own. With 
Donahue, Harrington, and Thompson driving the bill and 
Powers supportive of Donahue's efforts, the commission's 
legislative path was secure. Volpe's strong public 
endorsement practically ensured that a mutually beneficial 
deal could be reached between the Republican governor and 
the Democratic leadership in the Legislature. And to 
prevent the measure from being lost at session's end, the 
Globe maintained persistent coverage of its progress. 
Harrington recalls (interview, August 13, 1993) that "the 
Globe continued to be a great pusher on this." The major 
issue seemed to be at what point the ante would stop 
growing. 
On July 13, the House gave its final approval to the 
commission. Not to be upstaged by Volpe, Thompson added an 
additional $50,000 to the governor's supplemental request, 
bringing the total amount passed by the House for the 
master plan effort to $250,000. The only opposition to the 
measure came from a few disgruntled Democrats and long-time 
Republican opponents of education spending such as Theodore 
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Vaistses of Melrose who argued, "... They'll spend it on 
an educational junket" (Globe. 7/13/62, "House Votes 
$250,000 for Education Survey," p. 4). 
Within days, the Senate had also approved the 
supplemental budget, as had a House-Senate conference 
committee. With nary a whimper concerning the additional 
$50,000 appropriated to the commission, Volpe signed the 
bill. 
Volpe also made a tactical political move on another 
big ticket educational issue as the commission moved toward 
reality. With the recess commission recommendations in 
hand, the word among key Beacon Hill observers was that the 
governor would veto the state medical school legislation 
rather than antagonize the Commonwealth's medical society 
and the private universities who operated prestigious 
medical schools. In that the bill had passed by only a 
19-17 roll call vote in the Senate despite the efforts of 
Powers, Donahue and Harrington, it was doubtful a veto 
could be overridden. 
Then in July the Governor did an apparent about-face 
and suddenly announced that he would sign the legislation 
if the 14-member university Board of Trustees was expanded 
by five to allow him to appoint physicians experienced in 
management of a medical school. 
Almost immediately. Powers endorsed the Governor's 
proposal. Having lost his dream of Boston's mayoralty over 
his opposition to a university payraise in 1958, the Senate 
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President was not anxious to again be seen as standing in 
the way of such a high visibility issue affecting U/Mass. 
Powers said of the Governor's plan, "I don't care if the 
governor wants 50 trustees. It wouldn't bother me a single 
iota" (Globe. 7/26/62, S. J. Micciche, 'House Kills Volpe's 
Rider; Medication School in Doubt," p. 1). 
Thompson, on the other hand, issued a scathing attack 
on Volpe's proposal. Calling it a "thinly disguised 
sellout" to medical school opponents (Globe. 7/25/62, 
"Powers, Thompson Clash on Medical School Bill," p. 1), the 
Speaker argued that the governor's proposal was an attempt 
to simultaneously grasp control of the U/Mass board by 
appointing "the deans of private medical schools who would 
sabotage the Legislature's intention for a first-class 
medical school" (Globe. 7/25/62, "Powers, Thompson Clash on 
Medical School Bill, p. 1). 
With Powers and Thompson at odds over the bill, it 
was left to Donahue to step into the breach and find a 
workable compromise that would also earn the governor's 
support. The Holyoke Senator recalls (Interview August 19, 
1993): 
John Thompson was one of my closest friends. And 
Johnny Powers was very supportive of me as I rose 
to majority leader. This was one of several 
occasions when I worked to get them to smoke the 
peace pipe. 
By month's end, with The Legislature in its final 
hours, Thompson, Powers and Volpe agreed to a compromise in 
which the Governor would add three trustees to the 
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University Board. To earn the Speaker's support, language 
was included in the final conference committee measure that 
prevented the governor from appointing representatives of 
private medical schools to the University board. With this 
agreement, the bill calling for a $10 million state medical 
school received final legislative approval and was signed 
by Volpe on July 27. 
The third and final major education-related measure by 
1962 concerned fiscal autonomy for the University. Long 
sought by Furcolo, Donahue and others to correct what 
Harrington described as a situation in which "every time a 
light bulb went out you had to go to the Department of 
Education to get authority to purchase another" (interview, 
August 13, 1993), the bill had never been able to overcome 
fears in the Legislature concerning both the loss of 
direct fiscal control through legislative line items and 
the prospect that the measure could set a precedent for 
similar initiatives concerning the state colleges and 
community colleges. 
Recommended by Donahue's recess commission on the 
University, the bill held the backing of Thompson, Powers 
and Harrington. The governor remained supportive but 
relatively mute through July, awaiting disposition in the 
Legislature. That action came early in July when Thompson 
pushed the bill through the House and Powers and Donahue 
combined to force it though the more conservative Senate. 
Volpe signed the legislation quickly in the same month. 
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The measure would ultimately help lead to a similar, 
somewhat coincidental empowerment of the MBRCC in 1964. 
In a summary article (Globe. 7/28/62), Forman offered 
"high praise" for the year's legislative accomplishments in 
the educational arena: 
Vast gains were accomplished in the area of 
public education as the lawmakers faced up to the 
fact that many more millions must be spent to 
meet the challenge of present-day educational 
demands. (Globe. 7/28/62, "Volpe Made Great 
Strides in Legislative Year: Season's 
Achievements Listed, p. 5") 
Despite almost no discussion of community colleges in 
the Legislature's flurry of education-related initiatives, 
the MBRCC received a significant increase in funding as the 
session Ccune to a close. 
In addition to the education bills, a number of other 
hotly contested measures were approved before the 
Legislature finally perogued on July 27. For example, the 
General Court approved Volpe's crime commission (a stunning 
victory for the governor); passed a $10.2 million 
Federal-state study of mass transportation in the 
Commonwealth; endorsed a bond issue to pay for 
Massachusetts $110 million highway program; sustained a 
gubernatorial veto of Callahan's proposal to give the 
Turnpike Authority control of air rights around the 
turnpike extension into Boston. All in all, despite 
defeats on proposals such as his reorganization plan for 
the DPW, the year's work seemed to provide momentum to the 
governor as the election neared. 
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The November Surprise: Governor-Elect Peabody 
The focus of political pundits remained on the heated 
Kennedy-McCormick race as the September primaries 
approached. In the shadow of this dynastic battle, Peabody 
held to an advantage in the gubernatorial primary given 
his status as the convention's chosen candidate. 
Meanwhile, on the Republican side, Volpe continued to 
run a low-key campaign taking opportunities to point at his 
record and avoiding where possible remaining above the 
overall election-year fray. 
In the September primary, Peabody won an impressive 
victory over Ward. In earning the nomination, he also 
achieved a new measure of respect from political observers 
as having a shot at upsetting Volpe. 
Peabody stood as an anomaly in Massachusetts politics; 
he was in Donahue's words, "a new-look Democrat" 
(interview, August 19, 1993). The question was whether 
this "new look" would candidate hold the traditional ethnic 
Democratic base while appealing to sufficient Republicans 
to upset the incumbent. 
The final month of the 1962 gubernatorial campaign 
stands as an intriguing case study which deserves greater 
scrutiny than this work can provide. Two points deserve 
specific mention. 
First, to the end, the governor held to a low-key 
campaign. Rarely referring to Peabody by name, Volpe 
refused to debate his opponent or to respond to the 
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Democrat's blistering attacks. Choosing to remain above 
the fray by simply pointing to his record and his standing 
as a known quantity, Volpe relied on polls which showed him 
holding a consistent lead. Not only did this strategy open 
the governor to criticism from other Republicans that he 
was not actively working for the GOP candidates, it also 
opened the door for Peabody who ran a tireless campaign 
under the careful guidance of Congressman Thomas P. 
O'Neill. Moreover, the Kennedy camp provided support to 
Peabody. The Kennedy assist gained extra weight when the 
President journeyed to Boston to vote and personally 
endorsed Peabody. 
Further complicating the landscape was President 
Kennedy's October announcement that offensive nuclear 
missiles had been discovered in Cuba. For thirteen 
extraordinary days, the Cuban Missile Crisis dominated the 
news, casting the Massachusetts election into the 
background. 
Observers at the time estimated that the political 
fallout of the crisis aided Volpe by moving Peabody out of 
the limelight just as his campaign was coming together. 
Thus, as the Cconpaign entered its final days, most smart 
money seemed to remained on the Republican. 
On election day, however, the voters of Massachusetts 
offered a different verdict. Buoyed by a strong 
performance in traditionally Democratic urban areas and by 
a surprisingly solid performance among suburban voters. 
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Peabody maintained a narrow lead that would hold up through 
a recount requested by Volpe. Peabody owed his upset to a 
number of factors, as summarized by Globe political editor 
Robert Healey (Globe. 11/11/62, Robert Healey, "State 
Democrats Are Back on the Reservation," p. 6-A): 
What happened? Well, the governor just played it 
cool . . . The Cuban Crisis turned out to be a 
great break for Peabody in more ways than one. 
He was short of money. There was no point in 
spending on television or radio during the 
crisis. So Peabody was able to throw it all into 
the last week when the Cuban situation eased 
. . . And the real bust was the corruption issue. 
Gov. Volpe was not running against the entire 
Democratic slate. He was running against Peabody 
and there was no mileage in the corruption issue 
with Peabody. (p. 6-A) 
Volpe's stinging defeat, confirmed in a recount that 
consumed much of November, remains one of the most 
significant upsets in recent Massachusetts political 
history. More salient to the present study is the legacy 
of his first term as governor (Volpe would win a re-match 
with Peabody in 1964), particularly as it relates to 
development of community colleges in the Commonwealth. 
Conclusion 
Most political observers would not list community 
college development (or education in general) as a major 
component of John Volpe's legacy between 1960-62. Volpe, 
himself, referred to two-year colleges on only rare 
occasions and almost never discussed their mission in any 
thoughtful, much less, visionary manner. 
During his initial term, however, funding increased 
significantly for the planning and development community 
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colleges. This level of support, along with passage of the 
Master Planning Commission, University Fiscal Autonomy and 
the Medical School proposal, Volpe's record could be 
interpreted as highly successful in public higher 
education. 
As noted earlier, this record owed more to strong 
legislative leadership than to the governor's vision. 
Perhaps Volpe's greatest contributions lie in his 
underlying acceptance that public education was a good 
thing worthy of financial support and in his political 
understanding at critical moments that education offered 
the chance to upstage the Democrats on an issue close to 
their policy core. 
The community colleges also owed their growth under 
Volpe's governorship to the MBRCC. Under the strong 
leadership of Kermit Morrissey, the regional board used its 
voice and legislative connections to push an agenda of 
growth. Chapter VII briefly reviews the role played by the 
MBRCC between 1960-62. 
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CHAPTER VII 
THE MASSACHUSETTS BOARD OF REGIONAL COMMUNITY 
COLLEGES: 1959-62 
Chapters IV and V describe the political context 
within which the community college program in Massachusetts 
was born and nurtured between 1958 and 1962. This chapter 
looks within that context to identify a number of subtexts. 
Specifically, it examines the early activity of the 
Massachusetts Board of Regional Community Colleges, 
analyzing the process which the MBRCC brought to its first 
decisions regarding campus locations and institutional 
mission. It also presents a detailed summary of 
appropriations which the MBRCC secured from the General 
Court during the period in question, as well as something 
of the political dynaanic which inspired those 
appropriations. Finally, this chapter examines the 
Legislature's level of influence over the activities of the 
regional community college board, particularly as the Board 
designated sites for the first campuses. Through this 
examination of the MBRCC and legislative roles in community 
college development, the fundamental issue of gubernatorial 
role comes into clearer focus. This focus, in turn, 
illuminates a fundamental irony — why the pace of campus 
planning and the level of state financial support both 
appear to have increased in 1961-62 despite John Volpe's 
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lack of policy attention relative to that which Foster 
Furcolo brought to the issue. 
Furcolo: Shaping the Board; 1958-62 
On January 21, 1959, only days after submitting his 
annual budget proposal, Governor Furcolo met with the new 
Massachusetts Board of Regional Community Colleges (MBRCC). 
After formally swearing in the members, the Governor 
re-emphasized his commitment to the community college 
program and "indicated that the facilities of the 
governor's office, the Commission on Administration, and 
the Special Commission on the Audit of State Needs would be 
available to expedite the progrcim as rapidly as possible" 
(MBRCC Minutes, 1/27/59). 
One cannot adequately present Furcolo's impact on 
Massachusetts community colleges without looking closely at 
the governing board. Through his influence over the 
structure and temper of the MBRCC, the governor arguably 
left his most enduring legacy. 
Furcolo's vision of community colleges, as noted in 
Chapter V, was broad. He saw them as institutions of 
access which would "meet the needs of all students" 
(Interview, November 1988), allowing individuals of all 
socio-economic backgrounds to rise to the maximum of their 
abilities through career preparation or transfer to 
baccalaureate programs. The governor left it to Malian, 
Morissey, and others to provide the details on issues of 
mission. His most profound contributions remain the 
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conviction with which he fought for his broad vision, the 
infrastructure that he provided for the long-term 
management of the system and his willingness to adopt a 
political strategy which would achieve early progress 
despite Massachusetts' fiscal challenges and the persistent 
doubts of naysayers. 
Membership of the MBRCC 
The Commission on the Audit of State Needs had 
recommended that the regional community college board 
consist of five gubernatorial appointees and four other 
specifically defined members (state Commissioner of 
Education, president of the University of Massachusetts, 
president of Lowell Technical Institute and a president of 
a state college elected by his or her peers) who would 
serve overlapping five-year terms. 
Chapter 605, which resulted from fine-tuning on the 
part of the administration and members of the legislative 
leadership expanded the board membership to fifteen and 
mandated inclusion of 
the Commissioner of Education, the president of 
the University of Massachusetts, a president of a 
state teachers college elected annually by 
presidents of the state teachers colleges 
including the Massachusetts School of Art, a 
president of a Massachusetts technical institute 
elected by the presidents of such technical 
institutes and eleven members appointed by the 
governor with the advice and consent of the 
[executive] council, at least one of whom shall 
be the president of a private college, 
university, or junior college in the 
Commonwealth. (Chapter 605, Acts of 1958) 
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The modifications in board composition allowed Furcolo 
seven additional opportunities to exercise his power of 
appointment. They also ensured that key constituencies in 
both private higher education and from public colleges and 
universities would be drawn into collaboration with the new 
community college program. Finally, it afforded at least 
the slim possibility of co-opting the obstreperous 
Education Commissioner Owen Kiernan, long a foe of a 
separate community college board beyond his direct control. 
Chapter 605 also amended the Audit Commissioner's 
recommendation concerning board tenure. In the place of 
staggered five-year terms for gubernatorial appointees, it 
mandated a somewhat more complex formula: 
The governor in his initial appointments shall 
designate three members to serve for six years, 
three members to serve for five years, two 
members for four years, one member for three 
years, one member for two years, and one member 
for one year. Upon the expiration of the term of 
office of the member of the board his successor 
shall be appointed for a term of six years. 
(Chapter 605, Acts of 1958) 
The changes prescribed by the final community college 
enabling legislation offered Furcolo the opportunity to 
appoint individuals who would serve well after he had taken 
his final walk down the statehouse steps. The governor 
used this opportunity to good advantage as over time he 
appointed three of his most trusted allies to the MBRCC. 
The appointments of Harris (an original member of the 
board), Morissey (appointed 11/61) and Malian (12/61) 
ensured that the governor's interests would be voiced by 
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individuals who possessed sound academic credentials, 
passion for the community college agenda, and solid 
political instincts. Most of all, they guaranteed that his 
vision of community college development would echo at least 
throughout the mid-1960s. 
Furcolo gave intense personal attention to selection 
of the original board as well as to subseguent appointments 
during his last term. His seriousness of purpose was born 
of both a personal commitment to the nascent community 
college program and a recognition that appointment of a 
weak board would threaten the viability of that program. 
Years later, the governor elaborated on the basic criteria 
he brought to board selection (videotape). 
It was important to have people on that Board who 
were of excellent character. ... We wanted to 
get the best qualified people not only in terms 
of standing and reputation in the community but 
also from the point of view of being doers, 
people who were willing to tackle a challenge and 
something that would be new. Now the reason for 
this is that this was a brand new system. We 
wanted to try and build confidence in it and 
trust in it. We wanted the legislature and the 
public in general to know that the best qualified 
people possible were running these colleges. We 
also wanted to be certain that they were truly 
non-political and bipartisan so that there could 
be no question of the fact that they were doing 
what was best for education and without any 
political considerations of any kind. For that 
reason, we very carefully screened and selected 
people who would serve on the community college 
board. (videotape) 
Furcolo seems to have achieved his goal of appointing 
a "non-partisan" group of "doers" who held an "interest in 
education" and were "willing to take on a challenge." 
Individuals appointed during the governor's tenure included 
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Republican attorney Theodore Chase, noted educators such as 
Harris, Jaffe, and Mather, and respected business leaders 
such as Springfield's Roger Putnam. Each brought 
credibility to the board, as well as sincere commitment to 
the task of establishing a community college system 
irrespective of the fact that initially they had almost no 
money or broadbased statewide support. 
The governor's assertion that he appointed a board 
that would act "without any political consideration of any 
kind" is less easy to substantiate and serves as a subject 
for discussion later in this chapter. 
Furcolo appears to have accepted some political 
dynamic with his appointment of several MBRCC members who 
brought with them the support of constituencies which were 
important to the long-term health of the community college 
program. For example, he appointed the chief executives of 
Old Colony Trust, the Massachusetts AFL-CIO and the 
Massachusetts Congress of Parents and Teachers, all with an 
eye to the groups they represented (Brint & Karabel, p. 
146). As noted earlier, the mandated inclusion of 
representatives from private and public universities and 
colleges as well as that of Kiernan similarly recognized 
the need to bring potentially troublesome or important 
constituencies under the tent. 
The net result of Furcolo's efforts was a board 
comprised of key educational advisors, major business 
leaders and representatives of important constituencies — 
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almost all of whom shared a commitment of rapid progress. 
Brint and Karabel have written of this group: 
Businessmen and educators on the Board worked 
closely together. As Furcolo had hoped, members 
of the Board tended to view one another as people 
capable of "getting things done." Members of the 
Board shared, above all, a strong commitment to 
the signature elements of managerial culture: 
efficiency and productivity . . . High praise was 
reserved for those who were regarded as 
results-oriented, hard-headed and effective. 
(Brint & Karabel, 1989, p. 146) 
The MBRCC quickly embarked on a five-part strategy 
which centered around a consensus concerning the need to 
get campuses established quickly. The Board sought to 
generate demand for colleges among residents, government 
officials and particularly business in key cities and 
towns; to work with the civic and business leadership in 
these communities to develop studies which would 
demonstrate the need for a college; to open temporary 
campuses in available public buildings provided by local 
communities; to seek donated land to serve as permanent 
campuses; and, finally, to work with the administration to 
secure at least some operating monies to support the 
program. 
Costello (interview. May 1993) recalls that early 
board discussions concerning campus locations focused on 
two sites as "givens." The first was in Hyannis on Cape 
Cod, home to both Senator Stone and the recently closed 
Hyannis Teachers College. The second was the Greater 
Boston area. During an interview with Lustberg, Costello 
recalled that "Cape Cod demonstrated need . . . but it was 
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a Republican area, represented by a Republican strong-man 
and we thought that a community college there would give it 
bipartisan support” (1979, p. 141). Of the Boston 
situation, Costello said in a May 1993 interview with this 
author, "If we wanted long-term credibility we had to go to 
the largest metropolitan area and the one with the largest 
legislative delegation." 
Pittsfield soon emerged as the third site for a campus 
and, in fact, became the preferred location of the 
inaugural project. Its incarnation as the first community 
college warrants a detailed examination. 
Berkshire Community College: Choosing the First Campus 
The earliest efforts of the new regional community 
college board focused on establishing the criteria for 
location of the Commonwealth's first colleges. The board 
summarized these criteria in a retrospective report 
presented to Furcolo in December 1959: 
In order to determine sites for regional 
community colleges in Massachusetts, it was 
necessary to devise some method of assigning 
priorities based upon, among other things, 
greatest need, population, interest of people, 
and services rendered by existing institutions of 
higher education in the various areas. The 
current and potential secondary school junior 
and/or senior student population of an area, for 
example should be large enough to insure a 
minimum enrollment necessary to offer enough 
different programs to meet the needs of the 
region and also to insure an economical 
operation. The interest of the people in the 
region is also an important factor in determining 
sites for community colleges. The presence or 
cLbsence of other college facilities in an area 
considered for community colleges should be given 
close attention. The Board realized soon that 
the need would probably be more urgent in regions 
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without adequate college facilities. (Progress 
Report, p. 36) 
The board needed an implementation plan which would 
set community colleges in place quickly and with the 
maximum local support. To do this in a manner which also 
demonstrated a viable educational need in the first 
locations, the MBRCC adopted a four-phase approach to 
implementation: Phase One — Prioritization of potential 
community college sites statewide into three categories 
(A,B,C) according to "total population, enrollment 
potential, and the extent educational needs are currently 
being met by existing institutions of higher education" 
(Progress Report, p. 41). 
Phase Two — Surveys of areas designated A,B, or C in 
priority to determine "(1) the level of interest of the 
people in having a community college, (2) the need for such 
an institution in the area" (Progress Report, p. 41). 
Phase Three — Submission of findings in phase two to 
the MBRCC to permit final prioritization of 1, 2, 3, 4, or 
5 (1 being highest and 5 the lowest priority). 
Phase Four — Planning for community colleges in those 
locations designated as Priority 1. This planning included 
appointment of "a core of administrative people for each 
community college" and hiring of teachers "at least three 
months or earlier [before opening of the college] to 
prepare the curriculum" (Progress Report, p. 43). 
The preparation of Phase One by the Board was 
influenced by the works of contemporary leaders in the 
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community college movement such as Wattenbarger and 
Martorana. Each had completed studies concerning the 
location of community colleges. Wattenbarger's work had 
been central to the establishment of Florida's two-year 
college system. 
Influenced by Wattenbarger and Martorana, the MBRCC 
determined that "for area priority A there should be a 
minimum of 1,000 high school graduates within a commuting 
radius of 20-30 miles of the community college to insure an 
enrollment of at least 400 students in the two years 
(Progress Report, p. 39). This recommendation was 
basically consistent with that of the Commission on the 
Audit of State Needs. 
Phase Two was particularly crucial to both the 
governor and to the MBRCC. Unless support could be 
generated quickly and evidenced through the local surveys, 
the two-year college program could lose its viability. 
The governor had sought to ensure grass roots support 
through creation of local advisory groups as part of 
Chapter 605. These groups, which would advise individual 
colleges as to local needs, were consistent with both 
Furcolo's commitment to "citizen participation" and his 
belief that community colleges could only survive through 
development of core groups of supporters in cities and 
towns throughout the Commonwealth. 
Pittsfield seems, at first blush, an unlikely 
contender to lead the way in meeting the criteria of the 
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Board's first three phases. A closer analysis, however, is 
illuminating. 
First, Pittsfield was home to Representative 
Wojtkowski, whose steady support had been crucial to 
passage of the community college legislation and whose 
position on the powerful Ways and Means Committee made him 
important to community college funding. Brint and Karabel 
go so far as to write that "the location of the first 
college in the relatively isolated Berkshire mountain town 
of Pittsfield discharged the Board's debt to Pittsfield's 
representative, Thomas Wojtkowski” (1989. p. 146). 
To their great credit, however, Wojtkowski and his 
allies in Pittsfield had worked diligently to enhance the 
city's status as a potential college site. For example, the 
representative had compiled data showing the need for a 
college to provide technical and transfer education in 
Pittsfield during his 1956 effort to pass community 
college legislation. 
Moreover, Wojtkowski had campaigned tirelessly to 
build local enthusiasm for a community college in 
Pittsfield and had identified a former high school in the 
downtown as a temporary site. Costello recalls that "Tom 
had compiled a great deal of data which essentially served 
as a local study. And, of course, he had worked to identify 
a temporary site" (interview, June 1, 1993). 
Sensing the prospects for a successful campus 
start-up, the MBRCC quickly sent Thomas O'Connell, a 
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consultant in its employ (and eventually the first 
president of Berkshire Community College), to meet with 
senior executives of General Electric and the Berkshire 
Eagle to push for rapid completion of the formal study 
(MBRCC Minutes). Members of the Board were also actively 
engaged in the effort to achieve success. Minutes reflect 
that Putnam and Dr. Stanley Salwak (a University of 
Massachusetts professor who served as a consultant to the 
MBRCC) encouraged local activity in the Berkshires as early 
as 1959 (MBRCC Minutes, April 22, 1959). 
Dr. Salwak stated that both he and Mr. 
Putnam had been hard at work. Both had been in 
the Pittsfield area and suggested that a pilot 
program might be set up ... In addition both he 
and Mr. Putnam met with professional and leading 
citizens of Pittsfield in order to determine 
first hand any interest in having such an 
institution in their town. They also met with 
other people in the Northern Berkshire area and 
nearly every other community and thoroughly 
discussed the need and possibility. 
Costello, who visited other communities as a 
member of the staff, recalls that it was not 
uncommon to use significant energy building local 
demand for community colleges (Costello 
interview. May 1993) 
Brint and Karabel also emphasize the role played by 
the Board in helping to create local demand for community 
colleges, particularly among businesses: 
In the local communities, the Board's promotional 
efforts were usually channeled through major 
economic interests and most often through local 
chambers of commerce. There were practical 
political reasons for this: the leading 
businessmen were often the most influential 
forces in local political affairs. If they could 
be convinced of a project's usefulness, the 
project stood a good chance of acceptance. But 
the Board also saw the economic appeal the 
college might have for employers. The colleges 
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were promoted for their potential not only to 
bring new customers to local businesses but also 
to provide better and more cheaply trained 
workers. (1989, p. 147) 
In reviewing the Berkshire study, the Board professed 
to being persuaded on at least four counts (Progress 
Report, p. 52): 
1. Pittsfield's lack of established colleges 
open to county residents and isolation from 
other areas where there are colleges. 
2. The large number of high school graduates in 
the Pittsfield area with no place to go to 
college and the resultant low college-going 
percentage and high indication of reported 
interest by present high school seniors in 
attending a community college. 
3. The availability of a rent-free building in 
Pittsfield (the Central High School) which 
could be used, with some renovation, by the 
college on a sharing basis with the 
Pittsfield School System during the 1960-61 
school year, and in its entirety by the 
college starting in September 1961. 
4. The availability in the Pittsfield area of 
qualified teachers for a wide range of 
standard and specific subjects. (p. 52) 
Furcolo and the senior members of his administration 
also saw a compelling logic in Pittsfield's candidacy to 
host the first community college. Most significant was the 
fact that the college could open quickly and enjoyed the 
support of both a significant member of the General Court 
and the backing of major local business and community 
leaders. Morissey summarized the administration's position 
many years later (videotape): 
Berkshire would not rank in the top priority of 
the state population-wise or need-wise. But they 
were spending a great deal of money in Berkshire 
County training technicians to serve the needs of 
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General Electric in that part of the state. So 
with a massive technical need in that part of the 
state and with substantial local support — from 
the Miller family, the newspapers and just about 
everybody out there was in favor of it — we went 
for an appropriation . . . 
The MBRCC was prepared by mid-1959 to recommend that a 
community college open in Pittsfield in Fall 1960 and serve 
an initial student population of 125 students. Those 
students would pay a maximum tuition of $200 and take 
classes in Central High School (MBRCC Minutes, April 22, 
1959). 
Renovations to the school were slated to come from the 
1958 capital outlay of $1 million. Still unanswered, 
however, was the question of where to find operating 
dollars for the new Ccunpus as well as how the MBRCC would 
obtain a general operating budget to sustain its operations 
and its efforts to open additional colleges. 
The administration's decision to support the MBRCC in 
its 1959 bid to secure an initial appropriation of to seed 
its efforts in Pittsfield was a critical first test of 
community college viability. The proposal immediately fell 
prey to attacks from opponents who were not prepared to 
support new spending by the MBRCC absent a fully completed 
master plan. Ultimately, despite active lobbying by the 
governor and the support of Speaker Thompson, the 
appropriation failed in 1959 on a roll call vote in the 
House (Morissey, videotape). 
The administration and the MBRCC each recognized that 
the entire community college program was in jeopardy. It 
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was critical to earn another vote on the appropriation and 
secure a victory. 
The governor turned to Boston and Maine Railroad 
General Counsel and former state senator Joseph Mulhern to 
lead the MBRCC and nail down the appropriation. Mulhern 
was considered a power on Beacon Hill who controlled a 
strong lobbying network. Mahoney points out that Furcolo 
believed Mulhern's strength in the legislature could 
neutralize opponents such as Senator William Fleming 
(R-Worcester) who continued to oppose the governor from his 
position on the Ways and Means Committee (Mahoney 
interview, July 25, 1993). Mahoney also recalls a certain 
level of amazement on the part of Mulhern as to the 
governor's intensity in pursuing him to join the Board 
(Mahoney interview, July 25, 1993). 
The governor and Mulhern agreed that the latter would 
assume the chairmanship of the MBRCC from Putnam until the 
initial appropriation could be secured. At that time, 
Mulhern would resign from the Board and re-focus on his 
other interests (Mahoney interview, July 25, 1993). 
Morissey described Mulhern as "just a good tough guy" 
who brought "some muscle to the Board" and allowed it to 
"take the appropriations process seriously" (videotape). 
He also emphasized the critical role which Mulhern played 
during his short tenure as chair (videotape): 
It was the governor's theory that once the first 
appropriation was made it would be all done, and, 
of course, he was correct. The critical vote was 
the first vote. Joe Mulhern took the job as 
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chair in December 1959 and served until summer 
1960; got the appropriation; Berkshire opened in 
Fall 1960; he resigned from the Board; and I 
became chair . . . 
The appropriation (Chapter 318 of the Acts of 1960, 
April 13,1960) which Mulhern's power helped to secure as 
part of a general supplemental funding bill in April 1960 
provided $82,950 for "the regional community college in 
Pittsfield." Most of all, it provided a critical 
foundation for subsequent appropriations to support the 
opening of other regional colleges. The first Berkshire 
appropriation appears to be a watershed in the early 
funding history of the community college program. Table 1 
provides a chronological listing of all appropriations to 
the community college board and to individual colleges 
between 1958-62. It is interesting to contrast the funding 
pattern which preceded the April 1960 appropriation with 
the pattern which followed. Before April 1960, Furcolo and 
the Board had confronted a series of hurdles in setting the 
community college program on a sound fiscal base. Other 
than the $1 million capital outlay appropriation of 1958, 
the governor and the MBRCC could point to only a single 
$25,000 appropriation for administration of the program 
which had been included as part of an April 1959 
supplemental budget (Chapter 171, Acts of 1959, April 6, 
1959). So bleak had been the prognosis for community 
college funding amid Furcolo's continuing difficulties in 
the Legislature, his sales tax defeats and his continued 
public emphasis on the Commonwealth's fiscal difficulties. 
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that the governor had not even requested additional funding 
for the MBRCC in his formal budget proposal for Fiscal Year 
1960 (House 1, January 12, 1959). Moreover, no additional 
capital dollars for community colleges were included in a 
major special outlay of September 1959, despite the fact 
that the bill ultimately included over $12 million in 
higher education projects (Chapter 604, Acts of 1959, 
September 17, 1959). 
The outlook through much of early 1960 appeared little 
rosier. The administration slashed the MBRCC's budget 
request of $200,699 to a figure of $85,521 in the 
governor's budget proposal for Fiscal Year 1961 (January 
25, 1960). Until Mulhern lifted the Berkshire 
appropriation out of the Legislature, the administration 
and the MBRCC were left to create a community college out 
of high intentions, singleness of purpose and a near-empty 
operating account. 
By contrast, two major operating appropriations and a 
significant capital appropriations followed in 1960 on the 
heels of the Berkshire vote. A general supplemental which 
passed in June included over $71,000 to support 
administration of the MBRCC and to begin development of 
colleges in metropolitan Boston as well as Northeastern and 
Southeastern sections of the Commonwealth. A second 
infusion of $83,000 in operating dollars to support the 
same ends followed in a November supplemental (Chapter 784, 
Acts of 1960). Finally, a special capital outlay bill of 
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November 1960 included an appropriation of $300,000 to 
augment the $1 million outlay of 1958 (Chapter 774, Acts of 
1960). 
Furcolo had been right; the first appropriation was 
key to provide momentum behind community college 
development. With the appropriation of April 1960, 
Berkshire became a physical and political inevitability. 
This reality, in turn, catalyzed a reaction among other 
environmental factors which ultimately led to a series of 
larger appropriations in 1961 and 1962. 
The ironic outcome of this reaction is that while 
Foster Furcolo's energy and policy focus made the community 
college program a reality, it was the far less engaged John 
Volpe whose first administration witnessed nearly $2 
million in critical new funding for two-year college 
expansion and operations. 
This irony, and the environmental factors which 
inspired it, deserve some focused discussion. Three 
factors are particularly important. First, already 
discussed, is the momentum created by the 1960 Berkshire 
appropriation. Second is the approach of Volpe whose 
surface disengagement belies a sophisticated strategic 
position. Third is the fiscal status of the Commonwealth 
which had begun to show signs of improvement by mid-1960, 
an improvement which inspired renewed interest on the part 
of legislators to spend. Fourth, arguably most important, 
is the active involvement of legislative leaders who, in 
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the face of a tangible post-Chapter 318 community college 
initiative in Pittsfield, were not to be left at the 
starting line in securing campuses for their districts. 
Fifth, there remains the role played by the MBRCC. This 
group of largely Furcolo "doers" maintained fidelity to its 
maxim that community colleges must be set in place quickly 
so as to ensure the program's long-term viability. 
Volpe 1961-62 
The conclusion of Foster Furcolo's governorship ended 
a unique period of executive branch focus on community 
college development. Never in the more than thirty years 
since has a governor dedicated such energy and emphasis to 
two-year college growth. And yet, thanks in good measure 
to his labors, community colleges have survived and grown 
in the commonwealth. 
John Volpe, as noted in Chapter VI, came to power with 
a different set of policy priorities and political 
exigencies than did his predecessor. A builder and 
self-made Republican businessman, he pursued a legacy of 
government reform and completion of major construction 
projects. Surrounded by Democratic majorities in both 
houses and facing an increasingly Democratic sentiment 
cunong voters, Volpe held a tenuous mandate. To survive 
required acute political antennae and an ability to corner 
the Democrats on difficult issues such as corruption while 
stealing their thunder on matters such as education. 
215 
Partially because of his inherently fragile position, 
Volpe's term is rich in ironies concerning the community 
college program. MBRCC minutes indicate only two meetings 
during the period 1961-62 at which senior administration 
budget officials were in attendance (as opposed to the 
regular attendance of Morissey and Mahoney during Furcolo's 
governorship). Volpe's personal papers reflect almost no 
focus on issues of community college development or 
mission. Newspaper accounts from the period rarely link 
the governor to two-year colleges and Volpe's major 
speeches only refer to community colleges in the most 
general manner. 
And yet, during his first administration, colleges 
opened in Boston, Hyannis, and Haverhill; MBRCC efforts to 
open colleges in Worcester and Greenfield intensified; and 
budget appropriations to the MBRCC and to individual 
schools increased markedly. 
The community college program which Volpe found upon 
coming to power appealed to his self-made experience as 
well as to his political instincts. The program was 
established; it was slowly developing a core of business 
support in municipalities across the Commonwealth; key 
legislators were seeking colleges for their districts; the 
budget situation was improved to the point where some 
increased spending was perceived as acceptable; Forman and 
the Globe were beginning to rumble about unmet needs. For 
all these reasons, despite his limited policy interests in 
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community colleges, Volpe had much to gain from supporting 
reasonable growth in the program and little to gain by 
standing in its way. 
Thus, it is not surprising that in their first meeting 
with the new governor on February 10, 1961, Morissey Chase, 
and Putnam found Volpe "understanding and sympathetic, 
ready to discuss the Board's problems at any time" (MBRCC 
Minutes, February 20, 1961). 
The Minutes of the MBRCC meetings during the first 
Volpe term reflect only two substantive policy interactions 
with the governor. First, on March 20, 1961, Assistant to 
the Budget Commissioner, William Bixby, met with the Board 
to relay the governor's request for consideration of a 
tuition increase. Beyond a cursory discussion and simple 
reply concerning the Board's rationale for a tuition 
consistent with other public higher education institutions, 
there is no evidence that this policy discussion continued 
beyond the next meeting. 
The second policy interaction between the governor and 
the Board came with Volpe's request for a ten-year plan 
from the MBRCC. This request came during Volpe's second 
annual address, as the pressure for an education Master 
Plan was peaking. The report presented by the Board on 
February 23, 1962 received little public notice and there 
is so evidence that it drew any extraordinary attention 
from Volpe. 
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Perhaps the most intriguing of Volpe's decisions 
concerning the Board was his willingness to leave Kermit 
Morissey as chair during his entire first term in office. 
Under Chapter 605, the governor held the right "to 
periodically appoint a chairman" (Chapter 605, Acts of 
1958). Thus, Volpe could have removed his predecessor's 
close ally from the chairmanship and offer the political 
plum to a loyal Republican. 
When Mulhern resigned following achievement of the 
community college appropriation in 1960, Furcolo was a 
soon-to-be defeated candidate for the United States Senate. 
By this time, Morissey had left the administration to 
become assistant to Brandeis President Abraham Zachar. In 
a major step toward insuring his legacy on the Board, the 
outgoing governor reached an agreement with Zachar allowing 
Morissey to assume the chairmanship. 
Immediately Morissey became the Board's lifeblood. 
Irrepressibly candid, politically sophisticated, and 
passionately committed to community colleges, he led the 
Board through the power of his personality and the strength 
of his convictions. He was Board Chair in title and chief 
executive officer in fact. 
To remove Morissey as chair would have created a 
significant vacuum in leadership of the MBRCC. With this 
loss of leadership would likely come a slowdown in 
community college expansion; a prognosis which ultimately 
failed to serve Volpe's end. Moreover, Morissey held 
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respect in both the Legislature and in the academic world. 
Volpe could work with Morissey and the governor had no 
interest in creating problems at the MBRCC which would draw 
him from more pressing issues. Again, the short-term 
rewards of replacing Morissey with a Republican loyalist 
did not outweigh the longer-term risks. 
It is interesting to note Volpe's appointments to the 
Board. The governor's appointments to the MBRCC during the 
period 1961-62, including Reverend Richard Sullivan, 
President of Stonehill College, and Northeastern President 
Asa Knowles, were serious, if also politically 
advantageous. Furcolo himself, much later, would 
acknowledge that his successors, including Volpe, 
maintained a standard of excellence in their appointments 
to the regional college board (Videotape). 
Thus in his board appointments, his willingness to 
retain Morissey as chair, and his general willingness to 
support campus expansion, Volpe kept faith with the 
community college program. In doing so, he allowed what 
was essentially a Furcolo board to continue the former 
governor's strategy of establishing campuses quickly to 
generate sustainable momentum as he remained above the fray 
concerning legislative influence over campus locations. 
The consummate irony, summarized in Table 1, is that it was 
the Volpe administration which provided the greatest early 
infusion of monetary support to develop the early campuses 
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in Haverhill, Cape Cod, Worcester and Greenfield while also 
providing additional support to Berkshire. 
On the issue of community college expansion, as with 
others in education, Volpe seemed comfortable to ride the 
wave others had created. Community colleges had developed 
a certain momentum by 1961. Money was increasingly 
available and key legislators (several with a particular 
interest in higher education) were prepared to spend it on 
visible projects in their districts. Education was a hot 
issue thanks largely to Forman and Menzies and the upcoming 
Master Planning effort. 
Volpe's strategy appears to have revolved around 
securing a place in line when credit for educational 
expansion. Community colleges ("the people's colleges") 
were on track and Volpe, who endorsed their purposes, was 
more than willing to share the limelight for their 
successes. 
The Legislature and Early Decisions Concerning Campus 
Location 
The Legislature's role in shaping the early community 
college program during the period 1961-62 has received some 
scholarly attention. Most notably. Coles and Lustberg have 
discussed the influence of key legislators in pressuring 
the Board to open campuses in specific locations. 
It is important, before discussing the legislative 
role in detail, to briefly note the environmental realities 
which help to define that role during the period in 
question. 
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First, by early in Furcolo's second term, the 
Massachusetts fiscal picture had begun to show signs of 
improvement. The national recession of the mid-1950s had 
bottomed out and employment in Massachusetts had begun to 
tick upward. Republicans had used this changing economic 
picture to their advantage in battling Furcolo's 1958 
unemployment relief bill, citing increases in employment 
numbers as well as a general improvement in the 
Commonwealth's economy. This enhanced fiscal picture was 
further confirmed by a surprising surplus at the end of 
Fiscal Year 1958 (Brint & Karabel, p. 145_). 
The Massachusetts economy was well-poised for growth 
by 1961. The nation had entered a period of sustained 
growth, which the Kennedy tax cuts would soon reinforce. 
Continued high levels of defense spending and dollars spent 
to jump-start the space program was particularly helpful to 
the Massachusetts economy with its heavy concentration of 
research universities. 
This economic growth and renewal optimism fed the most 
traditional instincts of the now Democratic Legislature. 
Influenced by an activist President whom most knew 
personally, the Democratic leadership was positioned to 
exercise its pent-up demand to private government to work 
in pursuit of a liberal social policy agenda. For young 
Democrats who were entering leadership positions such as 
Donohue, Wojtkowski, and Harrington, education was central 
to this agenda. 
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Volpe, although a Republican, was a moderate political 
temperament. A self-made man, devoid of Brahmin roots, he 
believed government had a role to play. Moreover, if he 
were to survive politically, he had to catch the wave of 
positive energy established by the nation's young 
president. These were the days of Kennedy, not Coolidge, 
and if a Republican were to succeed in Massachusetts, he 
had best represent progress. 
As the legislature and the Board pressed for community 
expansion and general reform, Volpe joined the parade. He 
pressed for hefty budget increases for the MBRCC and he 
supported each new Cconpus which the Board voted to 
establish. His support was steady, if far more understated 
than Furcolo's. Mostly he stayed out of the way, allowing 
the Legislature and the Board to fill the void. 
Funding of the community college program was the most 
obvious leverage which the legislature held in the process 
of opening the commonwealth's first community colleges. 
Debate has continued through the years as to the role 
played by legislators in determining the location of 
individual campuses and their sequence of opening. 
The few studies available which discuss the 
establishment of Massachusetts community colleges focus on 
the Legislature's role in site selection. Cole (1977) 
argues both that in a number of instances there is a direct 
relationship between participants in . . . key legislative 
roles and the location of opening dates of the community 
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colleges" (p. 2). Lustberg writes that "as we do down the 
list of foundings we find one story of political 
interference after another" (1979, p. 141). Brint and 
Karabel assert simply that "legislative influence 
contributed to these first location decisions" (citation). 
To illustrate his argument Lustberg (1979, p. 141) 
points to a chain of events related to the decision to 
establish Cape Cod Community College. The MBRCC minutes 
from its April, 1960 meeting reflect some internal debate 
as to Cape Cod's application. Between April and June, 
Lustberg points out that Senator Fleming called Roger 
Putnam threatening to delay $75,000 slated for the MBRCC 
unless the Board declared its support for community 
colleges in Cape Cod, Haverhill (represented by long-time 
Senate Ways and Means power, John Rurak) and Boston. 
Lustberg guotes Morissey as saying that Fleming further 
demanded that preparation begin for a campus in his home 
city of Worcester (thus setting in motion the process that 
led to establishment of Quinsigamond Community College in 
1963), despite Costello's difficulty in generating either 
significant local support or a donated temporary facility. 
By June of 1960, the Board had given final support to the 
Cape Cod and Boston sites and had begun the push for a 
Worcester campus. 
There is no denying that politics played a significant 
role in the locations of Massachusetts community colleges. 
Wojtkowski, in fact, once went so far as to say that "the 
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House of Representatives is the Board of Trustees of the 
community colleges” (Lustberg, 1979, p. 140). 
If one acknowledges the fact that politics played a 
substantive role in the siting process, then one must ask 
to what end? While Chapter IX will elaborate further on 
this point, it is fair to make a number of observations at 
thus juncture. 
The central thesis of Cole's 1977 paper, "The Dynamics 
of Non-Planning in the Massachusetts Community College 
System, 1958-1972" is that undue political influence was 
used to site the Commonwealth's system of colleges and that 
the influence of Senate House Ways and Means Committee 
members was particularly pervasive. 
Cole argues that a number of adverse effects resulted 
from this legislative influence. First, that it usurped 
any serious planning effort by the MBRCC, such as that 
called for both by Furcolo and by the Special Commission on 
the Audit of State Needs. In concluding her paper, she 
writes: 
As a result of the dominant role played by the 
state legislature in determining the location of 
the community college system and the order in 
which they opened, the Massachusetts community 
college system today is a collection of 
institutions located in areas which are not 
always convenient to the population centers of 
the state or to the communities where there is a 
high percentage of college-age youth not pursuing 
post secondary education. (p. 20) 
Cole further argues that in establishing the Berkshire 
campus in temporary facilities provided by Pittsfield and 
by accepting land donated by Barnstable for the permanent 
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Cape Cod college, the MBRCC set a dangerous precedent which 
limited its options concerning the locations of future 
campuses and led to formalization of Board policies 
concerning the opening of colleges in temporary space and 
the requirement that communities provide land for permanent 
campuses. As Cole summarized: 
Both these policies were based on the precedents 
set by the willingness of the City of Pittsfield 
to provide a temporary facility at no cost for 
what became the first community college in the 
system and the Town of Barnstable to give the 
land for a permanent campus for Cape Cod 
Community College, the second college opened. 
While the original legislation for the community 
college system had not specified these 
conditions, once communities set the precedents, 
the state legislature resisted appropriating 
funds for the rental of temporary facilities or 
the purchase of land for permanent campuses. 
Instead of confronting this resistance, the MBRCC 
followed the lead of the legislature and adopted 
these precedents as policies for the community 
college system. The Board's support of these 
policies extended to initiating legislation 
making it legal for communities to raise local 
taxes in order to purchase land for the Board. 
(p. 21) 
While Cole's arguments are reasoned and persuasive, 
one must reach deeper to fully analyze the politics of 
establishing the Massachusetts community college system. 
First, it is important to remember that there was no great 
early groundswell of local support in any major city or 
region behind two-year colleges. As Mahoney correctly 
recalls: 
You must remember that at first there was no 
outpouring of demand for these colleges. As 
such, we were prepared to work with anyone who 
was prepared to work with us. (Interview, July 
27, 1993) 
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Wojtkowski and Stone were ready. They offered 
arrangements that would allow early tangible results for 
the MBRCC, potentially leverage additional appropriations 
for expansion to other communities (particularly given 
Wojtkowski's and Stone's positions on the Ways and Means 
Committees of their respective houses) and repay a 
political debt for their service in passage of Chapter 605 
and the initial capital appropriation. 
Costello argues that, particularly in these early 
difficult days when the MBRCC lacked either resources or 
strong community support statewide, the Board "used" 
legislative figures to set colleges in place and to secure 
appropriations (Lustberg, 1979, p. 144). Rather than a 
club at the Board's neck, legislative pressure may in fact 
have been one of the few points of leverage by which 
Furcolo and the MBRCC could achieve the goal of rapidly 
establishing campuses. 
It also deserves note that not every legislator who 
desired a college was able to secure one. Lustberg points 
specifically to Stone's foiled attempt to establish a 
second college on the Cape (1979, p. 145) and the continued 
failure of Quincy to acquire a public community college in 
the city (1979, p. 144). Board minutes from late 1961 and 
early 1962 reflect strong and formal Board opposition to 
legislative mandates concerning college locations, most 
notably concerning bills filed by legislators from Quincy 
and Lynn calling for colleges in their cities (MBRCC 
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Minutes, December 18, 1961 and January 13, 1962). Costello 
holds that such cases are evidence that while "we certainly 
listened to what the Legislature had to say, its input was 
not always decisive." 
A final point can be made, at least in terms of the 
Board's decisions concerning Pittsfield, Cape Cod, Boston 
and Worcester. Each of these sites was an original part of 
the Audit of State Needs Master Plan. While it is true 
that the planning process was probably far less formal than 
that originally envisioned by the Commission or by Furcolo, 
the fact remains that the first three campuses opened by 
fall, 1961 did so in regions consistent with those 
identified by the Audit Commission as having need. 
Early Discussions on Mission and Philosophy: 1959-1962 
The MBRCC's focus during the period 1959-62 was 
clearly on issues of campus location and funding. 
Comparatively little time was spent on matters related to 
mission or educational philosophy. 
When issues of mission were raised, an interesting 
dichotomy appears in the Board's minutes. On the one hand, 
MBRCC members were clearly committed to developing a 
curriculum that was responsive to the labor force needs of 
local businesses. This commitment inclined the Board 
toward occupational and community service programming; an 
inclination which grew in no small part from the Board's 
quest to earn local business support. 
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On the other hand, the MBRCC was not prepared to cast 
its lot completely with an occupational program. Its 
members perceived the need for a strong liberal arts and 
transfer foundation in order to achieve academic 
credibility for the two-year colleges. Clark (1960) as 
well as Jencks and Riesman (1969) have argued that 
community colleges have traditionally lacked the capacity 
to shape their own identity in that much of their curricula 
and academic status depends on acceptance by baccalaureate 
institutions. As Brint and Karabel have summarized, this 
dependency played a role in Massachusetts: 
Given the Board's curricular preferences (for 
occupational programs), it may seem surprising 
that the colleges themselves initially 
concentrated on developing liberal arts rather 
than occupational programs. Little real 
contradiction existed, however. Key Board 
members and campus officials understood clearly 
that the legitimacy of the colleges depended on 
their acceptance as institutions of higher 
education, which meant their offering liberal 
arts courses closely resembling those offered in 
four-year colleges and universities. As Kermit 
Morissey recalled, "Liberal arts gave 
respectability—the steunp of legitimacy. The 
standards for higher education were standards of 
private colleges ... a six-week training 
program for secretaries would not have been 
regarded as higher education. The transfer part 
had to be nailed down first." (1989, p. 148) 
In order to understand this tug-of-war concerning 
mission, it is important to consider the historical context 
within which the MBRCC operated. Three points are 
particularly salient in this regard. 
First, the nation in 1958-62 stood at the height of 
the Cold War, confronting a clear and seemingly monolithic 
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foe on the world stage. This conflict framed public policy 
on almost every major federal and state issue. Sputnik had 
placed education at the center of the Cold War in 1957, 
convincing many Americans that their country's scientific 
and technical skills lagged dangerously behind those found 
in the Soviet Union. And, as Brint and Karabel summarize, 
this perception of inferiority ’’encouraged national elites 
to take a greater interest in community college vocational 
programs” (1989, p. 83). 
Second, the 1950s and 1960s witnessed an extraordinary 
growth in college enrollments due to the G.I. Bill and the 
post-war baby boom. This enrollment pressure, which 
profoundly influenced Furcolo and other political and 
educational leaders in the nation, created a demand for 
higher education that the elite universities and colleges 
neither could nor wanted to meet. The result was both a 
remarkable increase in community college enrollments and an 
intensification of the debate as to what the two-year 
college mission should be. 
Third, the 1950s and early 1960s was a period of 
relative affluence and optimism in the United States, a 
time of unequalled military and economic stature in world 
affairs. Americans generally accepted the premise that 
through hard work and innate ability, individuals from any 
social or economic strata could improve their stations. 
And despite fiscal concerns such as those expressed by 
Furcolo or outrage over the occasional political scandal. 
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there remained an underlying pre-Vietnam and pre-Watergate 
faith that government and its institutions could and should 
contribute to the public welfare in a positive way. 
The Cold War and the socio-economic forces at play in 
the United States combined to strengthen the appeal of 
community colleges. Much of this appeal was rooted in the 
notion of "meritocracy”—the principle that community 
colleges allowed access to higher education by students of 
all socio-economic classes who would, in turn, achieve at 
their maximum levels of ability. In this sorting-out 
process, community colleges would filter their most 
talented students through to baccalaureate institutions 
(who would thus be saved the pressure of potential freshmen 
banging on their doors). For the rest—the majority— 
community colleges would provide a meaningful outlet, 
allowing them to contribute to an increasingly technical 
economy that required more than basic manual skills. 
One of the leading voices for such a system was 
Harvard's James Conant, who had first argued for a 
"differentiation in higher education" in his 1948 work 
Education in a Divided World. As Brint and Karabel have 
summarized, Conant called for a higher education system 
that "was at once meritocratic and technocratic." 
Through Conant's discussion of junior colleges in 
Education in a Divided World was frcuned in the 
context of his very genuine desire to expand 
educational opportunities, his specific vision of 
community colleges emphasized that they "should 
be defined as terminal two-year colleges." While 
subscribing to the official AAJC (American 
Association of Junior Colleges) ideology that the 
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junior college should be a "comprehensive" 
institution offering college preparatory, general 
and vocational programs, his clear preference was 
for the terminal functions. (1948, p. 200) 
Conant's arg\iments and those of other like-minded 
voices combined with demographic and socio-economic 
realities in the post-war United States to influence the 
leadership of public higher education across the country. 
Brint and Karabel (1989) have summarized the debate 
concerning the two-year college mission which occurred in 
the AAJC beginning in the 1930s. By the 1950s, the 
"vocationists" (those favoring a terminal, occupational 
focus at community colleges) had gained a position of 
prominence in the junior college movement over the 
traditionalists who favored a preeminent emphasis on 
liberal arts and transfer. 
The AAJC leadership, by 1959, had essentially adopted 
the position of Koos, Conant, and others that while 
academic credibility lie in the liberal arts, it would be 
occupational programs which would provide long-term 
viability to community colleges. It would be vocational 
programs which would allow two-year colleges to emerge as a 
clearly definable identity in American education, enjoying 
the support of key constituencies such as small business. 
The influence of Conant and others can be seen in the 
so-called California Master Plan which was implemented 
under the leadership of that state's university president, 
Clark Kerr. According to Brint and Karabel, the plan was 
"widely viewed as a model in providing for both broad 
231 
public access and the maintenance of academic excellence," 
while "diverting large numbers of matriculating students 
away from the state colleges and universities" (1989, p. 
86) . 
In projecting a limitation of 41 percent by 1975 in 
the number of lower division students attending 
California's senior institutions, the Master Plan combined 
open admissions at community colleges with progressively 
restrictive criteria at the state college and universities. 
Thus was the number of lower division students in the top 
two segments limited (Brint and Karabel, 1989, p. 86). The 
goal, in the words of the plan, was to insure that "the 
best students get into the right institutions" (Quoted in 
Brint and Karabel, 1989, p. 87). Thus, by the first 
meeting of the MBRCC, the curricular emphasis of the 
national community college movement was clearly leaning 
toward occupational programs. As Brint and Karabel have 
noted, ". . .by 1959 the battles in the AAJC between the 
traditionalists and the vocationalizers were well on their 
way toward being resolved in factor of the vocational wing" 
(1989, p. 148). 
Conant and others in the forefront of the debate over 
the two-year college mission were invited to address the 
MBRCC during early 1959. On March 10, Conant and SUNY 
President Elbert K. Fretwell, Jr. spoke to the Board 
concerning the mission of two-year colleges. 
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Minutes of the meeting reflect that Conant pointed to 
California as a model system referring positively to the 
concept of a "filtering process" and saying that "the whole 
key to a good program, as in California, would be to have 
the state university play the same role" (MBRCC minutes, 
March 10, 1959). Conant also focused his remarks on "the 
terminal student", arguing that such a student "must 
develop skills in specialized fields." He further argued 
that the needs of the terminal student made it particularly 
"important to have a community college set up so that a 
student may readily commute; discover the needs of the 
area; hire a good man to run it and let him handle the 
local situation." 
Fretwell spoke of the New York experience, focusing on 
the importance of local involvement and support of two-year 
colleges. He argued that "programs are adopted not only to 
the needs of local high school graduates but also to the 
needs of the community" (MBRCC minutes, March 10, 1959). 
In subsequent months, other noted leaders in the 
educational world met with MBRCC. For example, on March 
25, S. V. Martarana (U.S. Department of Health, Education 
and Welfare) and Edmund J. Gleazer (Executive Director of 
the AAJC) participated in a panel discussion of the fifth 
meeting of the Board. Each discussed the policy role of 
the Board, various criteria to consider in locating 
campuses, the relation of two-year colleges to the 
university and the balance between transfer and terminal 
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programs. Gleazer argued that vocational and technical 
curricula were particularly important for Massachusetts 
"because of the need for a continued supply of trained 
technicians and skilled workers" (MBRCC Minutes, March 25, 
1959). 
The Board's desire to create both a credible liberal 
arts cornerstone and a strong vocational program which 
focused on the needs of local businesses is evident in its 
recommendations concerning curricula at Berkshire. 
First, the MBRCC called for "a Liberal Arts offering 
to prepare students for transfer for four-year institutions 
for their last two years": 
At first this program should be modeled carefully 
on the freshman-sophomore progrcum offerings of 
the University of Massachusetts so that 
Pittsfield Community College students who do well 
can plan to transfer to the University. This is 
not to say that all transfer students of the 
Pittsfield Community College will or should plan 
to attend the University of Massachusetts for 
their last two years. The standards of the 
Pittsfield Community College should be high 
enough to provide students who do well with the 
possibility of transferring to any one of a 
number of four-year institutions. (Progress 
Report, p. 55) 
The language of the MBRCC consistently places 
community college liberal arts progrcuns in a subservient 
position to those at four-year institutions. Standards are 
to be set by baccalaureate colleges and universities with 
two-year colleges left to appreciate the fact that senior 
institutions would consider some number of transfer 
students. As the MBRCC wrote of the University of 
Massachusetts, "there is a clear advantage to using the 
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excellent University of Massachusetts programs as a basis 
for developing the Pittsfield Community College liberal 
arts or transfer program, particularly since the University 
has expressed its willingness to take as transfer students 
in the junior year a number of those Pittsfield Community 
college graduates who do well" (Progress Report, p. 56). 
The Board envisioned a single vocational program for 
Berkshire's first year. The program would train electrical 
technicians and "would parallel the apprenticeship course 
conducted by the Pittsfield School System for tool makers 
and draftsmen for 13th and 14th year level students" 
(Progress Report, p. 56). Designed with the needs of 
General Electric clearly in mind, the electrical 
technicians program would be the first of an expanding 
number of vocational initiatives: 
The Board's plan is to increase the number of 
offerings at Pittsfield to include one or two 
more occupational programs as the need becomes 
apparent. These might be in the areas of 
mechanical (as distinct from electrical) 
technology and business (including accounting and 
secretarial courses. (Progress Report, p. 57) 
Governor Furcolo and his aides appear to have been 
satisfied to leave specific curricular discussions to the 
MBRCC. The administration's goals remained to see colleges 
start and succeed quickly, to push generally for a 
comprehensive program, to secure sufficient funding and 
local enthusiasm to set the colleges and the Board on a 
reasonably firm footing and to maintain a Board whose 
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character was one of integrity and whose predisposition was 
to action. 
MBRCC minutes and interviews indicate that Governor 
Volpe expressed no more interest in the details of mission 
than did Furcolo. The only tangible expression of any such 
interest is found in his 1962 annual address request that 
the MBRCC develop a ten-year plan. This request, however, 
came amid the push for a statewide educational master plan 
and probably grew more from political strategy than 
personal policy priority. 
The ten-year plan which the Board sent to Volpe in 
February 1962 provides a lens into the Board's long-term 
projections as to campus development, enrollment levels and 
program emphases. The report's brief discussion concerning 
programs warrants remark. This section focuses on three 
program areas in which it argues a "distinct probability 
that over the next decade the nation will experience a 
great upsurge of interest" (p. 5). 
First, the Board points to "technical-vocational 
programs with the recommendations that in areas in which 
finely equipped technological facilities do not exist under 
public auspices, these facilities should be established in 
community colleges." Second, the Board calls for emphasis 
on "shorter re-training , refresher programs, and upgrading 
programs — as required by increasing technological 
requirements and, especially, automation." Finally, the 
Board indicates the need for "general studies, as developed 
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out of the growing realization that alert men and women 
capable of voting intelligently need opportunities to keep 
abreast of the times under able and exciting teachers" (p. 
5). 
None of these three program areas relate directly to 
the traditional liberal arts transfer program. Clearly, as 
the MBRCC and the Massachusetts community college 
presidents looked to their future, they saw vocational and 
general studies courses which were rooted in local need as 
defining much of their niche. 
By 1962, then, the picture which emerges of the MBRCC 
is one of a board working to quickly establish Ccimpuses in 
key locations across the state; a board seeking to create 
demand for such campuses among critical constituencies such 
as local businesses and legislators; a board dealing with 
the many details of Ccunpus start-up; a board seeking 
increased resources to support its efforts; and a board 
beginning to deal with basic issues related to mission and 
philosophy. 
Perhaps most significantly, the MBRCC by 1962 
represents a Board whose identity and viability are each 
emerging on solid ground. Thanks to Furcolo's energy, 
commitment and focus on key matters such as appointments 
and to Volpe's willingness to endorse the Board's 
activities during the key 1961-62 period, the MBRCC had 
achieved relative stability by the time of Endicott 
Peabody's election. Furcolo's dream of a two year college 
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system, though buffeted by strong winds and somewhat 
patched together across the state, was a reality and would 
survive and grow. 
CHAPTER VIII 
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
The methodology and style of the present study owes 
much to master historians such as Neustadt, May and Burns, 
whose works set high standards of excellence in historical 
scholarship. They understand, as few others, that history 
is part story and part analysis. Story alone, while 
entertaining, lacks connections and meaning. Analysis 
alone ignores the whimsy and the varied colors which give 
historical study its context. History that enriches and 
teaches is that which molds story to analysis with words 
worthy to the task. 
The "story” of this study has centered on the 
comparative roles which two very different governors played 
in the birth and early development of the Massachusetts 
community college system. Itself intriguing, this story 
provides a snapshot of politics, personalities and 
policymaking in the commonwealth. Lessons, however, lie 
within the story and demand careful analysis. Such 
analysis encourages the conclusions and recommendations 
which characterize serious scholarship. 
Drawing these lessons has required much care and a 
heavy dose of humility. As Michelet has argued, "history 
is a reconstruction of life in its wholeness, not of the 
superficial aspects, but of the deeper, inner organic 
process" (Oates, 1984, p. 33). Successful scholarship 
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thrives in this spirit — sensitive to context; wary lest 
the values and assumptions of one era be ascribed to an 
earlier place and time; always searching for the organic 
process of an historical moment. 
This study has exaimined the gubernatorial role in the 
birth and early development of community colleges in 
Massachusetts as one piece of a deeper organic process. 
Matters of little direct connection to two-year colleges — 
matters large and small, global and national, state and 
local — shaped the context of 1957-62. In doing so, they 
also influenced the values, needs and goals of those who 
steered the early development of the commonwealth's 
community colleges. 
Neither Foster Furcolo nor John Volpe encountered 
community college development in a policy vacuum, 
unaffected by other issues, events, and personalities. Nor 
for that matter, did any member of the Massachusetts 
General Court. Only by understanding the scope and 
interplay of these issues and their effect on the key 
actors in the drama, can one hope to achieve a rich 
understanding of early community college evolution in the 
commonwealth. 
Such richness of understanding requires the capacity 
to step outside the confines of one's preconceptions and to 
engage an earlier time on its own terms. While no student 
of history can completely set aside preconceptions and 
assumptions, the most successful scholars present a moment 
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within the context of its place and time, not within a 
framework dictated by the demands of the present. 
Traditionally, study of the American governorship has 
fallen within the realm of political science. 
Distinguished scholars such as Lipson, Beyle, and Sabato 
have contributed significant studies which focused on the 
mechanics of gubernatorial power. 
This study has attempted to bring the historian's 
perspective to bear on the American governorship. Utilizing 
a case study, it has reached beyond mechanics to touch the 
deeper organic process which describes how and why two 
governors used or did not use the formal and informal 
powers of their office. 
Thus, one must analyze the lessons of Furcolo, Volpe 
and the early days of Massachusetts community colleges with 
restraint and with a sincere attempt to walk in the 
footsteps of those who shaped politics and policies in the 
commonwealth during the period in guestion. 
Hopefully, through its reliance on interviews, 
newspaper accounts and official documents of 1958-62, as 
well as through a consistent effort to recognize the 
appearance of personal preconceptions or historical bias, 
this study has engaged the period on its own terms and 
within its own context. 
Early community college development in Massachusetts 
was the product of many ingredients. The executive branch, 
under both the forceful and focused leadership of Furcolo 
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and the more passive, less committed hand of Volpe, played 
a central role in this development. It is fair to say that 
without Furcolo there would have been no Massachusetts 
community college program and that without Volpe that 
program could well have lost its momentum and quite 
possibly its prospects for long-term viability. 
History affords numerous examples of leaders who, 
during moments of supreme challenge to a cause they hold 
deep, rise to the full measure of their office. Among the 
most significant such examples in American history are 
Lincoln's strength in preservation of the Union and 
Johnson's boldness in pursuit of civil rights legislation. 
Furcolo's effort between 1958 and 1961 to create and 
sustain community colleges in Massachusetts is less 
glcunorous but still a worthy case study. Had he wavered in 
the heat of an often lonely battle or diverted his 
attention to other less controversial matters, two-year 
institutions in the commonwealth would have been aborted or 
still-born. 
It is perhaps easy in the distant passage of nearly 
four decades to ignore the extent to which Furcolo cast the 
lot of his governorship with the cause of community 
colleges. From the moment of his special message in July 
1958, he accepted the burden of personal leadership on an 
issue that lacked, at least initially, any major vocal 
constituency. 
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This moment of personal leadership, a moment in which 
Furcolo drew on the full array of direct and indirect 
powers at his disposal, is the high point of his 
administration. Though constrained by fiscal challenges 
through much of his tenure and weakened in the Legislature 
by recurrent battles over the sales tax, as well as by his 
outsider status on Beacon Hill and his ongoing problems 
with Senate President Powers, Furcolo skillfully drew on 
the formal and informal powers of his office to make the 
community college program a reality. At critical moments, 
when a governor less committed to the idea of two-year 
colleges would have wavered, Furcolo was focused and took 
the political steps necessary to keep his idea alive. 
It is also easy to minimize the substantive strategic 
foundation which supported Furcolo's efforts during the 
period in question. Massachusetts community colleges are 
not, as some would have them, simply the political outcomes 
of legislative muscle-flexing and policy ad hocracy. 
Rather, their earliest development reflects conscious 
policy choices on the part of Foster Furcolo. These 
choices, made before and after passage of Chapter 605, were 
born of three essential realities — the governor's deep 
personal commitment to community colleges, the fragile 
state of his relations with the legislature and the lack of 
any large or coherent public constituency supporting 
two-year colleges across the commonwealth. 
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The reality of Furcolo's leadership position in 
1958-1959 mitigated against any strategy which reguired 
significant time or general systemwide planning. Any such 
lengthy process would have exposed the governor's weak 
legislative position, affording his opponents multiple 
opportunities to undermine the foundation of his community 
college agenda. Moreover, were the governor to leave 
office in 1960, most likely to pursue his long-time goal of 
the United States Senate, he needed to have a sound 
governing board securely in place as well as colleges both 
operational and in the pipeline. Otherwise, an unknown 
successor would control the fate of his entire community 
college progreun. 
To succeed, Furcolo required in late 1958 a strategy 
which created momentum and a sense of credibility for 
community colleges. He also needed a strategy that would 
quickly take advantage of positive factors such as the 
gradually improving economic and fiscal situation in the 
commonwealth. In attempting to persuade the public and the 
legislature, Furcolo could not depend (as Johnson had done 
in the civil rights battle and Wallace had done in 
establishing Alabama's community colleges) on force of 
personality or fear of retribution among recalcitrant 
legislators. He had to rely instead on a strategy which 
would overcome his hurdles in the Legislature and create a 
core of public support, building momentum through moderate 
successes and partial victories. The keys to this strategy 
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were initial approval of community college legislation 
(Chapter 605) and successful establishment of a college 
quickly to confirm the program's viability. 
The Furcolo strategy of "begging, borrowing, and 
stealing" to establish campuses and build momentum also 
reflected the governor's temperament, as well as that of 
the community college board which he appointed. To have 
engaged a long, highly formalized campus planning process 
would have violated his inherent desire to do big things 
and do them quickly. The seune spirit which moved so 
rapidly to engage the sales tax issue and held so little 
time for detail was congenitally ill-suited to further 
study the implementation of his community college program. 
The Commission on the Audit of State Needs provided his 
planning framework; with passage of Chapter 605 it was time 
to establish campuses. 
Thus, Furcolo's strategic approach reflects both the 
dynamic of his political situation and the reality of his 
personality. For him to have taken any other strategic 
course in 1958-1959 would have been politically tenuous and 
personally out of character. 
Strategic choices have policy consequences, however. 
Once Furcolo accepted a strategy based on speed and 
momentum, he also accepted the implications of his decision 
- a limited initial capital outlay, encouragement of 
campuses in temporary facilities, designation of Pittsfield 
as home to the first institution and a willingness to open 
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colleges where local support could be generated rather than 
according to a fixed developmental plan. Perhaps most 
significantly, the Furcolo strategy led almost inexorably 
to strong legislative influence over decisions related to 
Ccunpus location. 
To achieve rapid successes, Furcolo had to demonstrate 
that colleges could open without permanent homes; that they 
could operate at limited cost; and that they could earn 
popular support. Berkshire's opening demonstrated that 
colleges could open on a shoestring and that local 
enthusiasm could be generated. This success, combined with 
an improving fiscal picture created a dynamic which no 
powerful legislator could ignore — a governor and MBRCC 
dependent on accessing additional state funds (and without 
a local or county funding source to turn to), state 
revenues available to appropriate and a model in place 
which enjoyed increasing support among key constituencies. 
This situation was too enticing for even a traditional 
community college foe such as Senator Fleming to ignore. 
The decision by Furcolo to emphasize rapid openings of 
colleges represents a classic political trade-off in 
democratic policymaking. To succeed in ensuring the 
short-term survival of his program and thus enhance its 
prospects for long-term survival, the Governor accepted the 
consequences of legislative influence. By 1960, the nose 
of the legislative caonel was under the community college 
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tent; that tent, however, was firmly embedded in solid 
ground. 
Furcolo made a second decision, quite possibly 
unconsciously, which affected the evolution of community 
college identity in Massachusetts. He opted to avoid 
detailed involvement in the nuances of community college 
mission, preferring instead to focus on the broad notion of 
access and on the imperative of establishing colleges 
quickly. Specifics concerning issues such as the relative 
place of transfer versus occupational progrcims were left to 
the MBRCC and, in the tone and emphasis of the governor, 
consigned to secondary importance behind getting the 
program in place. 
It is not unusual for a governor to paint policy in 
broad strokes, leaving the details of implementation to 
governing boards or experts. Rare is the successful chief 
executive who is temperamentally or professionally suited 
to embrace the details of institutional mission. What 
makes the Furcolo case interesting is that, in his rush to 
establish campuses quickly, he appointed a group of "doers" 
to the MBRCC who shared his broad vision as well as his 
impatience. The focus of both Furcolo and the MBRCC was 
clearly on campuses first, with the details to follow. 
This situation did not change under the governorship 
of John Volpe, who was even less concerned with the details 
of mission than was his predecessor. With Furcolo's board 
still essentially intact and focused on achieving viability 
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through campus development, issues related to mission 
received only limited concentrated attention. 
While this lack of deep reflection concerning mission 
is understandable and was likely inevitable within the 
context of the time, it too was not without consequences. 
The Massachusetts community college system never built an 
identity of its own during its crucial early years. As 
Brint and Karabel describe, and MBRCC minutes reflect, the 
Board generally accepted the national direction of 
community college evolution toward vocational programming 
and continued to speak of mission largely in the general 
terms of access. There was limited debate as to how the 
national community college model could best be shaped to 
fit the Massachusetts reality. Arguably, this debate has 
never occurred to the present day. 
When Furcolo turned over the gubernatorial reins to 
Volpe, the momentum behind community colleges was beginning 
to grow. Legislative influence over the process of caunpus 
location grew concomitantly and inexorably with this 
momentum. As with the Furcolo case, one should not 
underestimate the strategic underpinnings of Volpe's 
response to the situation which he inherited. 
The contrasts between Volpe and Furcolo are evident 
and have been previously documented in this study — the 
former, a moderate Republican who had made a fortune in 
construction; the second, a Democrat whose liberal 
instincts reflected the Roosevelt tradition and whose 
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expansive world view set him apart from the majority of 
political figures in Massachusetts. The similarities 
between the two men are less obvious, but are of 
significant importance to an understanding of the strategic 
decisions each made concerning the politics of community 
college development. 
The first similarity between Furcolo and Volpe is 
impossible to guantify, is subtle in its manifestations and 
relates directly to the point made above concerning mission 
development. Each, through both his life experiences and 
worldview had accepted two fundamental arguments concerning 
higher education in Massachusetts during the late 1950s and 
early 1960s — that the existing system of public colleges 
and universities were insufficient to meet the burgeoning 
demand for postsecondary training and that community 
colleges, “democracy's colleges,” were a basic part of 
correcting this situation. Furcolo and Volpe might have 
differed in their passion concerning the policy importance 
of higher education and community colleges, but nothing in 
the historical record disputes the assertion that they held 
common ground around the need to expand the public system. 
To the contrary, comments made by each concerning public 
higher education (e.g., in their respective annual 
messages) emphasized the issue of access as fundamental. 
The second similarity between Volpe and Furcolo lies 
in the basic fragility of the relationship each held with 
249 
the Legislature. Although a Democrat with majorities in 
both houses from 1958 through the end of his tenure and 
with a friendly speaker in the House, Furcolo entered the 
governorship as an outsider and (thanks in good measure to 
the sales tax imbroglio) never developed a solid working 
relationship with many in his own party. 
Volpe's difficulties with the Legislature are more 
easily understood. A Republican with no roots in elective 
office and elected by only a narrow margin, Volpe had no 
strong foundation of camaraderie in either the House or 
Senate upon which to draw in his efforts to secure passage 
of his program. Nor did he possess an electoral mandate 
with which to bludgeon the unfriendly majorities in the 
Legislature. He was, in the minds of many Democrats, an 
cdDerration to be replaced in two years by one of their own. 
To afford him victories on his legislative program, 
particularly on his anti-corruption initiatives, could only 
help to validate his governorship at the expense of the 
Democratic Party. Thus, 1961 and 1962 were remarkably 
quick legislative sessions with passage of little 
noteworthy legislation. 
Volpe appears to have employed essentially a 
three-pronged political strategy to overcome his weak 
legislative position. First, he continued to attack the 
Democrats at their Achilles heel, corruption and government 
reform. Painting Thompson and other members of the 
Democratic leadership as entrenched and self-interested. 
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the Governor succeeded in some measure of role reversal — 
he became the voice of the person in the street while the 
Democrats increasingly became caricatures of machine 
politicians who were out of touch with the values of their 
constituents. 
Second, Volpe pursued an aggressive construction 
program. Although his proposals enjoyed scattered success 
in the Legislature, his efforts on behalf of projects such 
as the Prudential Tower, the Massachusetts Turnpike 
extension and the Boston inner beltway both reflected the 
builder in his soul and presented him as an aggressive 
governor seeking tangible progress for the Commonwealth. 
Third, and most' directly related to community 
colleges, Volpe selectively jumped on the wave to support 
proposals traditionally associated with Democrats. The 
most obvious manifestation of this strategy is his response 
to a series of education issues during his first term. 
Education had traditionally been a Democratic issue in 
Massachusetts. Furcolo had championed expansion of public 
higher education, Wojtkowsi had led in the fight for 
community colleges, Harrington had become a powerful voice 
for the Commonwealth's state colleges and Donahue an 
equally resonant voice for the University of Massachusetts. 
Almost alone among major Republican figures. Stone was 
considered a leader on educational issues. As noted in 
Chapter VI, Volpe had demonstrated little evidence during 
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the early days of his governorship that education would be 
an issue of gubernatorial focus. 
The Forman and Menzies series in the Globe changed the 
parameters of the field, however. Suddenly, education had 
become a hot issue in the Commonwealth and, with Forman 
consistently turning up the heat in his columns, Volpe 
faced the prospect that Harrington, Donahue, Thompson and a 
Democratic foe in 1962 could use the issue against him if 
he failed to respond. 
During 1962, as the education reform debate began to 
percolate on Beacon Hill, Volpe coyly played for time on 
potentially controversial issues such as the proposed state 
medical school, fiscal autonomy for the University of 
Massachusetts and the master planning effort for which 
Forman and Harrington were champions. On each of these 
issues, the Governor would ultimately offer his support, 
clearly enough to earn a measure of credit in the 1962 
Ccumpaign and with enough caveats to hold the conservative 
voices in the Republican Party in check. 
The issue of community college development was subtly 
different than others Volpe faced in the educational arena. 
By 1961, Furcolo's strategy had succeeded in creating a 
momentum behind college development. Ironically, community 
colleges provided a rare issue of mutual interest between 
Volpe and the Democratic leadership. 
While none of these individuals (with the possible 
exception of Thompson) shared the deep visceral commitment 
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which had driven Furcolo, each shared at the very least an 
acceptance that community colleges were a reality and an 
acceptance of the positive potential for such institutions 
both to address the challenge of growing post-secondary 
enrollments and to provide opportunities to students of 
varied backgrounds and needs. 
Thus, as the Commonwealth's fiscal picture improved, 
it served the political interests of no major political 
figure to stall the momentum for community college 
development. To the contrary, it served the interests of 
Volpe to encourage the construction of such institutions as 
evidence of achievement in an otherwise meager legislative 
record. Similarly, as the Democratic leadership held much 
of Volpe's agenda hostage, community colleges offered an 
opportunity to deliver a tangible resource to increasingly 
receptive communities. The mutual benefits which community 
colleges offered to Volpe and to the Legislature created a 
wide pathway for the MBRCC, a pathway which the aggressive 
board followed with vigor. 
It is tempting, within the context outlined, above to 
undervalue Volpe's role in the increased pace of community 
college funding and development during 1961-1962; to argue 
that the Legislature would have funded such development no 
matter who was governor and no matter what position that 
governor assumed on the issue. While such speculation is 
tempting, it unfairly undervalues the decisions which Volpe 
253 
did make as well as those he did not make that a lesser 
governor might have made. 
Perhaps the most important decision which Volpe did 
make was to accept Morrissey as chair and spirit of the 
MBRCC. Generally, governors covet such positions as 
opportunities to reward a loyal supporter or to establish a 
policy direction. Rare is the chief executive who both 
accepts and encourages the policy intimate of his erstwhile 
rival. In avoiding confrontation with Morrissey Volpe at 
least tacitly endorsed a program which was fundamental to 
his predecessor's legacy, as well as the policy direction 
which that program had taken. To have done differently, 
would have stripped the MBRCC of its life force and its 
most powerful visionary at a critically sensitive stage in 
the history of Massachusetts community colleges. Worse 
yet, to have made a purely political choice to attack 
Morrissey, surely a temptation to a new governor surrounded 
by appointees of a different party, could have killed the 
momentum generated by Furcolo, undermined the credibility 
of the Board and even further politicized the campus 
development process. 
The second major decision which Volpe made was to 
allow the process of community college development to go 
forward with relatively little gubernatorial interference. 
It is interesting to speculate what might have happened had 
Volpe taken a more activist interest in the process; had he 
intervened to stop Democrats from securing colleges in 
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their districts, or challenged the policy of opening in 
temporary facilities, or called for a more comprehensive 
planning process. Any of these decisions would have 
affected the course of community college development. 
Arguably, given the state of Volpe's legislative 
relations and the still tenuous status of community 
colleges, it is highly possible that such decisions would 
have led to stalemate and to loss of momentum. Given 
Volpe's lack of apparent policy emphasis on community 
colleges, Thompson's growing problems in the House and 
Wojtkowski's increasing difficulties with the leadership, 
two-year institutions would have faced this loss of 
momentum without a resonant voice in government. At the 
very least, Morrissey and the Board would have had to 
significant energy to re-establish their position. 
One can argue what chain of events might have ensued 
had Volpe chosen to play a more activist role. The fact 
remains, however, that he chose not to step into the fray 
and that the Furcolo strategy of speed and momentum 
continued to drive policy during the first Volpe 
administration. 
As the basic Furcolo strategy of community college 
development carried forward into the first Volpe term, so 
too did the policy consequences of that strategy. Colleges 
continued to open in temporary facilities and the 
Legislature continued to influence decisions concerning 
Ccunpus locations. 
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Chapter VII summarizes the arguments of scholars who 
criticize the influence which legislators brought to bear 
on campus development. While these arguments are in some 
measure persuasive, it is the opinion of this author that 
they hold the Massachusetts case to an unrealistic 
standard. 
First, they fail to recognize the strategic 
imperatives which forced a weakened Governor Furcolo to 
pursue a strategy of speed and momentum. To have opted for 
any other strategy in the context of his time would have 
likely doomed tangible campus development before the 
election of 1960, thus leaving the future of two-year 
institutions to a very uncertain future. 
Second, they fail to consider the position of Governor 
Volpe. Also the victim of a weak legislative position, 
Volpe effectively assumed Furcolo's strategy concerning 
campus development. Had he chosen any other course, 
momentum behind community colleges would likely have 
shifted, funding would have been threatened and the process 
even more politicized. 
Third, critics of the Legislature's role in the 
development of Massachusetts fail to acknowledge that other 
states faced similar situations in the development of their 
systems. Wattenbarger (interview, April 1994), for 
example, recalls that the earliest community colleges in 
Florida developed in rural areas due to the influence of 
individual legislators and Katsinas (1993, p. 2) describes 
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the situation in Alabama as one in which "two thirds of 
the eventual 41 system institutions were placed in the 
southern third of the state, a reflection of the rural 
power base in the state's political system . . (p. 2). 
Fourth, critics fail to recognize the extent of 
planning that did occur concerning community college 
development in the Commonwealth. Dating back to the Zook 
Report, numerable studies had taken place which analyzed 
the need for two-year institutions in specific regions of 
Massachusetts. Most notably, the Commission on the Audit 
of State Needs provides a fairly well-documented 
articulation of regional needs for such institutions. 
Finally, while admittedly pushed by an anxious MBRCC, the 
local studies prepared in each prospective college 
community, did provide important insights as to level of 
need and support. It should further be noted that such 
local studies were also a cornerstone of planning in 
Florida, a state recognized for the excellence of its 
two-year college system. 
Contemporary literature concerning the evolution of 
America's community colleges tends to focus either on the 
sociological foundations of such institutions (e.g., Clark, 
Zwerling, Brint, & Karabel) or on the essentially 
chronological presentation of data, personalities and dates 
(e.g., Monroe, Cohen, & Brawer, Witt et al). The role of 
politics, the inherently messy and human face of 
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policymaking, has been comparatively ignored (Katsinas 
standing as a notable exception). 
To ignore the political dimension is to invite an 
artificially antiseptic view of policy development, a sense 
that rational decision making based on clearly presentable 
models is not only possible but to be expected. For 
example, Brint and Karabel fail to incorporate the 
political dynamic into their presentation of an 
"institutional” model of mission evolution in Massachusetts 
community colleges. Coles recognizes a political dynamic 
in her study of Ccunpus planning, but only to criticize its 
inappropriateness; as though in a better world politics 
would remain discretely beyond the field of policy 
decisions. 
This study proceeds from a very different perspective 
— that politics and policymaking are inherently linked. 
Any attempt to divorce one from the other, to create a 
pristine policymaking environment, denies a fundamental 
reality of the democratic process and unfairly diminishes 
the human character of policy development. 
It is impossible to remove politics from policymaking. 
Particularly in a situation of gubernatorial vulnerability, 
legislative bodies will assume greater policy influence. 
When this occurs, the process inevitably becomes more 
messy, as multiple legislators jockey for position. 
In a democracy, it seems fair to judge the role of 
politics in policymaking against a long-term standard of 
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outcomes rather than against a standard of purity in 
apolitical planning. In 1994, fifteen community colleges 
serve over 75,000 students in Massachusetts. While 
political influence led to campuses in communities of 
arguably less need, the fact remains that over time each 
region identified in both the Zook Report and the report of 
the Commission on the Audit of State Needs received a 
campus. Despite a lack of intense or focused debate 
concerning mission, the system has evolved, with each 
institution finding its own identity in the community it 
serves. For all its admitted compromises, and limitations, 
the Furcolo strategy of speed and momentum — a strategy 
essentially assumed by Volpe — set the foundation for a 
viable community college system. In the final analysis, 
therefore, this author believes that both Furcolo and Volpe 
deserve history's acknowledgment for the positive role each 
played in the early development of community colleges in 
Massachusetts. 
General Lessons for Contemporary Governors 
The Furcolo and Volpe case studies offer innumerable 
examples of how two individuals of different backgrounds, 
temperaments and parties drew on the powers of their office 
to secure passage of their programs. Chapters V-VIII 
describe these cases in detail. 
The purpose of analyzing these studies has not been to 
provide a "how-to” primer for contemporary governors. Each 
governor must lead in a particular time and place. 
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confronting challenges in a specific context for which 
history offers no perfect template. 
There are, however, certain overarching lessons that 
today's governors can draw from the experiences of Furcolo 
and Volpe. 
The Furcolo case reconfirms that an activist governor 
in Massachusetts, even when hcimpered by strained 
legislative relations, holds enormous formal and informal 
authority. When a governor applies the full measure of his 
or her office to a cause, he or she draws on a powerful 
armada. The capacity of a governor to set the tone of 
public debate, to play off the goals and needs of 
individual legislators and to build key alliances in the 
community is profound. Only in rare cases does a governor 
care so deeply as to employ the full force of his arsenal. 
The Furcolo effort in support of community colleges offers 
one such example. 
Perhaps the most useful lesson of the Furcolo case for 
today's governor is that provided by the care which he 
brought to appointment of the MBRCC. The power of 
appointment is one of the most important which falls to any 
chief executive. Furcolo exercised this power with 
restraint, vision and integrity. The personal attention 
which he applied to defining the Board in Chapter 605 as 
well as the energy he applied to appointment of a Board 
which shared his broad vision and his passion insured that 
his influence would live long beyond his administration. 
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This author believes that the definition which Furcolo 
provided to the Board and the seriousness which he brought 
to its appointment is his greatest legacy to the community 
college movement in Massachusetts. It offers a standard 
which any governor could emulate. 
The activism of the MBRCC in the years following its 
creation also provides ample evidence of the potential 
power which a governing body can employ. The regional 
community college board became in many ways a 
"semi-hierarchy" of the sort described by Zusman, dependant 
on the governor and legislature for funding, but a driving 
force in the pace of college development. 
The Volpe case offers a somewhat different lesson for 
today's governors. When a chief executive assumes power 
from a governor of another party, there is an extraordinary 
human temptation to cast aside fundamental elements of that 
predecessor's program as inherently flawed. Volpe chose, 
for the strategic reasons enumerated above and because he 
saw the worth in Furcolo's initiative, to support community 
college development. Such choices deserve notice, both for 
their strategic significance and for the policy openness 
they represent. 
This case study also reminds contemporary governors 
that every strategic choice has policy implications which 
extend beyond the moment of decision and beyond the narrow 
issue at hand. No decision is made in a vacuum or without 
downside risk. For example, Furcolo's decision to pursue 
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campuses before mission and Volpe's decision to endorse the 
efforts of Furcolo's board each had long-term implications 
for the system. This study has concluded that the 
long-term benefits of securing and sustaining a community 
college system in the Commonwealth outweighed the downside 
effects of limited substantive debate concerning mission. 
For today's governor, the "lesson" may lie less in the 
details of what Furcolo or Volpe did or did not do 
concerning community colleges, but in the reality that the 
choices they made have affected the identity of community 
colleges in Massachusetts to the present day. 
Opportunities for Future Research 
The Furcolo and Volpe case studies also provide the 
foundation for further important research. A number of 
studies warrant particular attention. 
First, the present study offers only a first look at 
gubernatorial policymaking concerning community colleges in 
Massachusetts. Eight administrations and six governors 
have followed since 1962. Each governor brought his own 
set of priorities and goals to the corner office on Beacon 
Hill. Each also confronted opportunities, challenges, and 
political realities unique to his time and place. Each of 
these administrations deserves analysis within its own 
context so that eventually a holistic picture of governors 
and community colleges in Massachusetts will develop. 
Second, this research should be extended to other 
states where the mechanics of government and the community 
262 
college identity are different. Such research would 
provide an interesting opportunity to add significantly to 
both the literature concerning the American governorship 
and the politics of community college development. 
Third, it is hoped that his research will inspire 
others to use the case study method to examine how 
governors have influenced policy development in a number of 
areas beyond community colleges and higher education. 
Chapter II notes that case studies have been used 
successfully by Neustadt and others to examine politics and 
policymaking. These efforts should be extended and 
contrasts between cases and contexts should be encouraged. 
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APPENDIX A 
INTERVIEWS 
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Date Interviewee 
Daniel Asqunio 
David Bartley 
Steven Brint 
Theodore Chase 
John Costello 
Maurice Donahue 
William Dwyer 
Foster Furcolo 
Kevin Harrington 
James Wattenbarger 
Thomas Wojtkowski 
Title/Affiliation 
President, Mt. Wachusetts 
President, Holyoke Community 
College; 
Former Speaker of Massachusetts 
House of Representatives 
Author, The Diverted Dreeun 
Former Chair of Massachusetts 
Board of Regional Community 
Colleges 
Former member of the Massachusetts 
Board of Regional Community 
Colleges Staff 
Former President of Massachusetts 
Senate 
Former Executive Director of 
Massachusetts Board of Regional 
Community Colleges 
Former Governor, Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts 
Consultant; former President of 
Massachusetts Senate 
Distinguished Professor Emeritus 
at University of Florida 
Counsel, Massachusetts House of 
Representatives; former member of 
Massachusetts House 
10/20/90 
11/26/90 
11/15/90 
07/20/90 
06/01/92 
08/25/93 
07/18/93 
10/15/88 
08/18/93 
04/05/94 
05/10/91 
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